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 Abstract
This study analyses inter-organisational coordination among various departments at the local level 
administration in Bangladesh.  Unlike solo dance,  efficient coordination is  not achieved through 
individual action. Rather, it must be orchestrated through collective efforts towards a common goal. 
In  this  context,  the  objectives  of  this  study  are:  to  explore  and  identify  the  factors  affecting 
coordination  among  various  departments  involved  in  policy  implementation  in  an  upazila; to 
determine  the  factors  that  cause  coordination  problems;  and  to  identify  and  examine  the 
determinants  that  can  make a  difference in  the extent  to  which  coordination is  achieved in  an 
upazila. This study reveals that the issue of inter-departmental coordination has neither been an 
ends  of  public  administration,  nor  a  means  of  policy  implementation  at  the  local  level 
administration in Bangladesh. This is because although ensuring inter-departmental coordination is 
a sine qua non when policy is implemented by several departments, inter-departmental coordination 
suffers form the lack of clear division of labour, resources (financial and manpower), and regular 
communication,  which  takes  place  informally  among  departments  involved  in  policy 
implementation in an upazila. Moreover, the persistence of a colonial legacy in the civil service has 
led to different organisational cultures among different cadres of civil service, particularly between 
the generalists and the specialists. This issue is also contributory to coordination problems. Thus, 
the author concludes that coordination has not been a philosopher’s stone of public administration 
in Bangladesh; what has become important to civil servants is the completion of assigned functions 
perfunctorily. Thus, the issue of inter-departmental coordination can be exemplified by the highly 
individualistic approach of civil servants in carrying out their respective tasks. As a result, policy 
implementation is delayed, time and resources are wasted, and quality is compromised. 
xi
  
1Chapter One
Introductory Discussion
1.1. Introduction
‘Good coordination is nearly invisible, and we sometimes notice 
coordination most clearly when it is lacking’.
Malone and Crowston (1994)
The purpose of this study is to analyse inter-organisational coordination among departments at the 
local level in Bangladesh1. Several departments, such as political2 organisations and field agencies3 
of the central government, exist at the local level. There is a striving need for coordination among 
these departments for nation building purposes. Thus,  the following relevant questions arise: (1) 
what is the state of inter-departmental coordination among these departments? and (2) if the lack of 
inter-departmental coordination is the problem, what factors explain this paucity? In order to answer 
these questions, the implementation process of the ‘rural infrastructure development policy’4 of the 
government in Bangladesh is examined by focusing on the aspects of policy implementation, which 
will be discussed subsequently. Does coordination matter while various departments are involved in 
policy implementation? What kinds of problems occur during policy implementation when inter-
departmental  coordination  does  not  take  place  properly  and  what  factors  affect  such 
implementation? These are some of the questions that will be discussed in this paper. 
Field agencies of the central government found at the local level do not belong to a single chain of 
command;  rather  they have different  individual  identities  and operate  under  different  chains  of 
command. Despite performing more or less self-contained tasks, no agency or department found at 
the local level can always work in isolation from others (Zafarullah, 1998: 96). Rather, they must 
interact with others outside their scope of operations. Given that issues such as technical knowledge 
and expertise, funds required for the efficient implementation of policies are held in possession of 
and controlled by various departments, there is an indispensable need for cooperation from each 
other  while  the  policy  is  implemented  by  multiple  departments.  Moreover,  there  must  exist 
coordination  in  order  to  improve  the  ways  with  which  policy  implementation  takes  place 
successfully. 
1 Bangladesh, a South Asian Country, gained its independence in 1971 after a war against Pakistan which lasted for 
nine months.  More than 150 million people live in its total land area of 1,44,000 sq. km. 
2 It refers to local government institutions.
3 Field  agencies  are  the  extension  offices  of  different  ministries,  divisions,  and  some  autonomous  and  semi-
autonomous bodies.
4 Such a policy is made for the development of rural infrastructure, including concrete roads, bridge, and so on.
2In the case of policy implementation involving multiple organisations, this specific task is assigned 
to  the  organisations  involved.  To  achieve  policy  objectives,  the  implementation  functions 
independently performed by different organisations and agencies must be coordinated. Here, policy 
implementation refers to the task of promulgating and applying the rural infrastructure development 
objectives of the government. Rural infrastructure development policy is one under which different 
types of infrastructure development activities, including construction of culverts, bridges, roads, and 
union parishad5 complex in rural areas in Bangladesh are carried out. The implementation of this 
policy takes place through the office of the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED)6 
located at upazilas7 consisting of one engineer, one assistant engineer, two sub-assistant engineers, 
and some other officials (http://www.lged.gov.bd/about_lged/lged_org.htm). 
The importance of coordination came up during the ‘field administration’8 in Bangladesh, during 
which  the  government  established  several  local-level  field  agencies  with  delegated  power  and 
authority,  which  is  aimed at  providing  services  to  the  local  people  more  effectively.  However, 
ensuring  coordination  among  organisations  is  a  difficult  task.  According  to  Pressman  and 
Wildavsky ‘Much more has been said about coordination than actually has been done about it, and 
coordination  remains  a  principal  ‘‘philosophers’  stone’’ in  the  analysis  of  good  public 
administration?’ (Jennings  and Crane,  1994,  cited  in  Peters,  2006:  115).  When  coordination  is 
considered in this sense, questions such as ‘What happens to the issue of coordination?’ and ‘How 
does coordination take place among field level agencies in Bangladesh?’ can be raised.
1.2. Statement of the problem
‘Everyone is for coordination, but no one wishes to be coordinated, 
at least not just now’.
                Jon Bennett (2000)
Six bridges in the Joypurhat District became unfit for transportation. In 2006, around Tk 
2 Crore (US $ 285714) were allocated from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) for the 
reconstruction  of  one  bridge.  Due  to  problems  associated  with  the  process  of  land 
acquisition, the Roads and Highways Department did not start the reconstruction right 
away despite a specific deadline that had been set. As a result, the ADB withdrew the 
total amount of money it had allocated (The Daily Prothom Alo, 26.02.2008). 
5 Union parishad is the lowest tier of local government in Bangladesh, and is the only segment directly elected by the 
people.
6 LGED is  a  department  with a  pivotal  role  in  rural  infrastructure  development;  it  works  under  the  control  and 
guidance of the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives.
7 Upazila refers to a sub-district, one of the units of field administration in Bangladesh.
8 Sub-national administration stationed away from the center and comprised of four tiers scattered throughout the 
country,  with  numerous  departments  or  agencies  of  the  central  government  to  carry  on  the  business  of  the 
government within the easy reach of the people.
3Such  functional  gap  in  policy  implementation  is  a  symptom  of  problems  associated  with 
authenticating  lines  of  responsibility,  conflicts  among  departments  involved,  standardization  of 
work packages, and perhaps the most critical, the quality of relationships among the departments. 
Together,  these problems in policy implementation are taken into account for the lack of inter-
departmental coordination. Coordination is a multidimensional activity which takes place among a 
number of  actors  across  a  range  of  activities  (Sommers,  2000:  4).  Coordination  has  become a 
complex and crucial issue required both for daily operations as well as for policy implementation 
(Panday,  2006:  2).  However,  the  most  critical  problem  in  policy  implementation  in  field 
administration in Bangladesh is coordination, as the above account reveals.
1.2.1. Coordination at the upazila level
In the case of upazilas, there are a plethora of departments that must interact in order to implement a 
policy. Thus, there is a need for coordination in their activities. Accordingly, the government has 
established  an  elaborate  administrative  set-up  to  facilitate  coordination  in  the  implementation 
phases of the policy, but the policy is implemented without ensuring necessary coordination among 
the departments supposedly involved. What is the extent to which coordination is achieved? If there 
is poor coordination, to what can we attribute this phenomenon? 
Recent evidence shows that the government has expressed serious concern over the problem of 
coordination in the implementation of development policies or projects at both the national and 
local  levels.  Poor  coordination  among  the  departments  has  caused  the  delays  of  policy 
implementation and thereby the non-utility of allocated funds. Therefore, the government has taken 
initiatives  to  ensure  the  timely  implementation  of  its  development  projects  under  the  Annual 
Development  Programme  (ADP9)  (The  Bangladesh  Today,  29.09.2009).  The  state  Minister-in- 
Charge of the Local Government, Rural Development, and Cooperatives (LGRD&C)10 has recently 
pointed out that the LGRD&C is implementing different projects across the country to address the 
suffering  of  about  two million  poor  people;  several  ministries  and  their  field  level  offices  are 
involved in the implementation of those projects. However, no significant breakthrough to alleviate 
the conditions of the poor people has been achieved to date due to inadequate coordination among 
different ministries and their offices at the field level. The state minister has also added that in the 
absence  of  coordination,  the  performance  of  other  ministries  and  their  field  offices  is  not 
satisfactory at all (The Bangladesh Today, 11. 11. 2009). In addition, there is a lack of clear rules, 
9 ADP is the public sector development budget through which funds are allocated for various projects.
10 LGRD&C  refers  to  a  ministry  in  Bangladesh,  which  elaborately  is  known  as  Local  Government,  Rural 
Development, and Cooperatives.
4circulars,  and  instructions  specifying  the  relationship  among  departments  at  the  upazila  level. 
Unclear  and  unspecified  circulars  and  instructions  regarding  inter-relationships  of  departments 
impede coordination. The following example is a clear evidence of the lack of coordination. In this 
given situation, the question is to what extent coordination should take place.
In the case of agriculture, Upazila Agriculture Officer (UAO) is the functional head at 
the  upazila  level  and  is  responsible  for  coordinating  the  functions  with  regard  to 
agriculture.  In  reality,  officer  in  charge  of  Bangladesh  Agricultural  Development 
Corporation  (BADC) as  an  agricultural  input  distribution  wing is  reluctant  to  work 
under UAO due to lack of clear-cut instructions concerning their relations. This kind of 
lack of instructions has led to a serious dispute between the UAO and his counterparts 
in the BADC over the distribution of inputs which has affected the carrying out of their 
functions (Obaidullah, 1999: 118).
Furthermore, the shortage of required officers has created problems in ensuring coordination among 
departments in upazilas. The issue of coordination comes up when the policy is implemented by 
multiple departments as there is dependency among departments involved. In inter-departmental 
activities,  one  department  is  dependent  on  another,  and  coordination  is  achieved  when  each 
department performs its respective function properly.  Some of the relevant questions include: (1) 
how is  the respective functions assigned to department involved in inter-departmental  activities 
accomplished,  if post  of the officer in charge of department involved is empty? (2) how is the 
respective function assigned to department involved in inter-departmental activities accomplished 
properly, when an officer beside own takes over the responsibilities of more than one office or 
department  because  of  a  shortage  of  officers?  Evidence  shows  that  upazila  administration  is 
bothered by the lack of coordination in inter-departmental activities as many key posts are vacant. 
In this respect, the example below is an obvious sign of the lack of coordination in upazilas. In the 
given situation, the question ‘To what extent should coordination take place’ can further be raised.
In the case of the implementation of rural infrastructure development policy or project, 
the  office  of  the  Assistant  Commissioner,  Land  (AC  Land)11 is  one  of  the  offices 
involved. The issue of coordination has become problematic due to the shortage of AC 
Land in upazilas. There is AC Land in each upazila, and the total number of AC Lands 
in Bangladesh is 476, among which, only 73 posts are currently occupied while the rest 
have long been vacant. Moreover, the AC Land of an upazila is also working in up to 
four other upazilas. In some cases, Upazila Nirbahi (executive) Officers (UNO12) work 
as AC Land, despite being higher in rank. At times, the functions assigned to the office 
of AC Land are accomplished without prior consultation with AC Land. Consequently, 
11 An  AC  Land  is  a  junior  level  civil  servant  who  belongs  to  the  administration  cadre  in  the  civil  service  of 
Bangladesh.
12 The  Upazila  Nirbahi  Officer  (UNO)  is  the  chief  executive  officer  in  upazila,  and  is  also  a  member  of  the 
administration cadre of civil service in Bangladesh. UNO is a senior assistant secretary (mid-ranking officer) in 
status. 
5problems arise in the midst of the accomplishment of functions as a result of the lack of 
coordination (The Prothom Alo, 24.07.2009). Evidence shows that despite being posted 
in an upazila, one sub-registrar13 is working in other four upazilas at a time due to not 
being posted sub-registrar in other four upazilas (The Prothom Alo, 22.10.2009). 
1.3. Significance of the study
Over the years, studies on coordination have been conducted both on international and national 
levels.  Among  others,  Mintzberg  (1979)  analysed  coordination  from  the  intra-organisational 
perspective,  while  Christensen  and Lægreid  (2008)  analysed  coordination  from both  intra-  and 
inter-organisational  perspectives.  In  the  context  of  Bangladesh,  Panday  (2004)  analysed 
coordination and its impact on the policy implementation and urban governance. Shahnaz Khan 
(1995) analysed coordination in terms of credit management and linkage among agencies involved. 
Despite some good studies on coordination in Bangladesh, research on how and why coordination 
has become problematic in field administration and how the lack of coordination affects policy 
implementation is hardly available. This research aims to shed light on these issues.
In  addition,  research  on  coordination  problem  is  not  only  involved  with  successful  policy 
implementation, but may also help seek answers to some unresolved questions with regard to the 
causes of problems pertaining to  coordination.  In turn,  this  study may not  only be remedy for 
ensuring  sound  coordination,  but  can  also  resolve  other  issues  in  public  administration.  For 
example, conflict among the civil servants may be a problem of coordination and an unhealthy 
situation may prevail in civil service because of such conflict. The lack of healthy atmosphere, in 
turn, may lead to a failure of the initiatives taken by the government in nation building. In this light, 
the present study may help identify those factors causing such conflicts.
Given that the present research is concerned with the mapping of coordination problems in field 
administration in Bangladesh, the main objective of this research is to explore and identify those 
factors  that  affect  coordination.  The  lack  of  coordination  among departments  causes  delays  in 
policy implementation,  and  the  situation  becomes  worse  when  the  implementation  depends  on 
foreign funds. In the case of foreign or donor funding policies, policy implementation may stop 
half-way when it  exceeds the deadline.  The release of funds at  different phases requires timely 
execution of the previous phase, thereby causing the stoppage. In this regard, Bangladesh is faced 
with acute problems because of its extreme dependency on foreign funds. However, timely policy 
implementation is assured when coordination among departments exists. 
13 Sub-registrar is the officer in charge of the sub-registrar’s office at  the upazila level.  He is responsible for the 
registration of documents related to the land.
6Furthermore, the government’s  success is rooted in accurate policy implementation that, in turn, 
fully  depends  on  sound  coordination  among  the  government  agencies  involved.  Nonetheless, 
despite  the  availability  and  adequacy  of  required  components,  the  implementation  cannot  be 
successful unless coordination among those involved takes place. 
1.4. Research objectives
Successful  policy  implementation  largely  depends  on  the  degree  to  which  coordination  in 
implementation activities is achieved. Coordination can be compared to an orchestra, in which a 
collective effort  is indispensable in achieving a common goal. The lack of coordination leads to 
delays in policy implementation, causing wastage of resources and time. Thus, the present study 
intends to address the following objectives:
1.  To  explore  and  identify  the  factors  affecting  coordination  among  various  departments  in 
upazila involved in executing policies or projects of the government;
2.  To make an inquiry as to why problems of coordination take place among various departments 
in upazila; and
3.  To  identify  and  examine  those  factors  that  can  make  difference  in  the  extent  to  which 
coordination is achieved in upazila.
1.5. Research questions
The main objective of this study is to explore and identify those factors that affect coordination and 
identify the causes of the problems of coordination among various departments at the local level in 
Bangladesh. In order to explore information in this regard, the following research questions are 
addressed:
1. How and to what extent is coordination taking place among various departments to facilitate 
policy implementation?
2. What happens to coordination when there is lack of formal division of labour?
3. How does informal communication among departments involved in policy implementation 
facilitate coordination?
74. How do resources contribute to coordination?   
5. Does colonial legacy in public administration lead to different organisational cultures in civil 
service,  such  as  those  between  generalist14 and  specialist15 cadres,  given  that  cultural 
incompatibility may impede coordination between the generalist and the specialist?
1.6. Scope of the study
In upazilas, various departments are somehow interrelated in facilitating policy implementation. 
Interrelationship is developed on the necessity of having dependency on each other to get things 
done. The success of the efforts of departments depends on the extent to which coordination in their 
activities is achieved. In this connection, it is important to ascertain whether coordination exists in 
various  departments  involved  in  policy  implementation.  To  do  so,  one  upazila,  namely 
Shadullapur16 as an area of study, is selected,  after  which the Rural Infrastructure Development 
Policy of the Government, as implemented by the office of the LGED in Upazila, is chosen as an 
area  of  policy for  this  study.  In  order  to  examine the  effects  of  the lack  of  inter-departmental 
coordination  on  policy  implementation,  some  respondents  with  direct  involvement  in  the 
implementation process of rural infrastructure development policy were interviewed while others 
(e.g., chairman17 of the upazila parishad18 (UPZ), chairman19 of the union parishad, and the general 
public) were interviewed with the aim of exploring information in getting overall picture on the 
issue of the problems of coordination in upazila. 
1.7. Unit of analysis
The present study is based on qualitative research and the unit of analysis is an upazila. Bangladesh 
is administratively divided into two levels: national20 or central administration and local or field 
administration.  Field  administration  consists  of  6  divisions21,  64  districts22,  and  482  upazilas. 
Various government departments or agencies have their own offices in field administration through 
14 Officers who are mainly educated in liberal arts and social sciences and are members of the administration cadre of 
Bangladesh civil service have the secretarial status.
15 Those who are basically known as technical  officers,  such as doctors,  engineers,  and those whose professional 
expertise is developed based on a particular field of knowledge like medicine, engineering, agriculture
16 A town in Bangladesh.
17 Representative of upazila  elected by the adult population of the upazila
18 Another tier of local government in Bangladesh
19 Representative of the union elected by the adult franchise of the union.
20 The secretariat consisting of all ministries; all policy decisions are made in this level.
21 Division is the highest tier in field administration in Bangladesh and is headed by a commissioner with the status of 
a joint secretary of the government. 
22 One of the tiers of field administration lying in between the division and the upazila level; a mid-ranking generalist 
bureaucrat (deputy secretary in status) who is also the chief executive of a district.
8which government policies or projects are implemented.
Districts in Bangladesh are divided into sub-districts or upazilas, with the latter being the lowest 
level of administrative government. By average, each upazila consists of 9 unions, a population of 
around 300,000, and an area of around 320 square kilometers. Upazila is headed by a junior-level 
civil servant of the administration cadre, assisted by a large number of officials appointed by the 
central government (Islam, 2006). There are 18 departments of the central government in an upazila 
(Ahmed, 1991: 31), 12 departments of which are regarded as nation building departments, including 
the  departments  of  agriculture,  fisheries,  education,  health  and  family  planning,  and  so  forth. 
Nonetheless,  despite an upazila’s legal and administrative framework for ensuring coordination, 
there has been lack of coordination in the activities of various departments within it (Ahmed, 1991: 
26). 
In terms of its geographical area, Shadullapur upazila is a bit smaller than the average ones. With 
eleven unions to its credit, this upazila is even larger than the average ones in terms of the number 
of unions. According to the 1991 Census, the total population of this upazila is 243,012 among 
which males and females constitute 54.4 % and 49.6 %, respectively, and its total area is 227.97 
square  kilometres  (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sadullapur_Upazila).  Each  upazila  is  run  by  a 
council called the Upazila Parishad, headed by a chairman elected by the adult franchise of the 
entire upazila. Basically, this unit consists of representative members including the chairman and 
vice-chairman, the chairman of the Union Parishad, as well as the mayor of the pourashava (if any 
exists)  and government  officials  posted  at  the  upazila.  Since  Bangladesh  is  a  unitary state,  an 
upazila bears more importance in the system of local governance as an outcome of political and 
administrative  decentralization.  Therefore,  the  upazilas  have  become  a  focal  point  of  all 
development activities. Basically, there are two types of functions in the upazila: one is retained or 
regulatory,  and  the  other  is  transferred  functions.  The  former  is  controlled  by  the  UNO  as  a 
representative of central government and the latter is placed at the disposal of the local government 
at the upazila level. Discussion with regard to local governance is further made in details in Chapter 
Four. Existing structures of local government and field administration in Bangladesh are illustrated 
in Figures 1 and 2, respectively.
             
9                      Figure 1                                                                Figure 2
            
Source: Author.
1.8. Structure of the thesis
This thesis is composed of seven chapters, each of which contains short discussions here.
Chapter One: Introductory Discussion- an overview of the discussion that deals with research 
problem, significance of the study, research objectives, research questions, scope of the study, unit 
of analysis, and structure of the thesis.
Chapter Two: Theoretical and Conceptual Framework- discusses dependent and independent 
variables and their relationship. A theoretical framework for this study through a brief overview of 
literature for conceptualizing the relationship between dependent and independent variables is also 
presented in this chapter. 
Chapter Three: Methodology- an attempt to employ various methodological approaches used in 
this study. Why various methodological approaches used were appropriate for this study, how such 
usages were justified over others, and how these were incorporated in this study are also discussed 
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in this chapter.
Chapter Four: Development of Field Administration in Bangladesh: Pendulous or Static?- 
provides a brief historical background and the present status of field administration as well as a 
short discussion about the system of local governance in Bangladesh.
Chapter Five: Factors Affecting Inter-departmental  Coordination-  presents  the analysis  of 
primary as well as secondary data on three independent variables (i.e., formal division of labour, 
resources,  and  informal  communication).  Discussions  on  why  inter-departmental  coordination 
matters when multiple departments are involved in policy implementation and how and to what 
extent formal division of labour, resources, and informal communication affect coordination are 
dealt with in this chapter as well.
Chapter Six: Inter-departmental  Coordination:  The  Role  of  Organisational  Culture- the 
analysis  of  primary  as  well  as  secondary  data  on  another  independent  variable,  such  as 
organisational culture. In this chapter, attempts are made to analyse the process and the extent to 
which organisational  culture  influences  coordination among the  departments  involved in  policy 
implementation. Moreover, this chapter also discusses the impacts of the lack of inter-departmental 
coordination on policy implementation.
Chapter  Seven:  Discussion  and  Conclusion- discussions  of  findings  and  thereafter  the 
conclusion.  In  this  connection,  the  issues  on  the  objectives  of  this  study,  what  theories  and 
methodology were used, what was found and which theories were most useful, how and to what 
extent can findings be generalized, what conclusion can be made on the basis of such findings, and 
how this study can be implicated for further research are highlighted in this chapter. 
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Chapter Two
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework
2.1. Introduction
Since the purpose of this  study mentioned in the first  chapter is  to analyse inter-organisational 
coordination among departments at the local level in Bangladesh, the main purpose of this chapter 
is to develop a theoretical framework for exploring and analysing the issue of coordination in field 
administration in Bangladesh. To this end, this chapter presents a brief discussion or overview of 
literature on coordination in order to conceptualise the interplay of various factors that have an 
important role in ensuring coordination. 
2.2. Literature review
The success of organisations in terms of the functions they perform are inseparably associated with 
coordination, thus, the issue of coordination has captured the attention of the scholars on public 
administration as well as organisation studies to a large extent. Therefore, coordination, in terms of 
inter-organisation and intra-organisation is  not  new at all,  but  is  as old as organisation studies. 
Scholars such as Luther Gulick (1937), Chaster I. Bernard (1938), Frederick W. Taylor (1911), and 
Henri  Fayol  (1916)  all  emphasised  the  issue  of  coordination.  Moreover,  various  studies  on 
coordination have been conducted in  both the international and the local levels  over the years. 
Among others, Mintzberg (1979) and Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) are prominent scholars who 
analysed  coordination  from  intra-  and  inter-organisational  perspectives,  respectively.  Recently, 
Christensen and Lægreid (2008) analysed coordination in the Central Government of Norway from 
both intra- and inter-organisational perspectives.
In the context of Bangladesh, there are some interesting studies on the issue of coordination. Panday 
(2004)  basically  emphasises  policy  implementation  and  shows  what  happens  to  policy 
implementation  when  there  is  lack  of  coordination  in  terms  of  institutionalised  rules  and 
regulations,  financial  management,  central  local  relationship,  and accountability:  democratic  vs. 
bureaucratic. The issue of coordination is underscored and analysed in order to assess the effects of 
the above mentioned independent variables on the dependent variable (i.e., policy implementation). 
Thus, the problem of coordination is indicated as a very relevant and important research issue in the 
context of Bangladesh. 
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In order to provide a strong foundation for coordination, a theoretical lens is necessary, which shall 
offer insights into how coordination is performed. Thus, before understanding how coordination is 
achieved, gaining knowledge of the factors or the ways through which it can be achieved and what 
factors facilitate coordination is important. Coordination mechanism may either be chosen based on 
the capacities, legitimacy, and expertise of those whose functions are subject to coordinate or are 
pre-designed and imposed (Robinson et al, 2000: 215). Among others, Mintzberg describes a set of 
coordination mechanisms including mutual adjustment and direct supervision, as well as four kinds 
of standardization: work processes, outputs, norms, and skills (Mintzberg, 1988: 278-80). Drawing 
on  Gulick,  McCurdy  identifies  some  mechanisms  for  coordination,  such  as  structure  of 
organisation, written rules, system of authority, defining duties and responsibilities, and purposes 
(McCurdy, 1983: 114-121). By quoting organisation and cultural theories Panday and Jamil state 
three types of coordination mechanisms: formal rules and standard operating procedures, common 
organisational cultural norms and values, and leadership (Panday and Jamil, forthcoming). Views on 
coordination  mechanism  may  differ  since  coordination  is  based  on  the  perception  of  parties 
involved.  Therefore,  Thompson  (1967)  notes  that  the  mechanisms  for  coordination  should  be 
decided based on situations in which organisations are found rather than by reviewing the merits of 
theories (cited in McCurdy, 1983: 131). 
There is a growing body of literature in public administration and organisation studies that critically 
addresses the study of coordination,  and it  is  likely that  debates surrounding the proper use of 
coordination within organisational  studies or analysis  may continue for  some more time.  Thus, 
Harold Siedman (1998) rightly notes that coordination is indeed the philosopher’s stone of public 
administration (cited in Kettl, 2003: 254). As scholars define coordination from their own points of 
view, coordination has become associated with numerous meanings and definitions. Malone and 
Crowston  (1994:  90)  state  that  ‘Coordination  is  managing  dependencies  between  activities’. 
Seidman and Gilmour (1986) define coordination as ‘both a process- the act of coordinating- and a 
goal-  the  bringing  together  of  diverse  elements  into  a  harmonious  relationship  in  support  of 
common objectives’(cited in Jennings, 1994: 53). In the view of Newman,  ‘Coordination is the 
orderly synchronization of efforts to provide the proper amount, time, and directing of execution 
resulting in harmonious and unified actions to a stated objective’ (cited in Raj, 1989: 69). For Van 
de Ven et al. (1976), organisational coordination refers to ‘integrating or linking together different 
parts of an organisation’ (cited in Tsai, 2002: 180).
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Theoretical approaches to the analysis of coordination irrespective of discrete attempts to define 
coordination  can  be  grouped  into  two:  first  is  the  classical  hierarchical  view  or  the  formal 
hierarchical structure deduced from the work of Gulick (1937), Taylor (1911), Dahl (1947), and 
Simon (1947) (cited in Morris et al., 2007: 95). In the traditional view of coordination, ensuring 
coordination is subject to the use of hierarchical positions, legal-rational authority, specialization of 
tasks, and merit among members of the organisation (cited in Morris et al, 2007: 95). Second is the 
network-based approach or informal lateral relation. Agranoff (2006), Kettl (2003), O’Toole (1997), 
O’Toole and Meier (1999), and Wise (2006) mention that coordination, in this approach, is achieved 
through the interaction of actors outside the traditional hierarchical structure (cited in Morris et al., 
2007:  95).  Both  of  these  approaches  in  studying  coordination  have  specific  advantages  and 
disadvantages, and none of the two approaches is exclusively suitable for each kind of situation. In 
order to fill this gap, Kettl (2003), writing about the challenges of the Department of Homeland 
Security,  explored  and  suggested  another  approach  to  coordination  known  as  contingent 
coordination (cited in Morris et al., 2007: 95-96). Contingent coordination is ‘a hybrid approach to 
coordination in which separate and distinct actors at the different levels of government, each with 
its  own  formal  hierarchical  structure,  work  collaboratively  when  the  situation  demands 
cooperation’. Based on this approach, coordination can take place in both traditional hierarchical 
and  network-based  approaches  as  the  situation  requires  (Morris  et  al.,  2007:  96).  This  study 
employs  both  approaches  of  coordination  since  it  is  assumed that  the  issue  of  coordination  in 
Bangladesh,  particularly  in  upazila  is  not  documented;  it  is  nearly  impossible  to  analyse 
coordination properly by using a particular approach. Moreover, the purposes of this study, which 
include identification of the factors affecting coordination and factors  making difference in  the 
extent  of  coordination,  have  necessitated  the  use  of  both  approaches  on  coordination.  The 
independent variables of this study discussed below represent both approaches on coordination.
2.3. Theoretical point of departure
In order to develop a theoretical framework for describing and analysing issues on coordination at 
the  local  level  in  Bangladesh,  attempts  have  been  made  to  establish  a  relationship  between 
dependent variable (e.g., coordination) and independent variables (e.g., formal division of labour, 
informal communication, resources, and organisational culture) in the following section.
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2.4. Dependent variable
2.4.1. Coordination
‘The synergysm produced in human body is basically the result of coordinated efforts of 
different organs. Any system, whether organizational, management or others having 
interrelated parts or subparts must coordinate with each other in order to produce 
synergysm’(Islam, 1994: 1).
One of the ways through which structure and functioning of organisations can be described and 
analysed is coordination (Christensen and Laegreid, 2008: 97). Coordination is indispensable when 
multiple  actors  are  involved  in  the  pursuit  of  common  goals.  However,  the  obvious  end  of 
coordination is to have a harmonious relationship among actors by synchronising their actions to 
avoid  conflicts inevitably arising in their activities, and wastage of resources including time and 
energies. As to the implementation of a multi-actor policy, the process of achieving coordination 
and  how  it  leads  to  successful  policy  implementation  can  be  seen  in  Figure  3.  The  lack  of 
coordination leads to discord, friction,  chaos and confusion,  ultimately causing inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness in the activities of organisations involved (Khan, 1980: 29).
Coordination  is  based  on  the  common  notion  of  rule-regulation  and  hierarchical  organisation, 
associated with the state as a legitimate controller  and coercer (Robinson et  al.,  2000: 7). This 
notion of coordination is strongly resonated in the traditional view of management in which the role 
of manager is to plan, organise, command, coordinate, and control (Fayol, 1916, cited in Robinson 
et al., 2000: 7). Coordination is ‘an end-state in which the policies and programmes of government 
are characterized by minimal redundancy, incoherence and lacunae’ (Peters, 1998: 296). To Mooney 
and Reiley, coordination is the first principle of organisation and  ‘is the orderly arrangement of 
group effort to provide unity of action in the pursuit of a common purpose’ (cited in Islam, 1994: 2). 
Here, coordination refers to a suitable working relationship based on the mapping of perceptions of 
those involved in policy implementation towards coordination.
Figure 3: Relationship between coordination and multi-organisational involvement in policy implementation 
Source: Author.
Organisation: B
Organisation: D
Coordination
Systematic arrangement of 
implementation functions 
distributed
 to the organisations from A to D
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implementation 
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2.4.2. Inter-organisational coordination
‘Tell me, and I forget; show me, and I remember; involve me, and I understand’. 
Chinese Proverb (cited in Badiru, 2008: 29)
Coordination  can  take  place  either  horizontally  or  vertically.  Horizontal  or  inter-organisational 
coordination  can  be  between  organizations  on  the  same  status  or  line,  while  vertical  or  intra- 
organisational  coordination  takes  place  within  the  organization.  In  other  words,  coordination 
concerned with managing the activities of different organisations and coordination concerned with 
managing the activities of individuals or subunits of an organization are considered as inter- and 
intra-organisational  coordination,  respectively.  Verhoest  and  Bouckaert  (2005)  state  that  inter- 
organisational coordination is more network-based, while intra-organisational coordination is more 
hierarchy-based (cited in Christensen and Lægreid, 2008: 102). As problems of coordination among 
various  departments  in  an  upazila  is  highlighted  and  analyzed,  this  study  focuses  on  inter-
organisational coordination or the horizontal dimension of coordination.
Inter-organisational coordination must be considered when a policy is  implemented by multiple 
organisations. Organisations are considered as homogeneous entities, and large organisations have 
other  organisations  nested within them. Inter-organisational  coordination may take place at  any 
level: between ministries, between divisions within the same ministries or in different ministries, or 
between departments or offices within the same or different divisions (Moore, 2000: 90). In the 
present study, organisations refer to the departments or offices of different divisions or ministries 
located  at  an  upazila.  Inter-organisational  coordination  takes  place  in  the  context  where 
organisations  are  dependent  on  each  other  and  need  cooperation  from  each  other  to  achieve 
common goals. Coordination as a conceptual framework, in terms of accomplishing a particular 
policy in upazila in which several departments are involved, is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Conceptual framework of coordination in Upazila.
Source: Author.
Department: works as implementer
 
Departments: must be involved in the 
implementation process
Coordination
 Harmonious efforts of departments 
involved towards policy 
implementation
Chief administrative officer
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For  Malone  &  Crowston  (1994),  ‘The  need  for  coordination  arises  from  the  existence  of 
dependencies. If there is no interdependence, there is nothing to coordinate’ (cited in Weigand et al., 
2003:  118).  Thus,  coordination,  in  fact,  is  a  function  of  organisational  interdependence.  The 
intensity of coordination is a subject to the determination of types of interdependence (Islam, 1994: 
1). Thompson identifies three types of interdependencies: pooled, sequential, and reciprocal (cited 
in Mintzberg, 1979: 22). In pooled interdependence, each otherwise independent entity contributes 
to the whole. Sequential interdependence occurs when the output of one’s action is the input of 
another; in case of reciprocal interdependence, each stands in between the first two (i.e., the input 
and  output  of  each  action  is  sent  and  received  by each  other  (Mintzberg,  1979:  22).  Figure  5 
indicates  that  the  intensity  of  coordination  is  highest  when there  is  reciprocal  interdependence 
among  organisations,  whereas  the  intensity  of  coordination  is  lowest  in  the  case  of  pooled 
interdependence. This means that the level of intensity associated with interdependence enhances 
the  extent  of  coordination  to  be  achieved  among  interdependent  entities.  Thus,  the  greater  the 
complexity of interdependence, the greater will be the possibility of coordination.
     High Reciprocal
Interdependence
       Level of Complexity Sequential
Interdependence
Pooled
       Low          Interdependence
                  Low                        High
                 Degree of Standardised Coordination
                    Figure 5: Determinants of Coordination Modes
   Source: Islam: 1994: 3 
In the case of the implementation of a rural infrastructure development policy or project by the 
LGED in an upazila, there are some offices and departments within it that must be dealt with while 
the LGED takes the initiative to implement a rural infrastructure development project or policy. 
This is because the offices or departments involved have some degree of shared responsibilities 
towards the successful implementation of a project. The determination of departments or offices 
involved in the implementation process depends on the types of project or policy. Lowi (1979) and 
Grindle and Thomas (1991) state that policy implementation varies depending on the requirements 
of  technical  expertise,  specified  framework  of  time,  array  of  interests  affected,  and  the 
consequences of their distributeness (cited in Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002: 104). These features of 
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the policies bring organisations together to work and determine the roles and responsibilities of each 
organisation involved (Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002: 104). As mentioned in the first chapter, the 
rural infrastructure development policy implemented by the LGED is chosen as an area of policy 
(e.g.,  case)  in  this  study  in  order  to  analyse  inter-organisational  coordination  among  various 
departments  in  an  upazila.  The  following  offices  and  departments  are  involved  in  the 
implementation of the rural infrastructure development policy through an upazila. These include: 
the Offices of the UNO, the Assistant Commissioner of Land (AC Land), the LGED, the Upazila 
Education Officer (in the case of construction of  primary23 school complexes), and the local police 
station.  The underlying issue here is whether or not the need for coordination depending on the 
nature of cases varies; if it does, what kind of coordination (either bureaucratic or network-based) is 
needed for what type of cases? 
Inter-organisational coordination may suffer from several reasons such as lack of formal division of 
labour, absence of frequent and proper communication, lack of adequate and timely resources, and 
so  forth.  The  question  is  why these  happen  to  inter-organisational  coordination.  Whatever  the 
reason behind this, the implementation process suffers when coordination does not properly take 
place  among  the  organisations  involved.  The  following  example  proves  the  lack  of  inter-
organisational coordination and its impact on policy implementation.
People  have  experienced  unimaginable  sufferings  associated  with  the  delayed 
construction of a road in Saghata24 Upazila as a result of severe lack of coordination 
among the departments or offices involved. The LGED was supposed to construct a 3 
km-long road, but construction was suspended half-way for five months upon realizing 
that the land on which road was under construction fell short of the required size. The 
office  of  the  AC  Land  was  responsible  for  resolving  any  land  dispute  in  upazila. 
Moreover, it was the collective responsibility both of the LGED and the office of the 
AC Land to make sure that there is ample size of land for the construction of the said 
road before issuing construction permit (The Daily Modhukor, 12.03.2008).
The  above  example  demonstrates  that  coordination  among  departments  is  of  great  importance 
toward policy implementation as the action of the LGED depends on the action of the AC Land, and 
the discrete contribution of each entity leads to successful policy implementation. 
a. How can inter-organisational coordination be studied?
Does agreement on goals and means matter in coordination? If it does, what are the factors that may 
explain  the  state  of  coordination,  or  in  other  words,  what  are  the  factors  that  may  facilitate 
23 The primary level is officially the entry level of schooling in Bangladesh.
24 Saghata is a place in the Gaibandha District of Bangladesh.
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coordination? When the organisations involved agree with the goals to be achieved as well as the 
means that have already been developed, this may lead to better coordination in their activities, as 
existing mechanisms inform everybody about what will be done by whom, when and how. Cremer 
(1993) and Hermalin (2001) state that ‘Goal alignment also facilitates coordination, as there is less 
room for debate between different parties about the  firm’s best interest’ (cited in Sørensen, 2002: 
73).
          Development Issues           
                              High             Agreement on Goals          Low
           High         Better coordination  
                     The use of rules, routine, and standard        
                operating procedures already               
Agreement      developed are important.                   
on Means            Poor coordination
                                    Leadership and network building     
            Low        are important  
   
Figure 6: Relationship between coordination and agreement on goals and means established based on the contribution 
of Scott (1992), Thompson (1967), Christensen and Lægreid (2008), and Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002).
Source: Author.
When agreement on both goals and means is low, the degree to which coordination is achieved in 
their activities will be poor. The issue here is how coordination (though poor) is achieved despite 
less agreement on goals and means. In such a situation, a leader plays an important role in putting 
discrete efforts of the organisations involved into effect in a systematic and organised way by virtue 
of leadership qualities. Apart from leadership, linkages or networks among organisations are also 
important. In this regard, Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002: 118) note that there are linkages among 
various organisations involved in policy implementation, with particular function and linkage itself 
pooling organisations  to  work together  in  order  to  fulfil  their  respective functions  and achieve 
policy objectives.
2.5. Independent variables
2.5.1. Formal division of labour
‘Firemen can not stop each time they arrive at a new fire to figure out who will attach 
the hose to the hydrant and who will go up the ladder; similarly, airline pilots must be 
very sure about their landing procedures well in advance of descent’. (Mintzberg, 1979: 
83).
Coordination takes place effectively when it is governed by an accepted set of rules (Brinkerhoff 
and Crosby, 2002: 124). This is because a proper division of functions and responsibilities in an 
organisation decides who will do what, when and how. Therefore, the existence of formal division 
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of labour fosters the process of coordination as it guides the behaviour of organisations with respect 
to inter-organisational coordination. Rule is one of the ways through which behaviour is formalised; 
rules specify  who ‘can or cannot do what, when, where, to whom, and with whose permission’ 
(Mintzberg, 1979: 82). Now the question is how formalisation of behaviour facilitates coordination. 
When behaviour is formalised, no confusion exists and everyone knows exactly what they need to 
do  in  every  event  (Mintzberg,  1979:  83).  Likewise,  it  is  easy  to  design  reward-and-sanction 
mechanisms for neglecting and/or performing duties and responsibilities facilitating coordination. 
Bjork (1975) mentions that it reduces the variability of behaviour and helps to predict and control 
the behaviour (cited in Mintzberg, 1979: 83). For Mintzberg, the main objective of the formalisation 
of behaviour is to coordinate activities. In addition, he posits that precise and careful predetermined 
coordination of tasks requires formalisation of behaviour (Mintzberg, 1979: 83).  When a rule is 
made, it masters the circumstance for which it has been written until and unless a situation which 
requires new rules arises (McCurdy, 1983: 119). 
Formal division of labour makes a clear demarcation among organisations by drawing a boundary 
regarding their duties and responsibilities. Written rules let the individuals in an organisation know 
about what should be done by whom, when, and how. They also add that rules do not only form the 
basis  of  coordination,  but  also  structure  coordination  (Panday  and  Jamil,  forthcoming).  Rules 
prescribe the standard, and are binding, compulsory, and instructive. How formal division of labour 
is  important in  securing coordination is  the underlying issue. In this  regard,  Gulick’s argument 
(1937)  on  division  of  labour  and  coordination  is  used.  Gulick  firmly  states  that  a  dynamic 
relationship between division of work and coordination in organisations exists. The existence of the 
division of work is an indication of stronger coordination within organisations and vice-versa (cited 
in Christensen and Lægried, 2008: 101).
Clarity of objectives, formal division of labour and coordination
There  is  a  compelling  need  to  have  a  clear  understanding  of  the  objectives  that  organisations 
together intend to achieve when division of labour is considered as a mechanism of coordination. 
The success of coordination through formal division of labour largely depends on the degree to 
which objectives are clear to those who work for its attainment. Thus, objectives must be very clear. 
Otherwise, coordination suffers as ineffectiveness appears in the operations of organisations. Badiru 
firmly notes that ‘Project objectives must be specific, explicit, and unambiguous, as objectives that 
are not specific are subject to misinterpretations and misuse’ (Badiru,  2008: 51). Gulick (1937) 
states that those who are part of an organisation are expected to understand the objectives that have 
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been defined before individuals begin to operate in the organisation (cited in McCurdy, 1983: 123). 
Van Meter and Van Horn argue that the clarity of standards and objectives are required for effective 
policy implementation (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975: 465-66). When there is lack of clarity of 
objectives, conflicting interpretation arises, leading to ambiguous or unclear division of labour and 
non-coordination. Thus, the clearer the policy objectives, the greater will be the possibility of easy 
and unambiguous division of labour. In turn, clearer division of labour results in better coordination. 
Specification of division of labour and coordination
A question now arises: how is division of labour specified? Should there be written rules specifying 
the duties and responsibilities of each player? In the case of policy implementation, the effective 
enforcement of duties and responsibilities distributed to various organisations depends on a set of 
rules accepted by all (Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002). They likewise clearly state that rules should 
be specified in such a way which includes the  ‘determination of who is eligible to make which 
decisions in which areas; what actions are allowed, required, or prescribed: what procedures must 
be followed; what information must be provided, to whom, and when; what benefits and costs are to 
be assigned to organisations (groups) as a result of their actions; and how monitoring enforcement 
will be undertaken’ (Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002: 124-25). Moreover, duties and responsibilities 
are supposed to be defined not in isolation but in relation to the job of each organisation involved. 
Hence, the functional definition of all jobs bears an immense importance in improving coordination 
among the activities of organisations. 
Coordination suffers when there is lack of division of labour. In the case of upazilas, the lack of 
division  of  labour  causes  insufficient  awareness  of  the  duties  and  responsibilities  among 
departments.  In  turn,  duplication  in  performance  and  role  ambiguity  occur.  Duplication  in 
operations  does  not  only  waste  valuable  time  and  scarce  resources,  but  also  causes  failure  in 
meeting the deadline of policy implementation, ultimately increasing the volume of expenditure. 
Role  ambiguity  leads  to  conflict  among  departments  about  who  will  do  what.  As  a  result, 
coordination is hampered. In this regard, Panday and Jamil argue that policy implementation suffers 
because of the lack of sense of direction and misunderstanding about who will do what and when, 
along with the lack of proper division of labour (Panday and Jamil,  forthcoming). An interplay 
between the factors (e.g., how lack of division of labour may lead to lack of coordination) is shown 
in Figure 7.
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Figure 7:  An interplay between division of labour and coordination.
Source: Author.
Based on the above discussion and figure, the following hypothesis can be drawn.
Hypothesis 1: lack of formal division of labour impedes coordination among 
departments.
2.5.2. Informal communication
‘If individuals act without first establishing arrangements with those whom their actions 
affect and who affects them, each is likely to be sorry when he sees the price all will 
pay’.–
           Philip B. Heymann (cited in Chisholm, 1989: 64) 
                                                                                                  
Generally, communication is a way through which people stay close and share their feelings. It is a 
process  of  transmitting  cues  that  modify  human  behaviour  (Pfiffner  and  Presthus,  1953:  111). 
Communication is transformation of meaning from one to another, in which transmitted information 
and ideas are conveyed (Robbins, 1995: 114). It can also take place both formally and informally. 
Informal communication refers to ‘The spontaneous and flexible ties among members, guided by 
feelings and personal interests indispensable for the operation of formal, but too fluid to be entirely 
contained by it’ (Dalton, 1959 cited in Mintzberg, 1979: 46).  Thus, whereas the first independent 
variable of this study focuses on the existence of formal division of labour, this one focuses on the 
informal  form  of  communication  as  a  coordination  mechanism.  In  this  respect,  Verhoest  and 
Bouckaert  (2005)  argue  that  inter-departmental  coordination  is  more  network-based25 (cited  in 
Christensen and Lægreid, 2008: 102)  A network, in fact,  is developed on the basis of informal 
relationship or communication that helps organisations to coordinate their operations. With regard 
to  coordination,  Mintzberg  introduces  a  concept  of  mutual  adjustment  known  as  informal 
communication. He notes that coordination in activities can be achieved through the simple process 
of  informal  communication  (Mintzberg,  1979:  3).  Here,  it  is  important  to  note  that  informal 
communication takes place even if there is formal communication. Formal means obligatory and is 
25 Conceived as a platform of organisations based on common goals, motivation and interests, organisations within the 
network stay closely together to achieve certain objectives. In this study, a network describes departments or offices at 
the upazila level in Bangladesh involved in policy implementation, with specific function to communicate with each 
other informally in order to implement policy successfully.
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held  in  accordance  with  the  rules.  Formal  communication  among  organisations  for  achieving 
objectives understood is not an end; rather it necessitates and facilitates the process of informal 
communication. This is because informal communication, in some cases, is needed for the sake of 
formal communication, meaning, informal communication can supplement formal communication. 
In this respect, Mintzberg argues that ‘the two systems seem to be rather interdependent: at the very 
least, the formal appears to shape the informal, while the informal greatly influences what works in 
the formal, and sometimes even reflects its shape to come’(Mintzberg, 1979: 53).
Organisations that communicate with one another whenever they need and encourage such activities 
are likely to be more successful at coordination than those that do not. Pfiffner and Presthus note 
that  ‘Communication  is  inseparably linked with  coordination  which  is  a  process  by which  the 
multiplicity of skills, attitudes, and interests in an agency or a major program are bound together’ 
(Pfiffner and Presthus, 1953: 129). Here informal communication refers to an interactive process 
through which information is shared among departments involved in policy implementation in an 
upazila. Thus, informal communication across the organisations having exchange of information is 
assumed as one of the important factors that make inter-departmental coordination possible.
Why informal communication?
What  are  the  ingredients  of  informal  forms  of  communication  that  necessitate  coordination? 
According to Chisholm, ‘The development of informal mechanisms is associated with inadequacies 
and  failures  of  key aspects  of  [a]  formal  organisation’ (Chisholm,  1989:  65).  Furthermore,  he 
identifies a couple of factors that make informal communication important, most noteworthy of 
which are: (a) informal communication works more quickly than formal one; (b) there are times 
when formal  communication is  blocked because of organisational  politics;  and (c)  even formal 
channels may not exist (Chisholm, 1989: 65-67). There are no time-consuming official procedures 
to follow in informal communication which only make communication slower; rather interaction 
takes place instantly upon the need to communicate (Gortner, Mahler, and Nicholson, 1987: 155). 
Given that information is exchanged through communication and coordination takes place based on 
communication  when  communication  is  an  independent  variable,  the  most  important  argument 
concerning the informal channel lies in the statement of both Devons (1950) and Sapolsky (1972). 
For these authors, ‘Formal channels often tend to be ineffective when information is sensitive or 
politically changed: formal counterparts  do not  trust  each other;  there  are sanctions  against  the 
transmission of such information; or there are no formal channels between the person who wants 
the information and the person who has  it.  Informal  channels  are  not so constrained’ (cited in 
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Chisholm, 1989: 68). Informal communication is also argued to take place when issues are novel, 
new or innovative, and there is no precedence which may allow an organisation to develop routine 
to handle this issue.
Moreover, how coordination is achieved may not be documented, since bureau is permanent but 
bureaucrats are not. Alam et al (1994: 33) points out that the purpose of rotating public officials is 
to make sure that they acquire a wide range of knowledge and experience (Alam et al., 1994: 33). In 
the case of transferring public officials, experiences gathered are taken away. Expertise is developed 
through experiences,  and  experiences  can  be  formalised  and translated  into  rules.  That  is  why 
informal  communication  is  important  in  coordination.  Alexander  identifies  turnover  of  the 
personnel as an impediment in coordination and can also be symptomatic of other problems in 
coordination (Alexander, 1995: 18).
Function of informal communication in achieving coordination
In the present  study,  objectives  are  designed to  trace the problems of  coordination in upazilas, 
specifically in the activities of various departments involved in policy implementation. The issue 
now is the process by which informal communication facilitates coordination among departments. 
When informal  communication  takes  place  among departments,  information  is  exchanged.  The 
exchange of information is  subject to interaction which leads to coordination.  The exchange of 
information works in two ways that lead to coordination: it enhances the appreciation of the actors 
of  their  mutual  problems  and  interdependencies  and  influences  their  decisions  and  actions 
(Alexander, 1995: 43), thereby facilitating mutual learning.
From the perspective of informal communication, a network is seen as a steering of organisational 
functions  because  interaction  through  communication  takes  place  among  organisations,  and 
accordingly,  information  is  shared  leading  to  coordination.  This  means  that  informal 
communication is crisscrossing hierarchical needs of functional units. In this regard, Johnson and 
Mattsson (1987) argue that ‘There is a division of work in a network that means that firms are 
dependent on each other.  Therefore,  their  activities need to be coordinated.  Coordination is  not 
achieved through a central plan or an organizational hierarchy, nor does it take place through the 
price  mechanism,  as  in  the  traditional  market  model.  Instead,  coordination takes  place  through 
interaction  among  firms  in  the  network’  (cited  in  Harriss,  2000:  229).  The  interaction  among 
organisations is a vehicle of informal communication (Peters, 2006: 124), and coordination through 
interaction among such organisations involved in policy implementation can be achieved (Figure 8).
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Figure 8: A model of the relationship between informal communication and coordination is based on literature in 
communication and coordination, discussed by Mintzberg (1979), Johnson and Mattsson (1987), Peters (2006), and 
Bennett (2000).
Source: Author.
Figure 8 indicates that informal communication leads to coordination among organisations involved 
in policy implementation. When organisations share information through interaction, coordination 
takes place; this is because interaction among organisations creates opportunities for acquiring and 
sharing information on many issues on policy implementation (i.e.,  who is  doing what,  who is 
having  what  problem,  who  needs  what).  In  turn,  the  issues  on  mutual  concern  that  ensures 
coordination among organisations assigned to perform specific functions concerning the policies to 
be implemented are resolved. Furthermore, information is power, and people who possess and use it 
are considered key factor to the success of policy implementation, (Badiru, 2008: 47). Due to the 
lack of informal communication among departments, duplication in their  operations may occur. 
Now the question is what is the use of rules in the light of duplication? Here, apathy in obeying 
rules  specifying who will  do what,  when,  and how is  the main restraint;  however,  this  can be 
avoided by engaging in informal communication. When duplication occurs, scarce resources are 
wasted  and  implementation  process  takes  more  time  than  required,  increasing  the  volume  of 
unnecessary expenditure. Considering the importance of communication in achieving coordination, 
Bennett notes that the primary objective in the case of inter-organisational coordination is to ensure 
the minimisation  of  duplication and wastage by sharing information  and/or  resources  (Bennett, 
2000: 189). There are several factors embedded in informal communication which may constrain 
coordination.  In  Box  1,  a  sequence  of  arguments  illustrates  the  significance  of  informal 
communication in coordination.     
                       Box 1 
          Significance of informal communication in coordination.
         For the lack of informal communication, frequent interaction is lost;
         For the lack of frequent interaction, information is lost;
         For the lack of information, coordination is lost;
        All for the lack of informal communication.
Source: Author  (Idea is taken from Badiru, Adedeji B., Triple C Model of Project Management: Communication, 
Cooperation, and Coordination).
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The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2:  informal communication among departments facilitates 
coordination.
2.5.3. Resources
Resources—both financial and human—are important for achieving coordination in the activities of 
various departments during policy implementation; financial  resource accelerates the process of 
policy implementation contributing to the timely completion of implementation activities, while 
human  resource  puts  the  policy  into  effect  efficiently  and  cost  effectively.  When  a  policy  is 
implemented by several  departments, there is a dependency among departments as one’s action 
depends on another’s. Considering resources as an independent variable, dependency, in this study, 
refers to the amount of resources exchanged, the frequency of transactions, and the value of the 
resources to the recipient for policy implementation. 
a. Financial resource and coordination
How  do  resources  facilitate  coordination?  Resources  are  considered  only  as  instruments 
contributing in keeping continued functioning of all involved in a joint course of actions. Quoting 
the exchange theory,  Benson (1975) mentions that  resource is  the main factor which expounds 
organisational relations and behaviour (cited in Alexander, 1995: 7). Grandori (1987) thus states, 
‘Since  organisations  usually  exist  in  an  environment  where  resources  are  limited,  they  are 
dependent  in  varying  degrees  on  other  organisations  for  resources  which  are  critical  for  their 
continued functioning’ (cited in Alexander, 1995: 7). In the case of inter-organisational activities 
such as policy implementation,  resource is  controlled by a single  organisation.  An organisation 
whose functions are dependent on resource cannot start functioning unless and until resource is 
disbursed, and hardly be able to continue unless the disbursed resource is adequate. On the other 
hand, timely disbursement of resources leads to timely completion of functions that, in turn, lays the 
foundation upon which others can begin to start performing their tasks and functions in a timely 
manner. The continuation of this process is subject to synchronisation of the functions accomplished 
by interdependent organisations that ensure coordination in the activities of various organisations. 
Thus, the extent to which coordination is achieved in the activities of organisations involved in 
policy implementation depends on the degree to which funding for such a task is adequate and 
available. 
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The lack  of funds leads to the poor quality of implementation activities, while the occurrence of 
untimely funding causes failures to meet the deadlines of policy implementation; this ultimately 
increases  the  total  cost  of  policy  implementation.  Therefore,  funds  are  important  for  policy 
implementation  which  influences  coordination.  This  view  is  prevalent  both  in  literature  on 
coordination and policy implementation. For others, funds are indispensable for successful policy 
implementation such that, ‘Funding must be allocated, personnel assigned, and rules of procedures 
developed,  among other  matters’ (Howlett  and  Ramesh,  2003:185).  For  policy implementation, 
resources such as funds and other incentives are crucial (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975: 465). If 
more financial control is imposed on local or urban bodies, problems occur in coordination among 
departments, creating negative impact on policy implementation (Panday, 2006: 3). Thus, in order 
to ensure coordination among organisations involved in policy implementation,  timeliness is  as 
important as adequate funding. 
Figure  9: Model  of  relationship  between  resources  and  coordination  deduced  on  literature  on  resources  and 
coordination in policy implementation (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Mintzberg, 1979; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003; 
and Panday, 2006).
Source: Author.
b. Human resource and coordination
Coordination is achieved automatically in a given situation when organisations entrusted with duties 
and responsibilities possess the required skills and knowledge. Thus, prior to ensuring coordination 
in the activities of organisations, the skills and knowledge of those who are responsible for carrying 
out these activities must be standardised. In this regard, theoretical assumption has been taken from 
Mintzberg,  who  claims  that  standardisation  of  skill  and  knowledge  is  important  for  achieving 
coordination (Mintzberg, 1979: 6). This is because when skill and knowledge of individuals to get 
things done are standardised, coordination takes place automatically because they know exactly 
what is expected from each other and how to act, as in the case of theatre operation. How are skills 
and knowledge standardised? Can standardised skills and knowledge facilitate actual coordination? 
This way of thinking is reflected in Mintzberg’s argument that when organisations or individuals 
within these are trained to acquire some skills and knowledge for achieving their tasks, coordination 
is achieved by virtue of their respective training. Their standardised skills and knowledge ensure 
coordination within the group (Mintzberg, 1979: 7). 
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Hypothesis 3: the more resources organisations can pool, the better the degree of 
coordination.
2.5.4. Organisational culture
The term ‘culture’ has become an important instrument in the discussions and study of organisations 
(Jamil, 2007: 58). Culture is a way of life, and it has been viewed by different scholars depending 
on their belongingness to the society they observed. According to Hofstede (1991), culture can be 
seen as ‘The collective programming of mind which distinguishes one group of people from others’ 
(cited in Jamil, 2007: 58). In the view of Jamil, culture is ‘an independent variable which influences 
interpersonal relationship, and teaches what to prefer and what to abhor’ (Jamil, 2007: 65). In the 
present  study,  culture  refers  to  the  mind  set-up  of  civil  servants  influencing  their  working 
relationships governing coordination. The underlying issue is the nature of organisational culture 
and how it  facilitates coordination.  For Schwartz and Davis (1981), organisational culture is  ‘a 
pattern of beliefs and expectations shared by the organisation’s members’ that create ‘norms that 
powerfully shape the behaviour of individuals and groups in the organisation’ (cited in Meek, 1994: 
268). O’Reilly and Chatman (1996) define organisational culture as ‘a system of shared values (that 
define  what  is  important)  and  norms  that  define  appropriate  attitudes  and  behaviours  for 
organisational  members  (how  to  feel  and  behave)’ (cited  in  Sørensen,  2002:  72).  From these 
definitions,  it  is  obvious  that  there  is  a  common  set  of  values  and  norms  embedded  into  an 
organisational culture that shape the behaviour of its members, who are more likely to take the 
actions in a given situation and follow the way of actions that others perceive as proper. In this 
respect, it can be viewed that norms, values, and beliefs of organisational members are key factors 
creating consensus, predicting behaviour, and creating unity (Meek, 1994: 268). This leads to the 
assumption  that  common  organisational  culture  enhances  the  behavioural  consistency  of 
organisational members and thereby facilitates coordination. Thus, it is argued that ‘Organisational 
culture has a tremendous impact on the ability of one organisation to coordinate successfully with 
others. Organisations that routinely collaborate with others and encourage and foster activities (for 
which joint actions are required) are likely to be more successful at coordination than those that do 
not’ (Morris et al, 2007: 103).
Every  organisation  has  its  own  culture  embedded  in  its  goals,  perspective,  and  approaches  to 
problem solving (McCurdy, 1983: 132). Thus, there is a need to have a community of interests 
when multi-organisations are involved in achieving common objectives. Seidman (1980) states that 
‘If  agencies  are  to  work  together  harmoniously,  they  must  share  at  least  some community  of 
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interests  about  basic  goals.  Without  such  a  community  of  interests  and  compatible  objectives, 
problems cannot be solved by coordination’ (cited in McCurdy, 1983: 132). Mooney (1947) also 
mentions that coordination cannot be achieved unless it is based on a community of interests in the 
persuasion of desired objectives (cited in McCurdy, 1983: 121). Harmalin (2001) firmly notes that 
organisational  culture  enhances  goal  alignment,  and  conversely,  goal  alignment  facilitates 
coordination, since there is less chance to argue over the firm’s best interest (cited in Sørensen, 
2002: 73).
Cultural institutional perspective and coordination 
Another dimension employed in this study is cultural institutional perspective described by Selznick 
(1957) (cited in  Christensen and Lægried,  2008:  103).  From this  perspective,  coordination is  a 
product of an institution and greater interaction is produced while members of an institution share 
common values derived from the culture of the same institution (cited in Peters, 1998: 297-298). 
Meanwhile, for Krasner (1998) and March (1994), public organisation is developed on the basis of 
three  principles:  historical  tradition,  path  dependency,  and informal  norms and values  (cited  in 
Christensen and  Lægreid,  2008:  103).  This  means  that  the  development  of  an  organisation  is 
associated with a process which ‘happens to the organisations over time’ (Selznick, 1957; cited in 
Scott, 2001: 24). Such process causes failure to produce rational men who can think and act in a 
given situation according to logic of consequence. Rather, they act in the given course of action on 
the basis of logic of appropriateness. As for Mintzberg, coordination can be achieved based on a 
common set of beliefs shared by members of the organisation (Mintzberg, 1988: 280). Coordination 
takes place by virtue of organisational culture, when a common set of norms and values are widely 
shared  and  intensely  held  across  the  organisations.  Others  argue  that  ‘common  norms  foster 
common identity and preferences that make coordination of different activities across organisations 
easier’ (Panday and Jamil, forthcoming). In contrast, cultural differences among organisations may 
cause lack of coordination.
When coordination is conceptualised in this  theoretical  lens, logic of appropriateness forms the 
basis of cultural perspective among organisations. The logic of appropriateness determined by the 
institution  decides  what  is  expected  from the  members  and  also  guides  the  behaviours  of  the 
institution itself.  Logic of appropriateness is relevant for inter-organisational coordination in two 
ways (Peters, 1998: 298): coordination is achieved without using authority when a common logic 
exists among organisations (Gupta, Dirsmith, and Fogarty, 1994; cited in Peters, 1998: 298-99), and 
coordination is also achieved with less disruption of organisational routines when common policy 
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values are shared by organisations (Peters, 1998: 299). In this respect, March and Olsen (1989) state 
that ‘What is appropriate for a civil servant to do is defined by the institution to which he belongs 
and transmitted through socialisation’ (cited in Christensen and Lægreid, 2008: 103).         
Social capital, organisational culture, and coordination
There  appears  a  relationship  between  social  capital  (e.g.,  trust)  and  organisational  culture. 
Coordination suffers while there is mistrust in the relationship of organisations, as coordination is 
likely to be more based on confidence that organisations will perform their respective duties and 
responsibilities  properly.  Confidence  is  a  by-product  of  trust.  Irma  Bogenrieder  and  Bart 
Nooteboom  (2004)  explain  that  trust  creates  an  ‘expectation  that  others  will  not  behave 
opportunistically even if  they have both the opportunities and incentives for doing so’ (cited in 
Parker, 2007: 119).  Putnam (1993 and 2000) identifies trust as the glue among the members of a 
group and also as one of the features of social capital which facilitates coordination among the 
organisations for achieving common objectives (cited in Parker, 2007: 119 and Harriss, 2000: 236). 
Now the question is how does trust facilitate a common organisational culture? There are some 
ingredients of trust which include common preferences, values, norms, mutual liking, and so forth, 
and  all  these  factors  can  foster  common  organisational  culture  leading  to  coordination.  More 
discussions  in  this  respect  are  made  in  the  following  section.  There  is  interplay  between 
organisational  culture  and coordination  in  which  trust  acts  as  an intervening  factor  (Figure  9). 
Therefore, the extent to which coordination is achieved varies depending on the existence of trust in 
the relationship of interdependent organisations (Harriss, 2000: 229). 
Figure 10:  Trust is an intervening variable in the case of relationship between common organizational culture and 
coordination.
Source: Author.
Cultural compatibility and coordination
How  is  cultural  appropriateness  relevant  in  coordination  among  organisations?  Cultural 
appropriateness  varies  depending  on  the  culture  of  each  organisation.  In  inter-organisational 
perspective,  cultural  appropriateness  refers  to  cultural  compatibility among  organisations,  with 
cultural compatibility referring to the sharing of common norms, beliefs, and values system guiding 
organisations to act in a synchronised manner. When members of an organisation or a number of 
such groups share common norms, beliefs and values systems, coordination takes place in their 
operations since sharing similar norms and values represent a collective will or consciousness of 
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organisations. Does cultural compatibility among organisations contribute to coordination? In this 
regard,  it  must  be  noted  that  coordination  is  required  to  standardise  the  performance  of 
organisations;  but  variations in  performance may occur  due to  cultural  differences among such 
groups (Jamil, 2007: 66-67). Thus, the extent to which coordination is achieved depends on either 
the extent to which cultural compatibility is in existence among organisations or the extent to which 
cultural differences have been overcome. Generally, literature on culture and coordination posits a 
multidimensional relationship between cultural compatibility and coordination (Figure 11).
Figure 11: Model of multidimensional relationship between cultural compatibility and coordination.
Source: Author.
Figure 11 depicts that cultural compatibility among organisations generates a high level of trust on 
each other. Those with high levels of trust can predict the actions or behaviours of others based on 
the belief that the trustee will do what is appropriate in a given situation, which helps to develop 
partnership easily among organisations. Christensen and Lægreid note a ‘high level of mutual trust 
tends  to  enhance  appropriate  behaviour  and vice  verse’ (Christensen  and Lægreid,  2008:  103). 
Trust, in a sense, refers to some presumption of knowledge about someone. Similarly, organisations 
have more confidence on another group when there is high level of trust. Higher confidence on each 
other facilitates the delegation of duties and responsibilities to other organisations in the case of 
inter-organisational  involvement  in  achieving  common  objectives.  Building  of  trust  creates 
confidence and more confidence enhances the level of expectation toward each other in that no one 
fostering partnership among organisations will be opportunistic in a relationship, a result which 
leads  to  effective coordination;  thus,  in  this  respect,  formal  rules  specifying who will  do what 
become  highly  ineffective.  Jamil  argues  that  rules  and  procedures  are  replaced  by  trust  and 
confidence in organisations with high levels of trust (Jamil, 2007: 67). 
A harmonious relationship must appear in the workplace when high level of trust exists among 
organisations, as organisations with high level of trust consider each other as trustworthy partners in 
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their relationship. This relationship facilitates in building up partnership that produces high level of 
cooperation  which  leads  to  more  coordination.  The  existence  of  high  level  of  trust  among 
organisations vests the responsibility of functioning on behalf of all involved in an organisation 
because of similarity in terms of their preferences and choices. For example, in the visa processing 
for Scandinavian countries in Bangladesh, the Embassy of Sweden on behalf of all Scandinavian 
countries  does  the  representation.  Such  singular  representation  has  become  possible  as  their 
preferences and choices in providing visas are similar and they have high level of mutual trust 
which  has  developed partnership  among them,  leading  to  increased  coordination.  According  to 
Narus  and Anderson (1987),  partnership is  marked by coordinated  actions  directed  at  common 
objectives consistent across organisations (cited in Mohr and Spekman, 1994:138). However, the 
above discussion leads us to assume that coordination depends on partnership. The fundamental 
basis of partnership is trust; it was rightly noted that high level of trust among organisations is the 
foundation of coordination (Pires et al.,  2001: 287). Thus, it  is imperative that common norms, 
belief, and value system (e. g., culture) of organisations can foster coordination.
Factors governing organisational culture
The issue at hand is  whether organisational culture varies from one organisation to another. If it 
does, how does it vary or what are the factors that can explain cultural differences? There is an exert 
influence  of  the  history  of  organisational  development  on  organisational  culture  reproduced 
throughout the period of its existence. Christensen et al. note that organisation is developed at a 
specific point of history; accordingly, particular cultural contexts or norms and values that have a 
lifelong impact are produced (Christensen et al., 2007: 45). A second possible factor is the pattern of 
recruitment. Given the fact that organisations are heterogeneous entities in terms of functions they 
perform,  it  is  logical  that  their  requirements  for  assimilating  personnel  differ.  Accordingly,  the 
patterns of recruitment matching with personnel required vary from one another, and the choice of 
specific patterns of recruitment is embedded into the organisational culture. 
Organisational culture decides what kind of personnel is needed and what pattern is suitable to 
recruit such kind of personnel. For example, multinational companies hire competent and skilled 
personnel by offering higher monetary incentives, whereas personnel in public organisations are 
recruited  through  competitive  examinations.  Even  among  public  organisations,  the  pattern  of 
recruitment varies depending on how organisational culture has developed and what their norms 
and values they practice. A third factor may be prestige or status, which is basically cultural. The 
development of organisational culture in terms of prestige is subject to the culture embedded in the 
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society.  Working in government organisations is  seen as more prestigious than being in private 
organisations  as  people  who work  with  government  organisations  have  more  access  to  power. 
Moreover,  among  the  government  organisations,  people  working  with  administrative  or  police 
organisations which are closely linked to power are considered highly prestigious in the view of 
society,  which  is  likewise  attributed  to  direct  access  to  power.  Moreover,  power is  one  of  the 
determinant factors in the Bangladeshi culture. Thus, prestige or status variation leads to cultural 
differences among organisations. All these factors mentioned above are responsible for developing 
different set  of norms, values,  and beliefs  which make differences in the organisation’s way of 
thinking  as  reflected  in  their  logic  of  appropriate  behaviour.  Thus,  differences  in  logic  of 
appropriateness may lead to lack of coordination. The above discussion leads to the formulation of 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: organisational cultural compatibility among  departments may 
facilitate more coordination in their activities.
a. How can organisational culture and coordination be studied in Bangladesh?
Hierarchical pattern of civil service
In the context of Bangladesh, most of the civil servants somehow have strong roots in the village. 
Bangladesh is a village-based country as there are 65,000 villages within an area of 56,000 square 
miles. Even people who live in cities consider villages as their real homes since their parents or 
grandparents once lived in villages (Jamil, 2007: 7). Hence, societies in Bangladesh have a strong 
village basis. Jamil argues that the extent to which norms and values carries over from village life is 
reproduced in formal bureaucratic organisations depending on the degree to which society tradition 
prevails  (Jamil,  2007:  5).  According  to  Hofstede  (1980  and  1991),  ‘People  who are  born  and 
brought up in a particular cultural context reproduce many of the norms which are developed in 
childhood, in family, in school, and in society’ (cited in Jamil, 2007: 11). Thus, in a hierarchical 
society like Bangladesh,  traditional relationship in villages between father and son, teacher and 
student or master and servant is reflected in the relationship of superior and subordinate or senior 
and junior in bureaucratic organisations. In a traditional relationship, the son respects and obeys 
parents and in contrast, parents take care of the son. Jamil mentions that this type of relationship 
maintains harmony in a group with similar norms and values (Jamil, 2007: 9). 
In a civil service system with strictly hierarchical relationship such as Bangladesh, civil servants 
know how to obey and respect their seniors and how to take care of and protect their juniors (Jamil, 
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2007: 192-194). In contrast,  the relationship of civil servants in inter-service suffers because of 
rivalry,  factionalism,  and  lack  of  coordination  (Siddiqui,  1996;  cited  in  Jamil,  2007:  194). 
Moreover, civil servants of particular cadres prefer working with their respective cadre officials due 
to  a  community  of  interests  representing  their  own  departmental  or  organisational  culture  to 
officials of another cadre. Thus, when they work with others, there appears a problem of cultural 
differences or lack of cultural compatibility which may impede coordination. 
Generalist-specialist conflict
One major problem associated with coordination among departments in upazilas may be the conflict 
between the generalist and the specialist bureaucrats. Thus, Ahmed and Tasnim rightly note that one 
of the maladies of the Bangladesh civil service is the generalist-specialist conflict or controversy 
which exists and appears in the national level administration as well as field level administration 
(Ahmed and Tasnim,  2003:  84).  Hence,  the  underlying  questions  may include  why conflicting 
relationships exist between generalists and specialists and what its impacts on coordination are or 
how it affects coordination. Meanwhile, the administration simultaneously plays both traditional 
and  development  roles.  The  generalists  play  a  major  role  in  the  traditional  function  of  the 
administration,  whereas  the  specialists  are  the  key  functionaries  in  the  latter  case.  Thus,  both 
generalists  and  specialists  bear  equal  importance  in  running  the  affairs  of  the  administration 
(Ahmed and Tasnim, 2003: 92). However, there is discrimination between generalist and specialist 
bureaucrats, and perhaps this is the main reason behind the lack of harmonious relationship between 
the  two  groups  is  discrimination.  Discrimination  is  about  power,  status,  promotion,  and 
participation  in  decision  making (summarised  in  Table  1).  Despite  having  similar  backgrounds 
required  to  become  eligible  for  entering  into  the  civil  service,  the  existence  of  discrimination 
between  them  may  create  conflict.  This  conflict  could  lead  to  the  lack  of  cooperation  and 
coordination.
The  organisational  culture  embedded  into  the  structure  of  Bangladesh  civil  service  is  a  direct 
product of colonial legacy. The civil service that Bangladesh inherited after its independence from 
Pakistan was a  transformed  version of that developed by the British in the Indian sub-continent. 
During the period of British rule in single India (now comprising three individual countries namely 
Bangladesh,  India,  and  Pakistan),  generalist  administrators  were  labelled  as  elite  class  of  civil 
service. This is because all positions at the upper echelons of administration were occupied by the 
generalist  administrators  who had  an  absolute  supremacy over  others.  This  tradition  of  elitism 
prevailed in Pakistan civil service; and even after 38 years of emergence as an independent country, 
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the elitist structure of civil service is still a dominant feature of Bangladesh civil service despite the 
absence of a British ruler and the context for which the British developed such type of civil service. 
Moreover, in Bangladesh, there is no elite cadre as it prevailed in the British-India and Pakistan. 
After  independence,  all  services  have  been  integrated  and  discrimination  among  services  was 
abolished,  at  least  in  theory.  In  reality,  however,  the  administration  cadre  still  dominates. 
Furthermore, although the recruitment pattern of both generalists and specialists is similar, there is a 
major gap between them in terms of promotion. Members of the administration cadre are promoted 
to the next higher position on a regular basis, as the Ministry of Establishment which deals with 
civil  affairs,  including  the recruitment  policy of  the  government,  principles  for  promotion,  and 
training of civil servants irrespective of cadre affiliation, has absolute control of the administration 
cadre. On the other hand, promotion among specialist civil servants is slower; in addition, higher 
positions in technical ministries or divisions are occupied chiefly by generalists. Thus, the existence 
of colonial  administrative legacy and the lack of equal opportunity in terms of promotion may 
create a generalist-specialist tension, hindering coordination in their activities.
Generalist Sphere Specialist
Generalists  usually  have  access 
to policy making positions.
   Decision 
making  power
Specialists  seldom  occupy  policy  making 
positions.
They have higher status. Honour Their  position  in  authority  is  delimited  to 
departmental  activities  regarded  as  less 
prestigious.
Getting advantage of quota they 
have chance for quick promotion
Promotion Their promotion is too slow as they do not have 
any quota for promotion.
Table 1:  Basic sphere between generalist-specialist conflicts in Bangladesh
Source: Ahmed and Tasnim (2003: 84) (modified by author)
2.6. Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to develop a theoretical framework for exploring and analysing the 
issue of coordination in field administration in Bangladesh. In doing so, literature on coordination 
has been reviewed briefly and attempts have also been made to establish a relationship between 
coordination (dependent variable) and factors (independent variables) affecting coordination. The 
above discussions suggest that in a situation characterised by formal division of labour, frequent 
informal  communication,  adequate  and  timely funding,  skilled  and  required  number  of  human 
resource,  and existence of cultural  compatibility,  there is  likely to be better  coordination in the 
activities  of  the  organisations  involved  in  policy  implementation.  On  the  basis  of  the  above 
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arguments,  an  analytical  framework  has  been  developed  in  this  chapter  which  elucidates  the 
integrated  involvement  of  formal  division  of  labour,  informal  communication,  resources,  and 
organisational culture that cumulatively lead to coordination in this study.
  
Analytical Framework of the Study
Problem of Coordination in Field Administration in Bangladesh
Figure 12: Analytical Framework of the Study
Source: Author
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Chapter Three: Methodology
3.1. Introduction 
The major purpose of this chapter is to discuss various methodological approaches in relation to the 
research questions of the present study. By doing this, the present study is based on qualitative 
research.  Furthermore,  discussion  is  made  on  data  collection  techniques  and  methodological 
implications to justify the use in the context of the present research.
3.2. Research design
‘A research design is the logic that links the data to be collected (and the conclusion to be drawn) to 
the initial questions of a study [and] every empirical study has an implicit, if not explicit, research 
design’ (Yin, 1994: 19). For doing social science research, there are three types of research designs: 
qualitative, quantitative, and mixed approach. Qualitative and quantitative approaches are used to 
explore and understand the opinions of the respondents on social problem, make generalisations 
about  the  problem,  and  examine  the  relation  among  the  variables  used  in  research  to  test  the 
theories, respectively, while both are considered in using mixed approach (Creswell, 2009: 4). This 
study is a process-based qualitative research. 
3.2.1. Rationale behind using the qualitative approach
In qualitative research, the goal of researchers is to rely as much as possible on the respondent’s 
views on the issue being studied (Creswell, 2009: 8). Accordingly, the goal of this research is to 
explore information on the research problem based on the respondent’s perception towards it, rather 
than  being  confined  by  the  structure  of  predetermined  questions.  Such  approach  allowed  the 
respondents to express their opinions outside the questions asked. In this respect, interviews with 
open-ended questions were used to collect information. Second, before visiting the area of study, 
there was no preconceived idea regarding the research problem. For example, one of the variables 
was organisational culture and under this variable, one of the sub-variables was working procedures 
and norms. Before the respondents were interviewed, no preliminary background research was done 
as to whether they have similar or different working procedures and norms. Third, the present study 
is  concerned with  the  process  rather  than  the  outcomes;  specifically,  this  study is  designed to 
understand the research problem as a process by addressing the questions ‘why’ and ‘how’. For 
example, it can be assumed that coordination in inter-departmental activities may be problematic 
because of the lack of rules, when quantitative research is employed.  On the other hand, how the 
37
lack of rules is translated into activities and consequently affects coordination can only be shown 
through qualitative research. Moreover, this study does not intend to test theories; rather the purpose 
of  this  study is  to  understand existing  theories  and to  make generalisations  about  the research 
problem. 
a. Research problem
When a research problem is new or almost new, it calls for using qualitative research (Creswell, 
2009: 18). The present research is an exploratory one. A number of researchers in Bangladesh have 
studied and written about coordination. Their areas of study have been mainly about local and urban 
governance.  Very little research was conducted on issues like problems of coordination in field 
administration  and  its  impact  on  policy  implementation.  Many  facets  of  the  problems  of 
coordination beyond our knowledge may remain unveiled. Therefore, the present research may help 
explore important and interesting information on many unasked questions regarding the problems 
of coordination. 
b. Personal experience
A qualitative research was deemed more appropriate for the type of problem being dealt with in this
research, considering the advantages of delivering more discussions over fewer cases rather than 
fewer discussions  over  more  cases.  Accordingly,  a  particular  policy area  as  the  only case  was 
selected in order to determine the extent of the interrelatedness of the corresponding variables. To 
achieve  such  objective,  an  in-depth  analysis  of  variables  was conducted,  as  opposed  to  the 
oversimplified presentation of variables and their interrelationship in a quantitative research. To 
study variables,  questions were developed in a way that  one question led to  another  follow-up 
question. For example, a question asked under the variable resources was whether or not timely 
disbursement of funds fosters coordination among departments. The responses to this question led 
this author to ask further how timely disbursement of funds fosters coordination. Such spontaneous 
process helped in tracing facts and in exploring and understanding the respondents’ opinions about 
the research problem. 
3.3. Research strategy
The present study is based on exploratory and descriptive research. Here, the implementation of 
rural  infrastructure  development  policy  was  studied  as  a  process  to  understand  why and  how 
coordination in the activities of various departments involved in policy implementation in upazila is 
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lacking. In this connection, a field study was conducted in the Shadullapur upazila of Gaibandha26 
District,  approximately 300 km north of the capital city, Dhaka. Moreover, the scholars’ views on 
coordination are highlighted in order to have a better understanding why coordination is absent and 
how this has come to be. 
 
Research as a process deals with the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions; but the process of crafting the 
‘why’ and ‘how’ questions were suited for this study lies in the research problem. Since the present 
research intended to analyse inter-organisational coordination and explore and identify factors that 
affect coordination, it was required to identify variables and the relationships existing among them. 
Accordingly, variables such as formal division of labour and organisational culture were identified 
and  studied.  By  doing  so,  the  relationships  between  variables  were  established  in  order  to 
understand the interplay of various factors in the process of ensuring coordination. The use of ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ questions made it  possible for the author to establish relationship between variables. 
Another reason for studying this research as a process is the intention to identify and examine all 
probable factors that affect coordination.  By examining this particular policy area, the analysis of 
data became easier. As such, all possible variables were identified to understand the coordination 
process  more  comprehensively  and  create  generalisation  about  the  research  problem  more 
accurately. 
 
3.3.1. The logic behind selecting particular policy area
In  the  present  study,  the  policy  area  is  the  rural  infrastructure  development  policy  of  the 
government, through which various development activities such as roads, culverts, bridges, school 
buildings, complexes for union parishads, and embankments on river banks are carried out. The 
implementation responsibilities along this policy are vested on the LGED. The development of rural 
infrastructure is the main concern of the policy being studied in this paper, and it has been chosen to 
be congruent with the process-based approach employed by the present study. With nation building 
at its core, the government plays a vital role toward the socio-economic development of rural areas 
through the implementation of this policy. Bangladesh is an agriculture-based country; majority of 
its population live in villages and, therefore, agriculture is the main source of livelihood. Thus, rural 
economy is  a vital  area of the national  economy of Bangladesh.  Without  accelerating the rural 
economy, there is no other alternative to make the country’s economy stronger. On the other hand, 
the advancement or acceleration of rural  economy depends largely on the development of rural 
26 Gaibandha is town in Bnagladesh and it is a district where there are seven upazilas, one of which is Shadullapur the 
focul area of study in this paper.
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infrastructure such as roads, culverts, and bridges. Accordingly, all the government have always 
placed this policy at the top priority, and consequently, each government invests more money in this 
policy area compared to others. To achieve success, however, the coordination among those who are 
involved in the implementation of the policy must be strongly fostered, instead of investing huge 
amounts of money. Therefore, this policy area bears more importance in investigating. 
 3.4. Reasons behind the selection of the unit of analysis
As the area of study, Shadullapur upazila, located in Gaibandha District, was selected out of 482 
upazilas  in  Bangladesh  purposefully  because  of  its  manageability  and  controllability  within  a 
specified period of time. The second reason is its location; Gaibandha District is located at the 
northern part of Bangladesh and almost 300 km. away from Dhaka. Shadullapur upazila is nearly 20 
km. more north of the Gaibandha District headquarter, which means that there is lack of urban 
facilities in the prospective upazila. A relation may exist between the location of my area of study 
and the research problem, that is, more government officials are posted in urbanised upazilas. As a 
result, shortage of manpower is a common feature in rural upazilas, and such peripheral location 
may lead me in obtaining some interesting information. Another reason is the familiarity of the 
author  with  Shadullapur  upazila,  which  is  the  author’s  birthplace  and  hometown.  A  native 
understanding of this upazila is deemed significant in obtaining contextualised information. Except 
for  the  government  officials,  the  author  had  an  easy  access  to  all  the  respondents  who  were 
residents of this upazila as well, generating spontaneous opinions. Furthermore,  author’s personal 
networks and experiences used during field visits were helpful in obtaining information on issues 
relevant  to  the research. Collecting similar  information from an unknown upazila  can be more 
complicated within the time period (ten weeks only).  Below, the location of Gaibandha District is 
marked  in  the  map  of  Bangladesh  (on  top  from the  left);  the  map  of  this  District  is  shown 
elaborately, showing seven upazilas, including Shadullapur.
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Map 1: Map of Gaibandha District
Source: http://www.mygaibandha.info/districtMap.php 
3.5. Methods of data collection
The present research is basically qualitative. Some quantitative data were also collected and used to 
substantiate the qualitative data. 
3.5.1. Interview
Primary data  related  to  research  objectives  were  collected  through comprehensive  and detailed 
interviews  with  the  respondents.  An  important  source  of  evidence  is  interview,  which  allows 
researchers to interpret the events through the views of the respondents (Yin, 1994: 84). Moreover, 
the perceptions of the respondents served as the major sources of information on variables collected 
through interview. To interview respondents, open-ended questions were asked because first, open-
ended questions  allowed the  respondents  to  give  opinions  from their  own points  of  view,  and 
second, responses to one question led to another question and this process helped author to study in-
depth the research issue and map the respondents’ perceptions towards the research problem. In this 
study, the question, ‘How does coordination take place while multiple departments are involved in 
policy implementation?’ was asked. The response to this question led to another follow-up question, 
‘What  in  your  opinion  are  the  ways  that  may  ensure  coordination  properly?’ Such  mode  of 
questioning  enabled  the  author  to  collect  more  data  on  issues  to  be  addressed  in  this  study. 
Moreover, establishing dialogues with the respondents enabled the author to utilise the comments or 
remarks of the respondents to substantiate the research arguments. The third reason for using open-
ended questions lay on the fact that the comments or remarks of the respondents were considered 
41
important in qualitative research because personal views of the respondents on events can only be 
expressed through comments or remarks.
A standard questionnaire with some variations were developed and used to fit different groups of 
respondents:  the  UNO,  the  administrative  head  of  upazila;  the  officers  in  charge  of  various 
departments in upazila; the AC Land, the chief land officer of upazila; the chairman of the upazila 
parishad, the head of local government at the upazila level; the chairman of the union parishad, the 
people’s  representative  member  in  the  Upazila  Development  and  Coordination  Committee 
(UDCC27);  a number of contractors who physically work for the execution of rural infrastructure 
development  policy;  and  the  general  public.  The  variation  of  questionnaire  may be  a  point  of 
argument;  although the author categorised the respondents into four groups (i.e.,  governmental, 
people’s  representative,  contractor,  and  general  public),  there  are  actually  seven  types  of 
respondents according to the nature of functions they perform, indicating that they are functionally 
separated  from  each  other.  For  example,  the  UNO  and  the  AC  Land are  responsible  for 
accomplishing different types of functions. Likewise, the officers in charge of various departments 
perform functions different from both the UNO and the AC Land. Other respondents, including the 
chairman of the upazila parishad, the chairman of the union parishad and the contractors, were also 
separated from each other in terms of the functions they perform. Lastly, the general public do not 
have any function or involvement with regard to research problem, but they have general views 
over the functions accomplished by the above mentioned respondents. There were some common 
questions for all types of respondents except for the general people, although they were also asked 
several questions addressed to the contractors and chairman of union parishad. The total number of 
respondents was 57 (Table 2).
Table 2: List of Respondents
Group
of respo 
-ndents
Type of 
respondent
Status of 
respon-
dents
No. of 
respon
-dents
Reasons for choosing the respondents
Governmental
UNO
Chief 
Executive 
Officer 1
The  UNO  is  considered  an  important  source  of 
information as the coordination responsibility of all 
functions accomplished in the upazila is vested on 
him. Moreover, along with the AC Land, the UNO is 
also  a  generalist  officer  at  the  upazila  level;  the 
generalist-specialist aspect of civil service is one of 
the concerns in this study.
27 UDCC is a committee, which is an important mechanism for inter-departmental coordination in upazila because this 
is the only committee in which the UNO, other officers in charge of all national building departments, and people's 
representatives at the upazila and union levels have membership.
42
1)
Agriculture 
Officer
Head of the 
Dept. 1
They  were  selected  in  order  to  understand  the 
research problem more comprehensively. Second, in 
this study, an independent variable is organizational 
culture, which is directly connected with the inherent 
conflict  within  the  civil  service  between  the 
generalist  and  the  specialist.  This  group  of 
respondents,  along  with  upazila  engineer  of  the 
LGED, comprise the group of specialist officers at 
the upazila level. Moreover, they have membership 
in  different  committees  including  the  UDCC  and 
departmental  committees.  Thus,  they  were 
considered  relevant  sources  of  information  on 
research problem.
Health and 
Family 
Planning 
Officer
Head of the 
Dept. 1
Fisheries 
Officer
Head of the 
Dept. 
1
Education 
Officer
Head of the 
Dept. 1
They are directly involved in the execution of policy 
chosen as an area of policy in this study. In addition, 
apart from their membership in the UDCC, they are 
also members of different departmental committees. 
Thus,  there  was  a  greater  possibility  of  collecting 
relevant  information  on  coordination  from  these 
sources.
Upazila 
Engineer
Head of the 
LGED 1
AC Land Chief Land 
Officer 1
Total 7
 2)
People's re-
presentative
Chairman of 
Upazila 
Parishad
Political 
Head 1
He is  the head of local  government  at  the upazila 
level.  Moreover,  he is  considered  to  have  a  better 
insight  into  the  query  about  what  happens  to  the 
issue of coordination when there is a lack of formal 
division  of  labour.  Although  the  upazila 
administration  is  supposed  to  be  placed  at  the 
disposal  of  local  government  at  the  upazila  level 
while in operation, his duties and responsibilities are 
still  unclear even after being elected at this tier of 
local government. This is because there is no rule in 
this regard yet.
Chairman of 
Union 
Parishad
Head of the 
Union
6 They  are  people's  representative  members  of  the 
UDCC, chosen on the basis of random sampling and 
not on the total number of eleven chairmen of union 
council.
Total 7
3)
Contractor Specialised 
Business
-men
8 They have  a  better  understanding  of  coordination, 
especially  when  it  is  associated  with  funds. 
Coordination  can  ensure  timely  disbursement  of 
funds  and  accelerate  policy functions  executed  by 
the contractors. They were selected randomly.
Total 8
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4)
General 
Public
Citizens 35 They  are  considered  important  sources  of 
information on the results of policy implementation 
when there is a lack of coordination, as a policy is 
not implemented in isolation; rather local people are 
to some extent involved in its implementation. They 
are  all  male  and  chosen  on  the  basis  of  random 
sampling. The respondents consisted of grade school 
and  college  teachers,  local  elite,  businessmen,  and 
few college students.
Total 35
Total 57
Source: Author.
3.5.2. Documentation 
Documentation as a source of secondary data was used in this research to supplement the data 
collected  through  interview.  Various  internal  and  external  documents  on  coordination  were 
collected.  As  internal  documents,  information  on  various  issues  related  to  the  present  research 
problem  (e.g.,  why  inter-departmental  coordination  does  not  take  place  properly,  how  intra-
departmental coordination affects inter-departmental coordination, what are the consequences of the 
lack of inter-departmental coordination in policy implementation, and so on) was collected. Internal 
documents on issues mentioned above have not been recorded and preserved in concerned offices, 
whose only documents are those about the completion of projects known as progress reports. Such 
progress reports only stipulate how much money was allocated and the dates of completion.  
As regards external documents, attempts were made to explore data on various issues, including the 
lack of manpower and the untimely disbursement of funds for policy implementation. Likewise, the 
impact of these aspects on coordination, identification of cases or examples of poor implementation 
and the reasons behind these, why implementation of projects remain unfinished for long time, and 
so on, were determined. To do so, various published and unpublished books and journal articles 
relevant to the research, various field administration manuals, research reports and some national 
and local  newspapers,  were used.  In  addition,  as  an attempt to  collect  external  documents,  the 
Internet was used for browsing relevant websites including the LGED, the Daily Star28, the Daily 
Prothom Alo29, and other national newspapers containing secondary data. 
3.6. Problems of data collection
Collecting field data was easy, although some difficulties arose. Nevertheless, there were only few 
28 A widely circulated daily English Newspaper in Bangladesh.
29 A widely circulated daily Newspaper in Bangladesh published in Bangla.
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difficulties  in  gathering  data  given  that  the  area  of  study  was  very  familiar  to  the  author. 
Nonetheless, below are some of the situations the author faced in the process of data acquisition.
First, the author assumed that all information were properly recorded and archived in government 
offices, even though government officials in developing countries such as Bangladesh hardly reveal 
public documents in the pretext of secrecy. In reality, the picture concerning the preservation and 
maintenance of  proper  information  in  government  offices  is  completely different.  Although the 
offices  the  author  dealt  with  prepared  and  preserved  information  with  regard  to  their  policy 
implementation activities through reports or other documents, these did not show any information 
on whether or not policy implementation was successful, what were the factors responsible for its 
success or failure, and so on. Rather, their reports or documents only revealed limited information 
concerning the completion of activities. In the effort to collect more information, the author visited 
the construction of a two-storey  building for a primary school to become acquainted with actual 
implementation.  When the author  inquired with the official  concerned with why the quality of 
implementation work was poor and what were the problems associated with the implementation 
process, no substantial response was provided, except a template report similar in nature to that 
mentioned above.
Moreover, the Bangladeshi government does not usually look into this matter. For example, when a 
document  regarding  a  particular  inter-departmental  case  is  required,  the  government  official 
concerned prepares it perfunctorily or on an ad hoc basis and not based on a well thought-out plan. 
This  is  due  to  the  lack  of  attention  and  motivation  to  inter-departmental  activities.  Public 
organisations in Bangladesh are hierarchic in nature and are more attentive to their own activities, 
hardly  going  beyond  the  horizon  of  their  own  spheres.  This  lack  of  awareness  has  caused 
negligence in preserving documents related to inter-departmental activities. 
 
Second, another prominent problem was the failure of government officials to recognize the value 
of  coordination.  In  the  case  of  inter-departmental  activities,  the  issue  of  coordination  is  not 
prioritised and each entity performed his respective function in a highly independent manner and, 
hence. Government officials were not willing to talk about the issue of coordination; thus, a major 
way of  obtaining  information  was  to  ask  respondents  who are  non-government  officials.  As  a 
whole,  they  can  be  classified  as  the  local  people,  which  include  the  contractor,  the  people’s 
representative, and the general public. They comprise a mixture of direct and indirect participants in 
the system of local governance and policy implementation in an upazila who experienced the issue 
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of coordination. However, collecting information for a variety of cases necessitated the inclusion of 
a  large  number  of  local  people  as  no  single  person  or  group  exclusively  possesses  essential 
information. Obtaining information through this process was not only time consuming; it was also 
difficult to get access to the general public as they are likely to suspect the interviewer’s motive. 
Third, it was difficult to obtain access to the government officials posted at the upazila level, but 
belong to the central  bureaucracy  since these officials  mostly overlooked their  responsibility of 
providing services to the citizens. In this context, all citizens are equal and have access to the public 
officials;  however,  in  most  cases,  the  officials  are  mostly  inaccessible  because  they  consider 
themselves as members of the social elite. Moreover, easy access to government officials is not 
encouraged based on the assumption that citizens will not pay respect to them, if they have easy 
access to them. Thus, only those who belong to the elite have access to these officials. This culture 
explains why data collection through formal approach is almost impossible. In this light, network 
and  informal  approach  to  data  collection  had  become  an  important  tool  for  this  research. 
Accordingly, the author had to use his personal network in order to gain access to the government 
officials.
3.7. Reliability and validity of data
3.7.1. Reliability of data
Reliability refers to the consistency of data over time. It indicates that similar result is produced 
when similar procedures are applied in the same way (King et al., 1994: 25).  The primary data for 
this study was collected from various types of respondents (e.g., the UNO, AC Land, officers in 
charge of various departments, chairman of upazila parishad, a number of union chairman, some 
contractors,  and  a  large  number  of  general  public).  The  former  six  types  of  respondents  were 
selected  because  of  their  direct  involvement  in  the  implementation  of  rural  infrastructure 
development policy in the upazila in Shadullapur, while the last was selected in order to have a 
better understanding about the impact of coordination on policy implementation. In order to check 
the consistency of data, the similar questions were asked to various types of respondents, and even 
the  similar  questions  were  asked  to  the  same  respondents  at  different  times  during  interview 
session.  In  addition,  quite  a  number  of  respondents  were  interviewed  in  order  to  ensure  the 
reliability of data.
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3.7.2. Validity of data
According to Creswell and Miller (2000), one of the strengths of qualitative research is validity, 
determined based on whether the findings are accurate from the standpoint of the researchers, the 
participants  or  readers  of  an  account  (cited  in  Creswell,  2009:  191).  Validity  refers  to  the 
trustworthiness of data, which is subject to the measurement of phenomena (e.g., research problem); 
therefore,  it  depends largely on the degree to  which  how accurately phenomena are  measured. 
Focusing on accurate measurement of phenomena, various types of respondents were interviewed 
and on the other side, a good number of respondents within each type were selected and interviewed 
with  the  view  to  cross  check  the  trustworthiness  of  data.  Moreover,  in  order  to  enhance  the 
trustworthiness of data, various documents were collected to substantiate the data collected from the 
respondents. For example, secondary information with regard to the shortage of officer such as AC 
Land were collected after learning of the shortage of officers through the respondents. Furthermore, 
since the area of policy chosen for this study was the rural infrastructure development policy of the 
government implemented at the local level by the office of the LGED, the officer in charge of the 
LGED of the Shadullapur upazila became a subject of this study in order to review the reports on 
the research problem provided by the other respondents. The choice of this official was largely due 
to the fact that he was well informed and experienced by virtue of his job nature. Thus, the data 
collected from this source helped measure the phenomena more accurately, thereby enhancing data 
reliability. 
3.8. Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to discuss various methodological approaches in relation to the 
research questions.  The present  study is  an analysis  of  inter-organisational  coordination  among 
departments at the local level in Bangladesh, for which a process-based qualitative research was 
employed.  For  collecting  data,  interviews  as  well  as  documentation  were  used  as  source  of 
evidence.  During  policy  area  selection,  the  rural  infrastructure  development  policy  of  the 
government and upazila, namely, Shadullapur, was selected as the unit of analysis.  
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Chapter Four
Development of Field Administration in Bangladesh: Pendulous or Static? 
4.1. Introduction
The main purpose of this chapter is to give a brief account of the historical development of field 
administration and its current status in Bangladesh. In addition, it concisely discusses the system of 
local governance in Bangladesh.
4.2. Field administration
The term ‘field administration’ is  a  by-product of decentralization.  Decentralization is  found in 
almost  all  countries  irrespective  of  the  form  of  government.  Smith  (1967)  pointed  out  that 
decentralization, in a unitary form of the government, contains two complementary and interrelated 
practices. One is devolution, which is also known as political decentralization, through which the 
authority to make certain decisions in some spheres of public policy is delegated by law to the local 
level  government.  Another  is  deconcentration  within  the  bureaucracy,  which  is  termed  as 
administrative decentralization, wherein authority is delegated to the public servants working in 
wide areas scattered across the country in order to make administrative decision on behalf of central 
administration and responsible  in varying degrees for government policy within their  territories 
(Smith, 1967: 1). Generally, field administration refers to administration away from the capital city 
of a country and scattered throughout the country. Field administration is referred to a bureaucratic 
form of decentralization in which the authority to make administrative decisions are delegated to the 
civil  servants  working  in  the  field  (Smith.  1967:  1-3).  In  addition,  the  field  services  of  an 
administrative agency refer to ‘the personnel stationed away from its headquarters into the country, 
to  carry  on  its  work  from  the  numerous  sub-centres  within  the  easy  reach  of  the  people’ 
(Obaidullah, 1999: 96). 
4.3. Historical development of field administration in Bangladesh
In order to have an understanding about the existing system of administration at the local level in 
Bangladesh,  it  is  necessary  to  go  into  the  background  of  the  circumstances  that  led  to  the 
development  of  field  administration.  Bangladesh  (formerly  East  Pakistan)  was  one  of  the  two 
provinces of Pakistan before its emergence as an independent country along with the present India 
(ruled by the East India Company and later by the British Crown for two hundred years). Here, the 
discussion with regard to the historical development of field administration is made based on purely 
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bureaucratic in terms of the creation of administrative units at different eras. 
4.3.1. The British Period (1600-1947)
With the prior approval of Elizabeth I on December 31, 1600, the ‘East India Company’30, under the 
name  ‘Governor’  and  ‘Company of  Merchants  of  London  Trading  in  the  East  Indies’ 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_India_Company)  came  to  the  Indian  sub-continent  (presently 
comprised of the sovereign countries of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) for mercantile purposes. 
Apart from its trading purpose, the company was being connected gradually with the system of 
governance and in this respect, its first achievement was acquiring the right granted by the Nawab31 
of Bengal to collect revenue in the three estates of Govindapur, Sutanati, and Kolkata in 1698 (Ali, 
1982: 22). Given the right in revenue collection, the company realized the necessity of the creation 
of a post at the district in order to improve and accelerate the revenue collection system. Moreover, 
two momentous events caused changes in the charter of the company through which the company, 
from a mere trading body,  became a body entitled to  have political  authority:  one was victory 
against the Nawab of Bengal in a battle known as the Battle of Plassey (1757); another was the 
acquisition of the right of civil administration granted by the then Mughal Emperor over the three 
provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa (Ali, 1982: 22). Therefore, the territories placed under its 
charge were governed by the company, and the company, thereafter, developed its own pattern of 
administration.
In order to improve the revenue collection system, the company first became involved with the 
revenue and land administration in 1772. Consequently, Bengal was divided into nine collectorships 
(districts)  and  collectors  for  each  district  were  appointed.  A local  agency  conducting  revenue 
collection was decided to create and consequently, the Court of Director of the company issued a 
letter to the Government of Bengal with the instruction of taking necessary actions in this regard. 
This letter was considered as a comprehensive document in which the picture of the future of field 
administration in Bengal was drawn; it was laid down in the letter that ‘a moderate number of our 
provincial covenanted servants, distinguished for good conduct and abilities, and conversant in the 
country languages’ should be posted in the districts to be assisted by the native officers of revenue 
(Ali, 1982: 25). Later, Bengal was divided into twenty-four districts in 1787 and a collector was 
appointed in each district. After experiencing a vast body of debates on whether a union of judicial, 
30 The East India Company was a trading company founded in1600, with headquarters in London. It  was formed 
initially for pursuing trades with the East Indies. In the case of the Indian-subcontinent, it gradually came to rule 
which, in fact, effectively began in 1757 after the Battle of Plassey, its rule lasted for 200 years. The Company’s rule 
ended when the British Crown took over the governance of India in 1858. 
31 This literally refers to the Governor.
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executive,  and revenue powers should be vested in the hand of collectors,  collectors were then 
given a union of powers. 
In 1793, during the governorship of Cornwallis32, the district was divided into police jurisdiction in 
order to organise a regular police administration in rural  areas, and consequently,  thana (which 
literally means police station), consisted of cluster of villages as a unit of administration was created 
through the Bengal Regulation of xxii of 1793 (Ali, 1982; Ali, 1993; Abedin 1973; cited in Ahmed, 
2002: 332). The police administration at the district was under the charge of the Superintendent of 
Police (SP) who, in turn, was under the control of the district magistrate and collector. In 1829, 
another administrative unit above the district, namely division, consisting of four to five districts 
was created with a view to supervise the functions of the District Magistrate and Collector with 
regard to land revenue and land administration (Ali, 1986: 47). A government officer known as a 
commissioner was placed in charge of a division. In order to facilitate the administration of criminal 
justice, another tier of local administration known as sub-division which lay in between the thana 
and the district was also created in 1859 and it was headed by a sub-divisional magistrate known as 
Sub-divisional Officer (SDO). Each sub-division was composed of four or more thanas and one or 
more  sub-divisions  were  grouped  into  a  district  (Ali,  1986:  47).  In  1911,  another  unit  of 
administration below the sub-division, namely, circle was set up based on the recommendation of 
the Royal Commission upon Decentralization, 1907 aimed at bridging the gap between the district 
officer and the village people. One or more thanas were grouped into a circle, which was placed 
under the charge of a junior civil servant known as Circle Officer (CO) who was responsible for 
supervising and providing guidance to the union panchayant33 (Wahhab, 1996: 49-50). 
4.3.2. The Pakistan Period (1947-1971)
From 1947 to 1971, the pattern of administration at the local level remained largely unchanged. The 
higher areas of field administration were divisions, and below the divisions were districts. Districts 
were divided into sub-divisions, with the lowest unit of local level administration was the thana. 
During the Pakistan era, an important dimension of field administration was development in terms 
of creating local government units with bureaucrat leadership in all layers of field administration 
and  placing  these  units  at  the  disposal  of  the  administration  at  respective  levels  of  local 
administration. This new arrangement of local administration was designed to make the system of 
32 One of the Governors of Bengal appointed by the British Government in India
33  One of the tiers of the then local government at the union level (now known as the union council in Bangladesh)
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Basic Democracy (BD34) effective. In this connection, a new pattern of administration was created 
at  the  local  level  particularly  focusing  on  thana.  For  doing  so,  the  ‘Comilla  Academy’35 was 
assigned to  do experiments with regard to the development  of  Thana Council  (TC) and Thana 
Training and Development Centre (TTDC).
a. Thana Council (TC)
The TC was considered the most important contribution of BD and had been the focal point of the 
development administration in rural areas (Rahman and Sarker, 1997: 51).  Kotwali36 Thana under 
Comilla37 district of the then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was taken as the experimental area for 
the purpose mentioned above. The TC of Kotwali Thana consisted of the Chairman of the Union 
Parishad of Katwali Thana and some government and non-government official members. Given the 
satisfactory result, the concept of TC was extended throughout East Pakistan. The SDO and CO 
were selected as the chairman and vice-chairman of the TC, respectively. In 1961, the thana was 
converted into a development circle, and the TTDC subsequently established (Wahhab, 1996: 54).
b. Thana Training and Development Centre (TTDC)
The TTDC came into effect  through an experiment conducted by the Comilla Academy on the 
creation of specialist departments of the government at the thana level (Ali, 1982: 90). With the 
creation  of  TTDC in  1963,  many nation  building  departments  of  the  central  government  were 
established and officers of these departments were also posted at the thana level (Wahhab, 1996: 
54).  The  creation  of  the  TTDC,  thereafter,  enabled  rural  people  to  get  access  to  government 
functionaries within their easy reach. The CO was made the head of a combined team of operation 
at the thana level and was responsible for the coordination of governmental services. 
These experiments of the Comilla Academy led to a breakthrough in rural development through the 
creation of a new pattern of administration at the local level, particularly at the thana. Consequently, 
the thana  came out  from its  traditional  image as  a  mere  police station  and transformed into  a 
platform of administrative government at  the local level.  This enabled the rural  people to keep 
themselves  overseen  by  the  government  in  respect  of  their  needs  in  such  fields  as  health, 
34 A new version of the system of local governance in Pakistan introduced by General Mohammad Ayub Khan, a 
Pakistani military chief who later captured the state power through an army coup
35 The Academy was established in 1959 basically as a training institute for government officials and representatives of 
the local government village  organisations in various subjects related to rural development. Akhter Hameed Khan 
was  the  founder  of  this  Academy.  After  the  emancipation of  Bangladesh,  the  Academy became known as  the 
Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development (BARD). 
36 Kotwali is a place in the Commilla District of Bangladesh.
37 Commilla is town in Bangladesh.
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agriculture, and livestock.
4.3.3. The Bangladesh Period (1971- 2009)
In order to  emancipate from the old system and to develop a new pattern of field administration 
with the aspiration of a newly independent country, the first attempt of the government was the 
constitution  of  an  administrative  reform  committee,  namely,  the  Administration  and  Services 
Reorganization Committee (ASRC), also known as the Chowdhury Committee on March 15, 1972 
(Wahhab, 1996: 55). As regards the reorganisation of field administration, the ASRC was of the 
opinion that the democratization of administration at all levels and the devolution of authority to the 
elected local government must be ensured. Furthermore, the ASRC suggested that a sub-division, 
after being necessarily adjusted with the territory should be converted into a district (Obaidullah, 
1999: 107), and division, as a unit of administration should be abolished (Wahhab, 1996: 56). The 
ASRC also proposed that the thana would be the basic unit of administration and the responsibility 
of development administration at the thana will have to be entrusted to an elected local government 
institution-styled Thana Parishad at the thana level. However, the government took no initiative to 
reorganise the existing system of  administration as  per the guidelines suggested by the ASRC, 
except holding an election at the union level at the end of 1973 (Obaidullah, 1999: 107). 
In  1975,  a  revolutionary  change  was  brought  into  the  local  administration  by  introducing  the 
presidential  form  of  government  through  the  historic  fourth  amendment  to  the  Constitution 
(Rahman, 1997: 29). Accordingly, a presidential order was issued on June 21, 1975 and by doing so, 
a  system  of  district  governorship  was  introduced.  The  government  also  passed  the  District 
Administration Act of 1975 through which divisions and sub-divisions were abolished, each sub-
division was converted into a district (Morshed, 1997: 125), and districts were placed under the 
headship of  a  district  governor  (DG) who was made the chief  officer  in charge of  the general 
administration of the district (Wahhab, 1996: 57). Attempt to bring this new arrangement into effect 
fell  into  premature death after  Sheikh Mujib38,  who was the main architect  of this  system was 
assassinated by a young group of army officials on August 15, 1975. The succeeding government 
after the assassination of Sheikh Mujib discontinued the efforts for restructuring the administration 
and instead gave order to continue the work with the inherited administrative set up. In the history 
of  field  administration,  another  dimension  was  the  appointment  of  District  Development 
Coordinator  (DDC) in each district in  1980; DDC was assigned the rank and status of Deputy 
38 Bangladesh received independence under the leadership of Sheikh Mujib. He is considered as the ‘‘Father of the 
Nation’’ in Bangladesh.
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Minister. However, the scheme of DDC was dropped with the political change of 1982 (Karim, 
1991: 10). Figure 13 depicts the status of field administration in Bangladesh before the political 
change which led to the reorganisation of an administrative set up in state power in 1982. 
                      Administrative Units
Figure 13: Status of field administration in Bangladesh before administrative reform was carried out in 1982
A systematic  and  organised  effort  in  the  direction  of  establishing  the  decentralised  system of 
administration at the local level aimed at making breakthroughs in the inherited pattern of field 
administration appeared first when a reform committee, the Committee for Administrative Reform/
Reorganization  (CARR),  was  formed  on  April  28,  1982.  The  CARR  made  some  important 
recommendations in accordance with its responsibilities and submitted its report to the government 
in June 1982. In principle, the government accepted the CARR’s recommendations and appointed a 
high-powered  committee,  namely,  the  National  Implementation  Committee  for  Administrative 
Reorganization/Reform (NICARR) in  August  1982 (Wahhab,  1996:  67) in  order  to  suggest  the 
guidelines of how the CARR’s recommendations can be brought into effect. A major departure from 
colonial and post-colonial set-up of field administration was evident in 1982 when existing thanas 
were converted into upgraded thanas as suggested by the CARR. The 460 thanas were upgraded in 
ten phases (Table 3). 
After completing the fifth phase of the upgradation,  upgraded thanas were renamed as upazilas 
(Wahhab, 1996: 68). In the first eight phases, rural thanas were upgraded, and the remaining two 
phases were involved in the upgradation of urban thanas (Hyder, 1986: 10). After that, an election in 
the UPZ was held, through which the people’s representative designated as Chairman was elected 
and made the head of the UPZ. The posts of CO (Development) and CO (Revenue) created during 
the era of Pakistan were merged into one known as UNO and the function assigned to the UNO was 
to coordinate the functions of all upazila-based departments. As a result, upazila became the focal 
point  of  the  development  administration  at  the  local  level  in  Bangladesh,  with  a  vast  body of 
qualified administrative and technical officers placed under the UPZ (Ahmed, 2002: 332-33). 
Districts-21
Sub-Division-71
Thana-478
Union-4032
Divisions-4
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Table 3: Phases of the upgradation of thanas
Phases of upgradation No. of thanas upgraded Date of upgradation
1st 45 November 7, 1982
2nd 55 December 15, 1982
3rd 55 March 14, 1983
4th 57 April 15, 1983
5th 51 July 2, 1983
6th 47 August 1, 1983
7th 50 September 14, 1983
8th 37 November 7, 1983
Sub-total 397
9th 18 December 1, 1983
10th 45 February 1, 1984
Total 460
Source: Obaidullah, 1999:113.
Although the sub-division as a unit of local administration was dropped as per the suggestion of the 
CARR, the government retained division with the goal of maintaining the relation between the 
central government and districts and upazilas. Upgradation of sub-divisions into districts was done 
throughout 1984, after which 42 new districts created through the upradation of sub-divisions were 
added with the existing 22 districts, for a total number of 64 districts (Wahhab, 1996: 68). After the 
abolition of the upazila system in 1991, the UNO was renamed as the Thana Nirbahi Officer (TNO) 
and  became  the  key  functionary  because  of  the  absence  of  an  elected  body.  Even  after  the 
restoration of the upazila system in 1998 through the enaction of the Upazila Parishad Act of 1998, 
and the election in the UPZ in 2009, the upazila administration has not yet  been placed at  the 
disposal  of  the  local  government  at  that  point.  Figure  14  depicts  the  current  status  of  field 
administration in Bangladesh. In order to have a better understanding of field administration, all of 
its units are concisely discussed below.
          Administrative Units
Figure 14: Present status of field administration in Bangladesh.
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a. Division 
The division is the apex unit of field administration in Bangladesh. A senior level generalist civil 
servant  having  a  rank  of  joint  secretary  known as  Divisional  Commissioner  is  the  head  of  a 
division. This official is assisted by three additional commissioners and a large number of officers 
and staff. His or her role is basically confined to the issue of coordinating government activities at 
the district level, and is responsible for hearing appeals on the decisions of district revenue officer 
with regard to revenue matters (Ahmed, 2002: 331). Moreover, s/he also plays a supervisory role 
over all the departments and agencies in the division. According to the Population Census of 2001, 
the average number of districts, upazilas, and unions in a division is 11, 80, and 742, respectively. 
The  following  map  shows the  highest  unit  of  administrative  government  in  Bangladesh  called 
Division.
Map 2: Map of Bangladesh indicating the location of divisions.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh 
b. District:
The district  is  the second upper  tier  of  field  administration from the top,  headed by a  Deputy 
Commissioner (popularly known as DC39) who belongs to the administration cadre of Bangladesh 
Civil Service and is entitled to have a rank of Deputy Secretary of the government. The DC is given 
assistance  by few Additional  Deputy  Commissioners  (ADC),  one  additional  district  magistrate 
(ADM), a group of assistant commissioners, and other officers and staff. The average number of 
upazilas and unions based on the Population Census of 2001 in a district is 8 and 70, respectively. 
The primary functions of the DC are conducting revenue collection, maintaining law and order, 
accelerating economic development, ensuring coordination in all government activities related to 
39 Here deputy commissioner refers to officer having with the membership of administration cadre who is placed as the 
head  of  a  district  and  whose  main  function  is  to  coordinate  the  activities  accomplished  in  his  or  her  area  of 
jurisdiction.
55
‘nation building’, and encouraging and collaborating with local self-government initiatives. The DC 
is the principal channel of communication between the district and higher levels of government 
(Ali, 1993; cited in Ahmed, 2002: 331-32).
    Table 4: Territorial structure of administration in Bangladesh
Level Number of units Average size of population Average area in square kilometer
Division 6 22 million 24595
District 64 2 million 2306
Upazila 482 270 thousand 306
Union 4451 29 thousand 33
Source: Author (data somewhat modified are presented in the table based on Population Census, 
2001 available at: http://www.banbeis.gov.bd/bd_pro.htm).
c. Upazila
The upazila is the second lowest unit of field administration in Bangladesh. An officer having the 
rank of (Senior) Assistant Secretary serves as the Chief Executive Officer (UNO) of the upazila and 
is the key functionary of the upazila administration. Nine unions, on average, are grouped into an 
upazila,  and  several  functional  departments  of  the  central  government  have  field  level 
representatives at upazila headquarters. Each upazila normally has officers for various offices such 
as those for Health and Family Planning, Education, Agriculture, Engineering (LGED), Livestock, 
Fishery,  and  Social  Welfare.  Each  upazila  also  has  an  Officer,  Assistant  Commissioner,  Land; 
Officer-in-Charge, a Police Station, and so on. These representatives are appointed and controlled 
directly  by  the  higher  authorities  of  their  respective  departments  at  the  national  headquarters. 
Although the accomplishment of function assigned to them is subject to the directives of the central 
level administrative authorities, they are supposed to work under the general supervision of the 
UNO at the upazila level.
d. Union
Below the upazila is the union. Representatives of some nation-building departments, including 
Agriculture, Livestock, Health and Family Planning, are working at the union level. They work 
under  the direct  control  of the higher  authorities of  their  respective departments  at  the upazila 
headquarters. The union is placed under the headship of an elected people’s representative.  The 
Gram (village) police, known as ‘Chaukidar’, a formal force under the direct control of the local 
government at this level is tasked to maintain the stability of order in the village. The union consists 
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of nine wards40. A number of villages are grouped into a ward. According to the Population Census 
of 2001, a union contains 20 villages on average. In the following map of Bangladesh, the national 
capital and six divisional cities are marked in bold point ‘red’ and other district headquarters are 
also shown.
Map  3:  Map  of  Bangladesh  where  national  capital,  six  divisional  cities,  and  other  district 
headquarters are shown.
Source: http://www.ezilon.com/maps/asia/bangladesh-maps.html   
4.4. The system of local governance
The  commencement  of  the  existing,  organised  system of  local  governance  in  Bangladesh  was 
marked by the passage of the Chaukidary Act of 1870 and the Local Self-Government Act of 1885; 
both are considered important milestones in the history of the local government of the country. 
40 The union is divided into nine wards and a number of villages are grouped into each ward.
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However, throughout the country’s history, the existing structure of local government transformed 
with the changes of the country’s status, including those that occurred after Bangladesh became an 
independent country (Rahman, 1997: 27). In Bangladesh, there is a separate set of local government 
based on urban and rural areas. In the case of the former, local government institutions are called 
city corporations41 and  pourashavas42 or  municipalities.  The  zila  (district)  parishad43,  upazila 
parishad, and union parishad are the institutions of rural local government. Since the independence 
of  Bangladesh,  the  major  responsibilities  given to  the  local  government  institutions  are  the 
maintenance of law and order, infrastructure development and maintenance, health, and education 
within their area.
4.4.1. Urban local governance
Six metropolitan cities which are located at six divisional towns have been given the status of the 
city corporation. A city corporation consists of several wards and is headed by an elected people’s 
representative called Mayor. The corporation is run by a council composed of the elected mayor of 
the city corporation, mayors elected from each ward, and other government officials. The rest of the 
urban local bodies are known as municipalities or pourashavas that are again classified into three 
groups according to their financial strength. A cluster of wards is grouped into a pourashava, which 
is placed under the headship of an elected people’s representative known as Mayor, and is also 
administered by a council comprised of mayors of pourashavas, mayors elected from each ward 
within the pourashavas, and other government officials.
Table 5: Hierarchy of urban local governments
City corporations 6 (Dhaka, Chitagong, Rajshahi, Khulna, Barisal, and Sylhet)
Pourashavas (Municipalities) 286
Category Annual Income Level
Class I Pourashava 6 million +
Class II Pourashava 2 million
Class III Pourashava Less than 2.5 million
Source: http://www.unescap.org/huset/lgstudy/new-countrypaper/Bangladesh/Bangladesh.pdf 
4.4.2. Rural local governance
The rural local government plays a pivotal role in overseeing rural governance. A short description 
of the rural local governance in Bangladesh is presented below.
41 A city corporation is, out of two, one tier of urban local government in Bangladesh.
42 A pourashava or municipality is the rest of the tiers of urban local government in Bangladesh.
43 Zila parishad is the apex tier of rural local government in Bangladesh. 
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a. Zila (district) prishad
The zila parishad, is the first layer of the existing rural local government structure in Bangladesh. 
However, it only exists in name; there is no elected body at the district level for its management as 
election in the zila parishad has never been held since 1972. Even the national government took no 
attempt in establishing an election process at this layer of local government.
b. Upazila parishad (UPZ)
This is the second highest tier of rural local government from the top, headed by an elected people’s 
representative  called  Chairman.  Upazila  is  run  by  a  parishad  (council)  which  consists  of  the 
people’s representative members, including the chairman and two vice-chairmen of the UPZ, the 
chairman of  the  union parishad,  the mayor  of  pourashava (if  any exists  within  the territory of 
upazila), and other government officials posted at the upazila. The Ministry of LGRD&C recently 
provided a list of officers placed under the control of UPZ, including the UNO, the Upazila Health 
and Family Planning Officer, the Upazila Family Planning Officer, the Upazila Education Officer, 
the Upazila Agriculture Officer,  the Upazila Engineer (LGED), the Upazila Project  Officer,  the 
Upazila  Livestock Officer,  the Upazila  Youth Development  Officer,  the Upazila  Social  Welfare 
Officer, and the Upazila Women and Children Affairs Officer (The Prothom Alo, 31.12.2009).
c. Union parishad
The union parishad is the bottom tier of rural local government in Bangladesh and is headed by an 
elected people’s representative. The union is also run by a parishad consisting of the chairman of 
union parishad, nine male members (elected based on an estimation of one from each ward), and 
three female members (elected from three reserved seats, with each of these seats composed of three 
wards of a union).
4.5. Conclusion 
The main purpose of this chapter was to provide a brief discussion of the historical development of 
field administration and its current status, as well as to shed light—albeit to a lesser extent—on the 
issue of local governance in Bangladesh. For doing so, the genesis of various units of local level 
administration from tracing back to the years of British rule in the Indian sub-continent to date has 
been discussed. The pattern or set-up of field administration was never static; rather, it was more 
pendulous as every successive government tried to reorganise it in accordance with their political 
philosophies. 
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Chapter Five
Factors Affecting Inter-departmental Coordination
5.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the extent to which formal division of labour, resources, 
and informal communication affect inter-departmental coordination, and how such factors do so. To 
achieve this goal, the importance of coordination when multiple departments are involved in policy 
implementation is  discussed.  Afterwards,  the roles and the ways through which the division of 
labour, resources, and informal communication affect inter-departmental coordination are analysed. 
Moreover, this chapter presents some examples of coordination problem among various agencies at 
the field level.
5.2. Does inter-departmental coordination matter? A study of policy implementation
As there is a framework for policy implementation in terms of time frame and certain amount of 
fund, the success of policy implementation depends largely on the degree to which policy functions 
assigned to departments involved are accomplished within the framework which, in turn, depends to 
a fullest extent on the degree to which coordination among departments involved is achieved. In 
other words, policy implementation is a process comprising a series of interdependent functions, 
and the accomplishment of these functions within the time frame and funds allocated depends to a 
greater extent on the degree to which coordination among departments involved is achieved. When 
coordination takes place properly,  it  meets the deadline in completing the projects and prevents 
wasteful expenditure of funds. Thus, policy is implemented successfully when coordination in the 
activities of all involved takes place properly. The UNO remarked as quoted below:
That policy implementation can undoubtedly be considered as successful, implemented 
based on the coordinated efforts of those involved. However, the question is how far 
does coordination take place among departments involved in policy implementation? 
Policy implementation is delayed or even stopped in some cases when there is lack of 
coordination among those involved. Moreover, projects are cancelled sometimes due to 
problems associated with coordination. However, in the case of lack of coordination, 
policy implementation leads to wastage of time and funds. Therefore, coordination is 
considered important in ensuring successful policy implementation.
 
The Agriculture officer commented as follows:
Coordination is of great importance when a policy is executed by several departments 
because whether the implementation of policies would be successful depends largely on 
the extent to which coordination among departments involved is achieved.
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The above data signify the fact that the need for inter-departmental coordination is paramount when 
policy is implemented by several departments. 
5.2.1. Existing mechanisms of coordination
In answering the question of how inter-departmental coordination takes place in an upazila, all the 
respondents  (N  =7)  held  similar  view in  favour  of  the  UDCC,  departmental  committees,  and 
informal communication as the effective mechanisms to achieve  inter-departmental coordination. 
According  to  5  respondents,  as  per  the  Upazila  Parishad  Ordinance  of  2008,  15  standing 
committees in upazila are supposed to have been formed, but no initiative has yet been taken in this 
regard and only two respondents reported that there was a provision to constitute a sub-committee. 
At the same time, however, they revealed that the provision with regard to the formation of sub-
committee is not practiced. The UNO remarked as stated below:
Departmental committees can constitute sub-committees depending on the nature of the 
activities accomplished by the departments. Moreover, the UDCC may also form sub-
committees to monitor and coordinate the activities assigned to the departments in an 
upazila  if  required.  However,  the  UDCC hardly constitutes  a  sub-committee  as  the 
officer in charge of the department concerned does not take into consideration the issue 
of the formation of sub-committee as a way of functioning well; rather it  is seen as 
naked interference of others.
This finding supports Obaidullah’s observation that some sub-committees, including the Upazila 
Project Committee (UZPC) and the Upazila Planning and Evaluation Committee (UZPEC), exist to 
ensure coordination. In conducting research, he finds out that there is no such existence of UZPEC 
in two out of three upazilas (Obaidullah, 1999: 118).
5.2.2. Coordination problems faced by respondents 
Another question asked was whether or not the respondents felt any coordination problem in policy 
implementation while they worked with other officials in charge of various departments. They all 
(N = 7) agreed that there were problems in ensuring coordination while they worked with other 
officials. In addition,  they identified some problems in response to the question on what major 
problems they faced in ensuring coordination. These are presented below. 
a. Lack of clear definition with respect to the division of activities among departments 
In the case of inter-departmental  activities,  coordination takes place when departments perform 
assigned functions properly. The question is what is the state of coordination when there is lack of 
division of functions among departments? In the case of the upazila, the departments involved in 
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inter-departmental activities are not aware which department is responsible for what activity, when 
it should be executed, and how the execution must be carried out. Thus, ensuring synchronization of 
the functions  assigned to  the departments  involved has  become problematic,  hence the  lack  of 
coordination (more discussions on pages 68-69).
b. Lack of cooperation
Ensuring coordination depends largely on how cordially and timely officers involved cooperate 
with each other when involvement of multiple departments in policy implementation is the concern. 
In  the  case  of  the  upazila,  there  is  a  pronounced  lack  of  spontaneous  cooperation  among  the 
departments involved in policy implementation. As a result, problems arise in ensuring coordination 
(more discussions on pages 94-95).
c. Existence of obsolete laws and regulations
As noted earlier, there is a lack of specification of functions among the departments involved in 
inter-departmental activities. What are then the reasons that can explain this lack of division of 
function among departments? Existing rules and regulations are not suited for the present context 
where specialization of functions has gained attention to a greater extent. Moreover, there is a lack 
of rules in an upazila which could guide the departments involved in inter-departmental activities. 
Thus, the lack of coordination has become a persistent issue (more discussions on pages 67-69).
d. Dualism in control over officers
The issue of coordination in an upazila has become intense because a system of dual authority with 
respect to the control over the officers exists, that is, one servant serves two masters. The question is 
how does this dualism affect coordination? Officers who belong to the upazila level are required to 
follow the instruction of respective departmental heads at the district and they also act under the 
guidance of the UNO whose main function is to coordinate the activities of the upazila. Problems 
arise in coordination when instructions are given by two authority levels for a similar function at the 
same time. In the given circumstance, it is difficult for the officers to decide whom to follow. Thus, 
Karim rightly notes that officials in an upazila become stuck in a perplexing situation (Karim, 1991: 
53). Husain (1985) and Mannan (1984) also note that officers in many upazilas are reluctant to 
follow the charter of duties as outlined in the manual because of fear of departmental superiors who 
may not agree with the government’s policy with regard to decentralised administration (cited in 
Ahmed, 1991: 30). As a result, administrative efficiency is suffocated and the subsequent delivery 
of services is delayed (Zafarullah and Khan, 1989: 19).
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e. Lack of proper functioning of the committees
Committees as key mechanisms of coordination are considered important to ensure coordination in 
the activities of various departments. In the case of ensuring coordination through committees, the 
root of coordination lies in sharing information. Information on many issues, such as who is doing 
what, who is having what problem, who needs what, and so forth, are shared when discussions 
during meetings of the committee take place. As a result, coordination is ensured in the effort of a 
group of persons assigned to perform specific functions toward common goals. Thus, the extent to 
which coordination is achieved through committees depends largely on how frequently the meetings 
of a committee are held; how many members attend, bring up issues in the meetings, and participate 
in  the  discussion  of  such  issues;  and  how well  they  interact  and  how cordial  they are  to  the 
problems faced by others. 
However, despite having committees for ensuring coordination in an upazila, coordination does not 
take place properly because of the ineffectiveness of the role played by the committees in ensuring 
coordination among departments. A committee called UDCC exists to ensure coordination among 
departments in an upazila: despite the meetings of the UDCC taking place regularly44, coordination 
has remained an issue as  members,  particularly the people’s  representatives,  are  usually absent 
during meetings. Moreover, very few problems associated with departmental functions are hardly 
discussed during the meetings.  Apart  from the UDCC, each department has its  own committee 
comprised  of  several  officers  of  various  departments  in  order  to  take  care  of  intra-  and  inter-
departmental  functions  and  ensure  coordination  among  these.  In  the  case  of  departmental 
committees, representatives from other departments are not punctual in attending meetings. Thus, 
regular and systematic discussions with all members do not take place either in the meetings of the 
UDCC or in departmental committees; this finding corroborates the fact that the committee system 
in an upazila suffers from  the problems of members’ attendance in the meetings   (Houqe et al., 
undated,  cited in Ahmed,  1991: 34).  In addition,  conflicting relations among various groups of 
officials  and  between  officials  and  people’s  representative  have  prevented  fruitful  interactions 
during the meetings (Ahmed, 1991: 34). Thus, coordination has remained a major issue given that 
only the effective functioning of committee can lead to proper coordination. 
f. Dual authority in disbursement of funds and its impact on timely disbursement
Funds  are  indispensable  for  policy implementation,  because  deadlines  are  met  when funds  are 
disbursed on time. In the case of the disbursement of funds allocated under the ADP, there is a 
44 Refers to regular monthly meetings held by the UDCC. 
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system of dual authority in the upazila. For example, the UNO and the LGED’s engineer are jointly 
responsible for drawing money from the bank when rural infrastructure development policy is the 
concern. In most of the cases, funds are not disbursed in time as their opinions quite often vary. As a 
result, problems arise in coordination among departments involved in policy implementation. Now 
the  question  is  why the  opinion  of  the  UNO,  who is  a  non-technical  officer  and  unlikely has 
expertise required to give judgment on the quality of technical work, should vary with that of the 
LGED’s engineer (more discussions on pages 72-74). 
g. Apathy toward the rules 
Apart from the lack of rules, there is a tendency among some of the officials not to follow rules. 
Thus, the functions assigned to them are accomplished as per their preference rather than in the way 
specified by the rules. As a result, problems arise in the midst of the accomplishment of functions 
since  their  apathy  toward  the  rules  causes  lack  of  coherence  of  functions,  leading  to  poor 
coordination (more discussions on page 70).
h. Lack of skilled and adequate human resource 
Coordination takes place automatically when there are required numbers of officers with necessary 
skills and knowledge, and the functions assigned to them are accomplished properly. The question 
is how are interdependent functions carried out in a coordinated manner when there is a lack of 
skilled and adequate officers? Inter-departmental  functions are done without ensuring necessary 
coordination in an upazila as lack of skilled officer and shortage of officer have been an acute 
problem (more discussions on pages 75-78).
i. Discrimination among civil servants 
In terms of the rank and status of the officers, they are supposed to be privileged equally. In the case 
of the upazila, there is discrimination between the generalist and the specialist officers in terms of 
privileges they get. For example, the UNO, who is a generalist officer, holds a higher rank and is 
more privileged compared with other specialist officers. Under these circumstances, there has been 
discontent among the latter group of officers that leads to the lack of cooperation between them. In 
turn, this leads to coordination problems (more discussions on pages 87-88).
j. Lack of loyalty to the chief coordinator at the upazila 
Inter-departmental function is a teamwork in which there is a leader. Team members should obey 
their leader and the leader should have due respect to team members. In the case of the upazila, the 
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UNO is supposed to be a leader because his responsibility is to coordinate different functions of the 
upazila. However, the loyalty of the officers in charge of different departments to the UNO is lesser 
as compared with their loyalty to their respective departmental heads at the district level. This could 
be attributed to the fact that they seldom bother about the coordinating role of the UNO as he is 
neither their direct commanding authority nor is he empowered to write their Annual Confidential 
Report (ACR45). Rather, the authority to write their ACR is delegated to departmental heads at the 
district level. Therefore, the career prospect for officers posted at the upazila depends largely on the 
degree to which their departmental heads at district headquarters are satisfied with them. Given that 
partisan  politics  is  a  determinant  factor  in  Bangladeshi  society  (for  example,  job  seekers  are 
identified as whether they have an affiliation with the political party in power), satisfaction of one’s 
superior  depends  on  obedience,  rather  than  performance.  The  more  loyal  a  person  is  to  the 
departmental head at the district, the greater is his chance to succeed in his service career. This kind 
of  attitudinal  expression  of  the  officers  creates  dishonour  to  the  UNO  and  leads  to  lack  of 
cooperation. As a result, problems arise in coordination. 
k. Lack of proper linkages among departments
Interaction among departments  is  considered important  because information is  exchanged when 
interaction takes place; consequently, such an exchange leads to coordination. However, since there 
is lack of proper linkages among departments in upazila, the required information is not transmitted. 
As such, problems of coordination occur among them (more discussions on pages 79-81).
Examples: 
Two  examples  are  illustrated  here  with  regard  to  the  problems  respondents  face  in  ensuring 
coordination during policy implementation in the upazila level.
One example of lack of proper functioning of committees46 
Under  the  Annual  Development  Fund  2007/08,  I,  the  Officer  of  the  Livestock 
Department, received an allocation of a certain amount of money for purchasing three 
refrigerators  for  three sub-centers47.  According  to  the  rules,  the  issue  related  to 
purchasing is subject to the approval of the Project Implementation Committee  (PIC)48. 
However, PIC meetings have not been held since for a long time. Thus, I personally 
45 ACR is the evaluation of an officer by his superior and is used to facilitate promotion.
46 This was stated in an interview of an official in charge of the Livestock Department.
47 The sub-centre refers to the sub-office. The Livestock Department has some sub-centres across the upazila. The 
number of sub-centres depends on the size of the upazila. 
48 A committee exists in an upazila which consists of governmental officials and public representatives. Among others, 
the main function of the PIC is to make estimations for projects, including excavation of land and filling up holes on 
roads.
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communicated  with the  Project  Implementation Officer  (PIO) and requested  that  he 
calls a PIC meeting. Conversely, he requested me to communicate with other members 
of PIC and to find a time convenient for all. Accordingly, I made the effort to reach 
everyone, but some of them informed me that they were busy and it was not possible for 
them to attend the meeting if one was called. Then, I discussed it with the PIO and he 
himself informed me of his inability to attend the meeting if it was held fifteen days 
later. Due to the lack of coordination among them, the purchasing of the refrigerators 
was delayed. Thus, the medicines that were supposed to be preserved in the refrigerators 
were  not  sent  to  sub-centres.  Ultimately,  the  people  were  deprived  of  receiving 
government’s livestock services on time. 
An example of the disbursement of funds not made on time49 
Through the funds allocated under the ADP 2007/08, the construction of a two-storey 
building of the UNPB50 School in the Dhaperhat51 Union was begun. However, it went 
half done for several months because the fund was not disbursed on time. According to 
Kalam (owner of Kalam Enterprise, the construction company overseeing the project), 
‘I withdrew an amount of taka worth around 4.80 lacs (US $ 7018) against the total 
amount of expenditure in taka of around 7.5 lacs (US $ 10965). I could not meet the 
deadline for the completion of the construction since money was not disbursed on time. 
Although  the  engineer  of  the  LGED gave  timely  assent,  the  UNO was  delayed  in 
providing his consent. Consequently, the disbursement of money was also delayed’.
The above analyses reveal a variety of coordination problems occurring in policy implementation in 
an  upazila.  What  are  the  factors  responsible  for  such  coordination  problems?  These  will  be 
discussed in the proceeding sections.
5.2.3. How does coordination matter?
As several departments are involved in policy implementation in an upazila and implementation 
functions  are  assigned  to  the  departments  involved.  There  is  interdependency  among  the 
departments involved since one’s action leads others to act. The lack of coordination causes failure 
in establishing harmony in the assigned functions, thereby causing delays in implementation that, in 
turn, leads to failure in meeting the deadlines. Consequently, more time is required to implement 
policy functions, causing wastage that ultimately amplifies implementation costs. Worse,  people 
undergo unnecessary suffering when implementation is delayed. The LGED engineer pointed out 
that  the lack of coordination causes problems in the activities of various departments involved, 
leading to poor policy implementations. In fact, problems of coordination arise around the office of 
the UNO. He proceeded:
A file concerning the bill of a construction work was sent to the office of the UNO for 
49 This was delineated by a contractor when interviewed.
50 UNPB refers to Upandranath (name of a person) Prathomik (primary in English) Biddaloy (school in English); this 
primary school was named after the founder of this school. 
51 A place in Shadullapur Upazila.
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approval. He delayed signing in retaliation to the decision of the tender committee52 not 
to award the work order to his chosen contractor53.  The delayed signature of the UNO 
subsequently caused failure in ensuring timely disbursement of money; more than half 
of the construction works must then be accomplished within a short period of time in 
order to meet the implementation deadline. As a result, the quality of construction work 
was not ensured as specified in the LGED’s manual. 
5.2.4. Ways to ensure coordination as suggested by respondents
Respondents were further  asked about the mechanisms that,  in their  opinion,  can ensure sound 
coordination among various departments. The respondents’ opinions differed because they had little 
experience with similar problems that impede coordination. Thus, they identified those issues they 
encountered  as  problems  of  coordination.  The  mechanisms  for  ensuring  sound coordination  as 
suggested by the respondents are: authentication of lines of responsibility, formation of the standing 
committees and ensuring the effectiveness of the committee’s existence, a system of single authority 
in  disbursement  of funds,  involvement  of  the officer  concerned in  the disbursement  process  of 
funds,  proper  emphasis  toward  the  opinion  of  officers  concerned  in  departmental  function, 
placement of the UNO as an advisor in all committees,  service-oriented attitude of the officers 
irrespective of cadres, empowering the UNO more by including the power to write ACR of all 
officers posted at the upazila, and placing the UNO as the chief of all committees. 
The above data clearly reveal that the issue of inter-departmental coordination in an upazila has 
been problematic owing to the presence of some problems discussed above. As a result, the policy is 
executed without ensuring necessary coordination among the departments involved.
5.3. Does formal division of labour matter? 
Formal division of labour is considered important in guiding organisations in ensuring coordination 
in the activities accomplished. Specialization decides who will do what, when, and how; everyone 
becomes aware of what must be done in a given situation when behaviour is formalised (Mintzberg, 
1979: 83). 
5.3.1. Why does division of labour matter?
Coordination depends on timely and properly performance of functions of those involved which, in 
52 There is a tender committee in upazila consisting of five members. Committee's members are Upazila Engineer, 
LGED (convener), Senior sub-assistant engineer, LGED (member secretary), Upazila Agriculture Officer (member), 
Upazila  Education  Officer  (member)  and  Sub-assistant  engineer,  Public  Health  and  Engineering  Department 
(member). Function of this committee is to select contractor among those who take part in tender process.
53 An allegation of failure to meet the deadline of implementation of construction stood against the said contractor. 
Moreover, he was accused of corruption for using construction materials of lower quality.
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turn, depends on the extent to which departments involved are aware of their functions. This is 
division of labour which specifies the function of each involved. These views were expressed by the 
respondents when asked to give and explain their opinions on the importance of division of labour 
in ensuring coordination. The Fisheries officer stated that functions are not specified when there is 
lack  of  division  of  labour.  The  lack  of  specification  of  functions  causes  poor  coordination. 
Furthermore, the chairman of UPZ made the following remark:
Division of labour bears more importance because each individual can perform their 
assigned functions properly, thereby leading to increased coordination. The question is 
whether division of labour exists. I have taken an  oath of office of the head of local 
government at the upazila level but there is still no specific duty and responsibility that I 
must follow. Although the Upazila Parishad (Reintroduction of the Repealed Act and 
Amendment) Act of 2009 has been passed in the Parliament and is now being enforced, 
my  role  has  not  been  explicitly  defined  in  this  act.  At  present,  my  only  duty and 
responsibility is to simply report for work.   
An example of the lack of division of labour and clearly defined roles and their impact on 
coordination54 
With due  respect  to  the electoral  pledges,  the present  government  initiated to  bring 
changes in the structure and composition of the local government at the upazila level in 
order to strengthen the system of local governance in Bangladesh. A local election was 
held in January 22, 2009. In order to place the upazila administration at the disposal of 
the elected local government in the upazila, a circular with regard to the operation of the 
functions of the UPZ under the Upazila Parishad (Reintroduction of the Repealed Act 
and  Amendment)  Act  of  2009  was  enforced  (http://www.lgd.gov.bd/downloads.). 
Unfortunately, neither the duties nor responsibilities of the chairman of UPZ and the 
UNO have been specified, and the role of the UNO either as an executive officer of 
upazila or as a secretary of UPZ has not been made clear in this circular. Thus, it is still 
unidentified who (between the chairman of UPZ and the UNO) will play what role and 
whose  approval  is  needed for  what. In  the  given  context,  some  secretaries55 of  the 
Government  of  Bangladesh  (GoB),  have  expressed  their  worries  on  the  issue  of 
coordination. They mentioned that the existing situation in the upazilas is not favourable 
for effective coordination. Today, whether or not the chairman of UPZ or the UNO will 
preside  over  the  meetings  of  the  UDCC  or  the  state  programmes  in  upazila  has 
remained unclear (The Daily Prothom Alo, 25.03.2009). 
5.3.2. Do existing rules matter?
Another question asked was about their opinions regarding the role of existing rules in specifying 
the functions of  each individual involved in inter-departmental activities. Despite having a large 
number of rules, there is no particular rule that can specify the functions of everyone involved in 
inter-departmental activities. Some are ambiguous and overlapping in nature, and others are weak in 
that many aspects required for effective enforcement have been overlooked. Moreover, six out of 
54 This example has been presented on the basis of secondary data.
55  Secretaries are the top most civil servants in Bangladesh, and each ministry is headed by a secretary.
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seven respondents stated that existing rules are not easy to understand, indicating ambiguousness. 
However, these discussions lead to the assumption that there is lack of division of labour among the 
departments involved in inter-departmental  activities in an upazila.  A question was asked as to 
whether or not the lack of division of labour creates problems in coordination. They all (N = 7) 
concurred that problems arise in coordination when division of labour is not specified.
 
5.3.3. How does division of labour matter?
The question asked was ‘How does the lack of division of labour affect coordination?’ Coordination 
takes place when departments accomplish assigned functions as specified by the division of labour. 
This  is  because  the  division  of  labour  not  only  draws  a  boundary  among  functions,  but  also 
specifies the time and manner in which a particular function must be accomplished. Therefore, the 
reason behind coordination by division of labour is that the division of labour clarifies the functions 
of each involved. With regard to the above discussion, it is argued that the clearer the division of 
labour is,  the greater  the extent of awareness among departments;  in turn,  the more awareness 
departments  gain,  the  greater  will  be  the  possibility  of  timely  and  proper  accomplishment  of 
functions.  Finally,  the more functions departments accomplish in time,  the better  the degree of 
coordination  will  be.  Likewise,  the  extent  of  coordination  will  be  better  when  there  is  more 
rationalization of individual behaviours through clear division of labour.  This finding resembles 
Mooney’s observation that coordination depends largely on the extent to which functions assigned 
to organisations are clearly defined and promulgated (cited in McCurdy, 1983: 115). 
One of the respondents pointed out that when there is lack of division of labour, difficulties in 
ascertaining who does what cannot be avoided; in such a case, duplication of activities and efforts 
of those involved occurs. Another respondent mentioned that due to the absence of clear division of 
labour, they do not know what their duties and responsibilities are in inter-departmental activities. 
Although they are told to cooperate with others, in reality, they can hardly cooperate as they are 
largely involved in  intra-departmental  function.  This  has  caused  coordination problems in  their 
functions. The Agriculture officer commented as quoted below: 
I once received a letter from the ministry mentioning that a program called ‘Folod o 
Brikkho Ropon Pokkho o Mela’56 has to be organised. It was also instructed in the letter 
that a committee comprising five members from different departments must be formed. 
It was surprising that it did not refer to which member will take care of what duties and 
responsibilities in organizing that program in instruction. He further noted: 
56 A Bengali sentence referring to an arrangement of a 15-day program called ‘Yielding Fruits and Tree Plantation 
Exhibition’.
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I do not understand coordination. I do not bother whether coordination exists or not. The 
only thing I understand is that I have to actualise those tasks assigned to me. Being an 
officer in charge of the agriculture department, I am responsible for accomplishing all 
the tasks related to agriculture in the upazila, and I have to do it even though no other 
officer cooperates with me.
The LGED engineer mentioned that the lack of division of labour has created role ambiguity among 
departments that has led to the lack of inter-departmental coordination. He proceeded:
After a small bridge in the Faridpur57 Union broke down, I immediately contacted the 
UNO for the necessary actions to reconstruct the bridge but I was told to contact the 
chairman of the UPZ. The chairman referred the file to the UNO when I talked about 
this issue to him. This is an indication that neither the UNO nor the chairman of UPZ 
had any clear idea about their respective roles in this regard. Thus, there existed a role 
ambiguity between them, creating conflict  that  caused lack of cooperation and poor 
coordination. 
The UNO stated that coordination is quite problematic because of some weak rules. Despite the fact 
that officers assigned at the upazila are required to work under the guidance of both their respective 
departmental  heads  at  the  district  and  the  UNO  at  the  upazila,  they  are  accountable  to  their 
respective  departmental  heads  at  the  district  as  per  the  rule.  In  this  regard,  the  UNO raised  a 
question on how officers working at the upazila would deal with the problem if it arises in their 
functions, and who would solve such a problem? Moreover, in most cases of intra-departmental 
function, the UNOs are not informed as nothing is specified in the rule on this respect. Worse, even 
the functions accomplished by the officers are hardly visited and inspected by district level officials. 
These findings confirm that ‘district level officials did not feel they had much contact at the upazila 
level.  They would pass on important circulars and instructions to the upazila level officers and 
advice them on technical matters when they are approached for such advice’ (Alam et al, 1994: 30). 
He gave an example presented below: 
The office of the LGED in the Shadullapur Upazila was working for the construction of 
a road. All tasks related to that construction work from tender calling to the issuance of 
work order were done by the office of the LGED located at district level. I was neither 
involved with nor officially informed about such construction work. In the midst of the 
implementation,  construction  work  was  resisted  by  the  local  people.  Upon  the 
occurrence  of  that  incidence,  the  upazila  engineer  of  the  LGED and the  contractor 
contacted me, not the officer in charge of the office of the LGED of the district. Later, I 
resolved that problem with the help of the AC Land. He further added: 
Basically the problem associated with that construction work was the acquisition of 
land. If appropriate rules existed, the problem that I had resolved would have never 
occurred. The AC Land mainly assigned to take care of the issues related to the land in 
upazila is supposed to be consulted before any project which requires land use. In fact, 
57 This is a place in the Shadullapur Upazila.
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weak rules have caused such kind of coordination problem. 
The LGED engineer pointed out that apart from the lack of division of labour, another important 
reason for the lack of awareness about duties and responsibilities is apathy. Officers hardly read 
rules, but on the contrary, work either on the basis of their own judgment or on the records left by 
their  predecessors.  Now  the  question  is  why  does  apathy  toward  rules  exist  among  officers? 
Performance is not the main concern of the Bangladesh civil service, especially since the reward 
system in the civil service is more ‘network and relation-based’58 rather than performance-based. 
There is a proverb on civil service in the Bangladeshi society which states: “It is easy to get a job in 
the  public  service,  but  difficult  to  lose  it  once  obtained’.  Thus,  the  duties  and responsibilities 
entrusted  to  officials  are  poorly  performed  because  they  are  done  not  out  of  a  sense  of 
responsibility,  thereby constituting  a  perennial  problem of  the  Bangladesh  civil  service  system. 
Such tendency of the civil servants only proves another Bangladeshi proverb: ‘sorkari mal doriya 
may dhal’ which in English means ‘who cares about the public property’? 
The  reason  behind  this  tendency  is  rooted  in  the  lack  of  institutionalization  of  the  fact  that 
negligence in accomplishing functions on the basis of written documents is subject to sanction in 
the civil service. Moreover, civil servants are, in fact, punished when they do not serve the political 
parties  especially  the  party  in  power.  This  means  that  partisan  politics,  (e.g.  patron-client 
relationship) exists between the political parties and civil servants in Bangladesh causing apathy 
among civil servants with regards obedience to existing rules. Partisan politics has also led civil 
servants to think and act on the basis of logic of consequence rather logic of appropriateness, which 
means that the tradition of apathy toward the rules has been  institutionalized in the civil service. 
Such backward culture only confirms Perrow’s note on Selznick's (1957) view that ‘organisations 
are  not  the rational  creatures they pretend to be but  [are]  vehicle[s]  for  embodying  sometimes 
surreptitious) values’ (cited in Scott, 2001: 25). The LGED engineer remarked:
You would be surprised to hear that officers in charge of various departments are not 
aware of the provision for constituting sub-committees; although there is a provision 
that a departmental committee can constitute sub-committees depending on the nature 
of  activities  accomplished  by  the  department  in  order  to  ensure  cooperation  and 
coordination among those involved. He also stated: 
A project entitled ‘Local Government Support Program’ (LGSP) is being implemented 
by the LGED in each upazila. Under this project, two committees are supposed to be 
constituted by the LGED. One is at the union level and another is at the ward. In the 
case of the Shadullapur Upazila, both committees exist on paper only. 
58 Network  and  relation  refer  to  the  relationship  between  intra-cadre  officials  and  the  relationship  between 
government officials and political leaders.
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The above example attests to the fact that there is extreme apathy among officers in following the 
rules, considering that the respondent himself is the LGED engineer of the Shadullapur Upazila. 
Moreover, the above discussion reveals that there is hardly any monitoring as to who is doing what 
and how in the civil service. Thus, apart from the lack of division of labour and apathy in following 
the rules, the lack of proper monitoring on whether rules are followed or applied in performing 
respective functions has become another problem of inter-departmental coordination in an upazila. 
This is because the lack of monitoring resulted in the failure to ensure the accountability of officers 
in discharging duties as specified. In turn, this failure has impeded the division of labour. Proper 
monitoring can lead to better application of division of labour; the better the application of division 
of labour, the better the coordination will be. This finding helps in understanding Gulick’s (1937) 
proposal  stating  that  ‘the  more  specialization  in  a  public  organisation,  the  more  pressure  for 
increased coordination, or vice versa’ (cited in Christensen and Lægreid, 2008: 101). Thus, it may 
be said that  in  ensuring coordination,  the monitoring of  application of  division of labour  is  as 
important as the existence of division of labour. 
An example of apathy toward the rules59 
Under the ADP, an amount of taka worth about 3,200,000 (US $ 46,784) was allocated 
for the construction of a two-storey building for a primary school. After completing 
one-third of the project, construction was halted. Abdul Mannan, owner of the land on 
which the school was established, donated the land at least forty years back without any 
written documents. Even the school authority took no initiative to register the land in 
the name of the school. In 1990, a one-storey building was constructed on a certain part 
of the land. The remaining part of the land was cultivated by the local people. Problems 
arose when another building was constructed in 2007. The locals who cultivated the 
land claimed ownership of land as he had made its registration in his name possible. 
Even after seven months, the problem remained unresolved. Later, allocation of money 
for the supposed two-storey building was cancelled. As a result, both time and resources 
were wasted and a large number of pupils suffered as classes were held in a very limited 
space60, compromising the quality of education. All these happened due to the apathy to 
follow the rules. There should have been a provision dictating a consultation with the 
AC Land to ensure that there was no problem with the location of the project before the 
project plan was sent to the ministry or division for final approval. 
This is an example of the lack of coordination resulting from apathy toward the rules. This project 
was selected based on the notion of adjudication, instead of following the rules. The above analyses 
reveal that although formal division of labour has great influence on coordination, an acute problem 
in ensuring coordination in an upazila is the lack of division of labour. Apart from this, apathy and 
the  absence  of  a  monitoring  system  to  ensure  its  proper  application  are  also  responsible  for 
59 This is an example brought up by a respondent.
60 According to government rules, the ideal ratio between the number of student and the number of classroom is 46:1.
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coordination problems in an upazila. These findings corroborate the findings of Panday’s study on 
coordination, policy implementation and urban governance in Bangladesh, which revealed that the 
more structured the institutional rules and regulations are in terms of who will do what and when, 
the less will be the coordination problems met during policy implementation (Panday, 2004: 73). 
Thus, it can be concluded that problems arise in coordination in an upazila mainly due to the lack of 
division  of  labour.  This  supports  the  hypothesis  that  the  lack  of  division  of  labour  impedes 
coordination among departments.
5.4. Resources
5.4.1. Does financial resource matter? 
As previously mentioned, coordination is a function of interdependence. Thus, the extent to which 
coordination among departments involved is achieved depends on the degree to which funds are 
disbursed in time by the department empowered, as timely disbursement of funds leads other to act.
a. Why does financial resource matter?
In response to the issue of the importance of funds or financial resources in ensuring coordination 
when multiple departments are involved in policy implementation, the respondents pointed out that 
funds  are  of  great  importance  in  ensuring  coordination  among  departments  involved  in  policy 
implementation. Coordination depends on the timely disbursement and adequacy of funds that help 
achieve  the  successful  completion  of  functions  and  lead  to  improved  coordination.  However, 
timeliness in disbursement of funds, apart from adequate funding, is an important factor ensuring 
coordination in an upazila; this is evidenced by the fact that all the respondents (N = 7) opined in 
favour of timely funding when asked about the importance of such factors. This is because funds 
are  allocated  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of  the  project  approved  by  the  authority 
concerned61. Hence, the untimely disbursement of funds is a major cause impeding coordination.
b. How does financial resource matter?
In answer to the question ‘How does timely funding foster coordination’? the respondents stated 
that when funds are disbursed in due time, departments or individuals whose actions are dependent 
on funds  can  start  to  operate  timely,  further  influencing  others’ actions.  The  end result  of  this 
61 Projects can be selected by the people’s representatives (member of the Parliament, Chairman of Upazila Parishad 
and Chairman of Union Parishad) or bureaucrats at the local level. A list of projects selected with an estimate is sent 
to the ministries or divisions concerned for approval. A project has never been seen approved with the fund which is 
less than the requirement. The required amount of fund estimated by the concerned department at the local level 
must be allocated, if the project is approved.
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process  ensures  synchronization  in  the  functions  of  departments  involved;  in  turn,  this  ensures 
sound coordination in their activities. With untimely disbursement of funds, not only are time and 
resources wasted, but the beneficiaries of the policy or project are also deprived of their rights to 
receive timely services from the government. Their opinions have been summarised and shown in 
Figure 15. Thus, it can be argued that the extent to which coordination is achieved depends to the 
fullest  extent  on  the  degree  to  which  funds  are  disbursed  in  due  course.  Thus,  timely  fund 
disbursement results in improved coordination.  
Figure 15: Relationship between timely funding and coordination based on respondents’ opinions
Source: Author.
c. Does the existing pattern of fund disbursement matter?
In order to know the state of disbursement of funds in the upazila, the question asked was whether 
or not funds are disbursed on time. Funds were revealed as not being disbursed in time at all as 
opined by all the respondents (N= 1562). One respondent, a contractor, remarked as quoted below:
Despite the perpetuation of the problem of  untimely disbursement of funds, we work 
and maybe, will still work in the future as it is our profession. He proceeded: 
Under the Flood Rehabilitation Project implemented by the LGED, I constructed a two-
storey building for a primary school in the Rasulpur63 Union. Even after completing 90 
percent of the works, I did not receive any money. There was nothing I could do about 
it. Nonetheless, I was not disheartened to carry on another job order for the construction 
of a 3 km-long road in the Dhaperhat Union.  
The above discussion suggests that untimely fund disbursement is a problem in an upazila that, in 
turn, has worsened inter-departmental coordination.
d. How is coordination impeded by the untimely disbursement of funds?
Respondents  were  asked  to  provide  their  opinions  regarding  the  problems  associated  with  the 
untimely disbursement of funds in an upazila. There is a provision stating that the withdrawal of 
funds under the ADP at the upazila level requires the joint signature of the UNO and the officer of 
the department concerned. For example, in the case of the implementation of rural infrastructure 
62 Respondents include government officials and contractors who were 7 and 8 in number, respectively.
63 This is a place in the Shadullapur Upazila.
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development policies, the issuance of a cheque depends on the signature of the UNO and the LGED 
engineer at the upazila. This provision aggravates the problem of coordination, indicating that the 
untimely disbursement of funds is an outcome of the lack of consensus between the UNO and the 
officer concerned regarding the withdrawal of funds. This can be explained by some factors: one is 
the lack of trust between the UNO and the officer concerned. When trust exists, parties involved 
have confidence on each other, thereby facilitating the process of joint action (e.g., partnership as 
they have similar preferences and choices). In the case of joint actions such as the withdrawal of 
funds,  the  UNO quite  often  differs  with  the  opinions  given  by the  engineer  on  the  quality  of 
activities  to  be implemented  as  there  is  a  lack  of  similar  preference and choice between them 
because of their cadre differences, leading to the lack of consensus on the withdrawal of funds and 
subsequent delays in disbursement. Another is administrative culture or history of civil service; the 
engineer is expected to flatter the UNO for having the ‘best’ opinion. Moreover, the UNOs are 
inclined to demonstrate power when things run counter to their interest, an attitudinal expression of 
the UNOs rooted in the history of administration cadre ensuring the supremacy of its members over 
others. The engineer of the LGED gave an example as stated below:
During the construction of a complex for a Union Parishad, the UNO suddenly visited 
the site at which the wall of the complex was being plastered. For such work, ‘chikon 
baluka’64 was required, but the UNO argued that ‘mota baluka’65 should have been used 
instead,  as  is  the  common  practice  of  people  in  Bangladesh.  As  an  engineer  with 
relevant academic background, however, I know what type of sand is suitable for what 
kind of construction work. Unfortunately, the UNO declined to sign the cheque for the 
supposed fund.
In addition, corruption in some case, if not all,  matters since it has been institutionalised in the 
public sector of Bangladeshi society. A contractor stated that: 
In fact, funds are not disbursed on time due to the lack of consensus between the UNO 
and the LGED engineer concerning their own financial benefits. He proceeded:
Once,  there  was  an  urgent  need  to  sign  a  cheque  concerning  the  bill  of  a  certain 
construction within the 30th of June, as after this date the funds would automatically 
bounce  off.  Although the  engineer  of  the  LGED was  convinced,  the  UNO delayed 
signing the cheque as he was not satisfied with the money the engineer offered him. 
Since there was no other option but to satisfy the UNO, the money he demanded was 
provided. 
The above statement and example attests to the involvement of officers in corruption regarding the 
disbursement of funds.
64 This is a type of sand in Bangladesh.
65 This is yet another type of sand in Bangladesh.
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5.4.2 Does human resource matter? 
Prior to proceeding with the discussion on skilled manpower and coordination, the meaning of skill 
and what kinds of skills are referred to must be clarified. In general, skill refers to the ability to do 
something. Here, skill refers to a specific ability considered highly useful for the accomplishment of 
an assigned function. A skill is mainly acquired by training and, to some extent, by experience.
a. Why does skilled human resource matter?
Coordination does not take place properly unless the officers involved are skilled. This is because 
the  required  skill  and  knowledge  automatically  ensures  coordination.  Given  that  functions  are 
assigned as  per  skill  and  knowledge,  these  helps  to  accomplish  functions  timely and properly, 
leading to improved coordination. Thus, it can be argued that coordination is achieved by virtue of 
the  level  of  skill  and  knowledge of  those  involved.  This  idea  helps  shed  light  on  Mintzberg’s 
observation stating that coordination is primarily a result of standardised skill (Mintzberg, 1979: 
201).
In response to the question on whether there is lack of skilled human resource in the upazila, they 
all (N = 7) converged that there is. The main issue now lies on the factors explaining the lack of 
skilled officers. To answer this query, a supplementary question was asked why there is lack of 
skilled officers in an upazila. Generally, technical and professional officers join the civil service 
with  some  degree  of  skills  and  knowledge  acquired  by  virtue  of  their  education  in 
technical/professional  universities  and  colleges  such  as  BUET  (Bangladesh  University  of 
Engineering and Technology),  agriculture  universities or medical  colleges,  apart  from acquiring 
some skills  and  knowledge  through professional  experiences.  However,  there  is  still  a  lack  of 
systematic and need-based training in the civil service system (e.g., lack of in-service training). 
Moreover, the shortage of staff has prevented the impartation of skills to officials, as many officials 
are not allowed to undergo any extensive training program timely due to the shortage of required 
staff. The Agriculture officer even remarked:
If officers working at the upazila level are promoted to the next higher position within a 
4- or 5-year interval, such as the members of the administration cadre, then fresh and 
younger officers would replace us, since the upazila is considered the entry level of 
some cadre services. In such case, upazila administration would collapse since none of 
the civil servants joins the civil service with requisite skill and knowledge; rather, they 
only acquire  these  required  skills  and  knowledge  through training  and  actual  work 
experience.  Unfortunately,  there  are  only few training courses  at  different  stages  of 
service.  
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The Livestock officer also commented:
None of the civil servants who entered the civil service possessed the required skill and 
knowledge.  Skill is developed through a variety of professional training across their 
service career.  Unfortunately,  many officials  have not undergone any comprehensive 
training program within 10 years of their service except their foundation training. I have 
hardly seen in my service career of 13 years that government employees are provided 
with required training consistent with the requirements of their professions.
In answering the question  of  whether  they experience problems in coordination due to lack of 
skilled human resource, all the respondents (N = 7) opined that they face problems in ensuring 
coordination because of the lack of skilled officers. 
b. How does skilled human resource matter?
The  question  asked  was  ‘How  does  lack  of  skilled  human  resource  affect  coordination?’ 
Coordination takes place through the timely completion of each individual’s respective function. 
Only skilled officers can accomplish assigned functions more efficiently and effectively through the 
proper utilisation of funds and time. This is because acquiring requisite skill and knowledge is the 
key to developing an understanding of  how effectively functions can be accomplished.  This  is 
especially true since factors such as timeliness,  punctuality,  discipline,  and commitment—all of 
which enhance one’s level of understanding—are embedded in skills and knowledge. In addition, 
ensuring coordination depends largely on the functional requirement of skills and knowledge since 
beginning one’s action depends on the completion of another’s, and timely completion of action 
demands  skill  and  knowledge.  For  example,  in  the  case  of  the  implementation  of  a  rural 
infrastructure development policy, the AC Land and LGED engineer are hardly required to meet as 
they know exactly what to expect of each other by virtue of their skill and knowledge. Moreover, 
despite the existence of problems in the functions accomplished by skilled people, a solution is 
produced by virtue of such skills and knowledge developed through their experience. Thus, it can 
be argued that increased skill and knowledge result in greater possibility of accomplishing functions 
in time; in turn, on time accomplishment of tasks results in improved coordination. In the case of 
lack of skill and knowledge, timely completion of each function is hardly met,  resulting in the 
inability to synchronise the functions they perform and worsened coordination problems.
c. How does shortage of human resource matter?
Workload of the officers and coordination
Shortage of officer was identified as an impediment in coordination as opined by the respondents 
(N=7). The underlying issue is how does this affect coordination. This has increased the workload 
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of existing officers. In the given situation, an acting officer cannot cooperate with other in a way 
that  a  full-time  officer  can.  Moreover,  lack  of  attention  to  inter-departmental  activities  is  a 
problematic  issue in  civil  service.  As a  result,  many activities  are  done without  consulting  the 
officer concerned whose action is required to commence to the task of others. Hence, failure in 
maintaining harmony of their assigned functions unavoidably leads to lack of coordination. The 
LGED engineer who deals with infrastructure-related policy and is over-loaded with tasks stated 
that:  
How it is possible for me to cooperate with others as they desire. My posting is in the 
Fulsori66 Upazila. In addition, I am also working in the Shadullapur Upazila. I normally 
do office for three days in Fulsori and for two days in Shadullapur. Sometimes, I come 
to Shadullapur once in a week or less because of my business in Fulsori.
The Fisheries officer remarked in the following manner:
I think shortage of human resource has caused a lack of synchronization of functions 
that, in turn, has led to lack of coordination among departments. 
The UNO stated that in addition to his duties and responsibilities, he is also acting as AC Land in 
the Shadullapur Upazila because of the vacancy of the post. However, not all functions that the AC 
Land deals  with  are  accomplished  with  his  counsel  as  he cannot  give  sufficient  time to  those 
functions due to having his involvement with a great deal of activities both inside and outside the 
upazila. Thus, problems arise in the process of accomplishing inter-departmental functions in which 
the AC Land is involved. This is an obvious outcome of the lack of coordination accrued from a 
shortage of such officer. He proceeded: 
A work order for the construction of a building for a primary school at the early stage67 
of implementation was cancelled due to a problem associated with the land on which 
the  building  was  supposed  to  be  constructed.  After  the  problem  arose,  the  LGED 
engineer spoke with me since I was in charge of the AC Land as well. Unfortunately, I 
could not help him since I was busy assisting the government in conducting peaceful 
national elections which was my priority at that moment. However, if the post of the AC 
Land  was  occupied,  such  a  problem would  not  occur  since  it  was  the  AC Land’s 
responsibility and he must be consulted regarding matters related to any sort of land 
dispute.  
To supplement data concerning the shortage of officers in an upazila, the current picture of the posts 
of the AC Land in Bangladesh is depicted in Table 6. Table 6 clearly shows that out of 476 AC Land 
posts, 403 are vacant, indicating that only 73 posts are occupied. The case of the Rajshahi68 Division 
66 It is a place in the Gaibandha District.
67 It refers to the beginning of implementation upon the completion of some steps, including project identification, its 
approval, money allocation, tender calling, receiving of tender, and issuance of work order.
68 It is the name of a palce of Bangladesh. 
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is the most serious where 120 posts are vacant; the Gaibandha District under Rajshahi Division has 
only 3 out of 7 posts occupied. The post of AC Land at Shadullapur Upazila is also vacant. 
Table 6: Total number of vacant and occupied posts of AC Land in Bangladesh
Countrywide Division-based Gaibandha District-Based
Total 
posts
Vacant 
posts
Name of 
division
Total 
posts
Vacant 
posts
Name of the 
Upazilas
Vacant
?
Occupied
? 
Total
476 403
Dhaka
476
87 Sadar Yes
7
Rajshahi 120 Sundorgonj Yes
Chitagong 83 Shaghata Yes
Khulna 50 Shadullapur Yes
Barisal 35 Palasbari Yes
Syhlet 28 Fulsori Yes
Gobindogonj Yes
Total 476 403 476 403 4 3 7
Source: The Prothom Alo ( 24.07.2009) and Author (The UNO of Shadullapur Upazila was informant here.)
Lack of consultation and coordination and untimely completion
The above data reveal that lack of consultation among officers impedes coordination. A question 
that now arises is how does it do so? When consultation does not take place,  the technical issues 
involved are overlooked as the officer concerned is the one who knows what the technical issues are 
and how these can be met. Thus, problems of coordination arise in the midst of accomplishing 
certain functions when question with regard to meeting the requirement of technical issues involved 
arises. As a result, the timely completion of tasks is not achieved. The LGED engineer gave an 
example as follows:
The Chief Engineer of the LGED once scheduled to visit some projects in the Fulsori 
and Saghata Upazilas. I had a lot of things to do ahead of his visit as my official posting 
was in Fulsori Upazila. Previously, I was scheduled to visit the construction site of a 
road in Shadullapur Upazila, and after that I was supposed to sign a cheque. Owing to 
my business in Fulsori, I could not find time to be in the office for more than one week 
in Shadullapur Upazila. However, upon coming back to Shadullapur Upazila, I visited 
the  construction  site  and  signed  the  cheque.  Disbursement  of  funds  is  a  matter  of 
agreement  on the fulfilment  of  technical  issues  involved between the UNO and the 
officer concerned. The lack of coordination causes disagreement; thus, funds were not 
disbursed on time since my absence caused lack of consultation and timely agreement 
between the UNO and me. If there was a full time officer, however, he would have 
visited the construction site on time and checked whether or not technical requirements 
were met. In such case,  funds would have been disbursed on time, ensuring prompt 
policy implementation.
The above story substantiates the fact that both financial and human resources play an important 
role in ensuring coordination. It was also found that there is lack of inter-departmental coordination 
in an upazila, as funds are not disbursed in time and the number of skilled and adequate staff is 
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insufficient. Thus, it can be concluded that the hypothesis ‘the more resources organisations can 
pool, the better the degree of coordination’ is supported in the present study. 
5.5. Does informal communication matter? 
Informal  communication  is  a  way  through  which  departments  involved  in  inter-departmental 
function  can  come  to  know  about  the  position  of  each  other  without  making  any  formal 
arrangement. Here, informal communication is understood to mean linkages and networks among 
departments  involved  in  policy  implementation  in  upazilas  outside  the  formal  channel  of 
communication. The way through which information is transmitted can take place face to face, over 
the phone,  during lunch meetings,  or  any other  preferably convenient  way.  Notably,  there  is  a 
difference  between  formal  and  informal  communication;  the  former  is  written  (e.g.,  rules, 
instructions, order), whereas the latter is self-motivated, need-based, and spontaneous. 
5.5.1. Why does informal communication matter?
Informal communication is integral in ensuring coordination. Moreover, informal communication 
has become one of the prominent mechanisms of coordination in an upazila, where formal division 
of  labour  is  lacking.  In  such  situation,  the  success  of  coordination  depends  on  how  assigned 
functions  are  accomplished  on  the  basis  of  mutual  understanding  among departments  involved 
which,  in turn,  depends on how frequently and effectively departments communicate with each 
other  informally.  Now  the  question  is  ‘What  is  it  in  informal  communication  that  fosters 
coordination’? The answer lies in information (which is about who does what and when), which 
paves the way toward improved coordination. In the case of lack of informal communication, the 
functions  assigned  to  departments  involved  are  accomplished  on  the  basis  of  departmental 
preferences, causing failure in maintaining any sequence of performance. This leads to overlapping 
and duplication of activities that also lead to wastage of time and resources. Thus, it can be argued 
that  functions  assigned to  departments  are  accomplished in  a highly individualistic,  rather  than 
collective manner when there is lack of informal communication. The UNO commented as follows: 
 Since there are no specific rules related to inter-departmental activities, the extent to 
which  coordination  is  achieved  depends  largely on  informal  communication  among 
various departments. In fact, informal communication is the backbone which ensures 
coordination of the activities done by various departments.  He proceeded:
 
A  state  program  was  held  in  upazila  a  couple  of  months  back,  and  there  was 
involvement  among  several  departments  or  offices  in  organizing  that  program.  The 
functions of each department were interrelated with other departments. Thereafter, the 
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program  had  to  be  managed  through  informal  communication  to  ascertain  which 
department would start working when as no rules existed to specify who will do what.
5.5.2. Does status quo matter?
A total of 5 out of 7 respondents claimed to hold infrequent communication, whereas the rest said 
that  they  have  frequent  communication  with  others  whenever  they  are  involved  in  policy 
implementation; likewise, they said that communication is mostly maintained over the phone. There 
are times when they also meet informally and discuss matters which make them appreciate the 
importance of communication.  The respondents  pointed out  that  the lack of willingness among 
officials  is  one  of  the  major  reasons  behind  infrequent  communication.  Moreover,  when 
communication is  assumed to  be informal  in  nature,  there  is  no obligation  motivating  them to 
engage in communication, which is self-driven, and whose success depends on the willingness of 
parties  involved.  The  responses  substantiate  the  fact  that  officers  who  demonstrate  better 
performance despite the absence of formal communication are supposed to be rewarded. The more 
an  informal  role  is  recognised,  the  more  the  officers  would  show  willingness  in  functioning 
informally. 
In the case of the civil service in Bangladesh, the reward system is not based on performance, but 
rather on network and connection. Even informal role in performance is not taken into account 
when ACR is  made since the the quality of function does not matter.  Moreover,  how assigned 
functions are accomplished is hardly examined. What has become important is the completion of 
functions.  This  means  that  Bangladesh civil  service  has  been  personalised  as  a  relationship  of 
‘patron-client’. However, the lack of recognition for the initiatives demonstrated by civil servants 
has discouraged them to do anything beyond their formal and official duties. This has led to a lack 
of frequent informal communication. 
The  participants also stated that another critical problem is the non-cooperation among officers, 
which means that there is a relationship between the level of cooperation and the extent of informal 
communication.  Thus,  it  may be  said  that  the  lack  of  frequent  informal  communication  is  an 
obvious  outcome  of  low  level  of  formal  cooperation  among  the  officers  concerned.  Informal 
communication takes place based on good interpersonal relationship among those involved.  The 
fundamental logic behind harmonious relationship is rooted in mutual trust. The existence of mutual 
trust facilitates partnership, and cooperation appears among officers when partnership is developed. 
Thus, it can be argued that the more mutual trust organisations have, the more likely will there be 
informal  communication  among  them.  In  the  case  of  the  upazila,  there  is  lack  of  common 
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preference and choice among departments as they have different identities. This has caused failure 
to generate mutual trust among them; the lack of trust has impeded partnership causing failure in 
ensuring spontaneous cooperation.  The above findings establish Putnam’s  observation that  trust 
being  a  feature  of  social  capital  facilitates  coordination  (cited  in  Harriss,  2000:  236).  The 
Agriculture officer commented: 
Basically,  the  extent  to  which  communication  takes  place  in  an  informal  manner 
depends largely on the relationship among the officers concerned. The extent to which 
such a relationship exists, encouraging officers to communicate must thus be examined. 
In such a situation, how can I communicate with others frequently?
All the respondents (N = 5) agreed that they observed problems in ensuring coordination due to the 
lack of frequent informal communication among departments involved in policy implementation.
5.5.3. How does informal communication matter?
The  follow-up  question  was  ‘How  does  lack  of  frequent  informal  communication  affect 
coordination’? Coordination is needed because actors are interdependent on each other. In the case 
of dependency, it is fundamental to be aware of the functions of others as one leads other to act. The 
extent to which departments are aware of the functions of others depends largely on how accurate, 
frequent, and effective information is exchanged among departments. This means that there must be 
conscious  efforts  to  enhance  interaction  among  departments;  each  must  understand  what  other 
departments are doing, who needs what, who will start functioning when, who will complete which 
tasks at a certain time, whose action will lead to whom, and how problems that arise suddenly can 
be resolved. This causes success in synchronizing functions leading to coordination. There is no 
other way but informal communication through which interaction can take place. In other words, 
the departments can interact with one another only through informal communication whenever they 
need to know something or help others identify their task. The end result of interaction is improved 
coordination. The more communication departments maintain informally, the greater the degree of 
coordination. These findings help in understanding Mintzberg’s contribution stating that ‘Mutual 
adjustment achieves the coordination of work by the simple process of informal communication’ 
(Mintzberg, 1979: 3). 
 An example of the of lack of informal communication69 
In the construction of a shelter house70, several departments, including the Department 
of Public Health and Engineering (DPHE), Education Department (ED) and BRDB, 
69 This is an example cited by an official in an interview.
70 Such kinds of houses constructed on government land for the landless people.
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were  involved  and  their  functions  were  interrelated.  As  expected,  each  department 
performed according to  its  specialization.  Toward the fulfilment of the project  goal, 
nevertheless, communication remained the basis of doing everything; and with the lack 
of communication among the departments, coordination was also impeded. As a result, 
the  timely  completion  of  construction  became  impossible.  Although  the  ED  was 
supposed to start working after the DPHE completed its part, the ED could not carry on 
simply because it  was  not  aware when to  begin.  This  happened due to  the lack of 
communication between the two departments. Consequently, ED’s inaction affected the 
rest who were involved. 
The above incident reveals that despite the fact that informal communication has great influence on 
coordination,  there  is  a  lack  of  informal  communication  among departments  involved in  inter-
departmental activities in an upazila. This is because there is lack of willingness among the officers 
to engage in informal communication as well as an absence of cooperation among officers that has 
caused  failure  to  maintain  communication  on  a  regular  basis.  Thus,  it  can  be  concluded  that 
problems in coordination arise when informal communication does not take place regularly among 
the departments. In effect, the hypothesis ‘informal communication among departments facilitates 
coordination’ is substantiated, corroborating the finding of Trist and Bamforth (1951). Their study 
on  a  British  coal  mine,  including  both  the  pre-  and  the  post-mechanization  period,  show that 
informal communication was destroyed by the new system in the post-mechanization era; likewise, 
productivity decreased and workers suffered from alienation problem. They eventually inferred that 
no coordination mechanism can replace informal communication (cited in Mintzberg, 1979: 48). 
5.6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to analyse the extent to which and how formal division of labour, 
resources, and informal communication affect inter-departmental coordination. The analyses of data 
point out that the success of inter-departmental activities, such as policy implementation can be 
highly  attributed  to  coordination.  The  data  also  demonstrate  that  formal  division  of  labour, 
resources  (financial  and  man-power)  and  informal  communication  largely  influence  inter-
departmental coordination. Moreover, the analyses of data indicate that ensuring inter-departmental 
coordination in an upazila has become a problem because of the lack of formal division of labour, 
timely disbursement of funds, skilled and adequate officers, and frequent informal communication 
among the departments involved.
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Chapter Six
Inter-departmental Coordination: the Role of Organisational Culture
6.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the process and the extent to which organisational culture 
affects  coordination  when  multiple  departments  in  an  upazila  are  involved  in  policy 
implementation. This chapter also discusses the impact of inter-departmental coordination as well as 
some coordination problems during policy implementation.
6.2. Does organisational culture matter? 
Culture is considered as a way of securing coordination among organisations, owing to the role of 
cultural compatibility in establishing relationship among organisations. When cultural compatibility 
exists, the respective members of organisations share a common set of norms, beliefs, values, and 
working procedures that guide them in the manner coordination takes place in their functions. 
6.2.1. What matters? Top-down versus skill and expertise
a. Does elitism matter?
The civil service system in Bangladesh can horizontally be classified into three groups: generalist-
administrative, functional, and specialist (Jamil, 2007: 25). The system has retained the tradition of 
Pakistan71 civil service which, in turn, is a lineal descendant of the British72 civil service.  At that 
time,  the  Pakistan  civil  service,  generalists  are  labelled  as  elite  cadres  who  enjoyed  a  lot  of 
privileges compared to others, and who occupied almost all policy making posts at the higher level 
of administration.  The Bangladesh government adopted a system of civil  service with all  these 
features after its independence despite the fact that the supremacy of one cadre over the other has 
already been abolished.  In spite of this reform, elitism still prevails in the civil service system in 
Bangladesh,  causing  distinction  among  different  cadres.  These  views  were  expressed  by  the 
respondents  when  they  were  asked  regarding  their  evaluation  of  elitism  in  civil  service.  The 
Livestock officer remarked:
The term ‘elitism’ in civil service is not new at all. We know a particular cadre in the 
civil  service  who  enjoys  extraordinary  privileges.  They  are  tasked  to  oversee  the 
71 Pakistan is a sovereign country which obtained its independence from Britain in 1947. 
72 The British government established a colonial administration in the Indian subcontinent, which now consists of 
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. After being ruled for 200 years by the Britain, the Indian subcontinent was divided 
into two distinct sovereign countries as India and Pakistan in 1947. The present Bangladesh was a part of Pakistan 
until 1971.
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functions of other cadres. Our opinions are not important to them; rather they impose 
everything on us by virtue of their cadre membership. Members from our cadre can only 
rise up to the post of DG73 and the next higher posts up to the ministry are filled by 
officers from the administration cadre. This is not a stray instance of elitism; rather this 
is a common scenario irrespective of all cadres of the Bangladesh civil service.
At present, there is discrimination and imbalance between the administration cadre and other cadres 
of  Bangladesh  civil  service  regarding  promotion  and  appointment  to  higher  administrative 
positions. In an estimation (Khan, 1998, cited in Zafarullah, 2007: 166), it has been revealed that 
despite the increase in the membership of the officers of the administration cadre to over 6000 in 
the mid-1990s, its contribution to the total strength of civil service only reached about 17.23 %; 
ironically,  Hulme and O’Donovan (1995) have shown that over 75% of all  positions of deputy 
secretaries and above are occupied by the members of the administration cadre (cited in Zafarullah, 
2007: 166). This evidence corroborates the above data that all positions at the highest echelons of 
administration are occupied by members of the administration cadre. The UNO commented:
Subordinates do not obey their superior unless their superiors can extend influence over 
them. People do not respect the superior unless colleagues show due respect to him. 
Thus, there is an utmost need to have elitism in civil service. In order to be inducted as 
elite, civil servants must be highly ambitious and prominent. These qualities are only 
found among those belonging to the administration cadre. We, members of this cadre, 
successfully own these qualities. Therefore, we are promoted to the higher positions of 
administration at different levels. However, an elitist attitude is borne in our mind and 
grown up with time, especially when we notice in our initial days of service, in which 
officers working at the district level are subject to the orders of the DC. Moreover, we 
serve various departments and deal with a variety of functions at different times which 
make us efficient in various functions; whereas specialists only acquire knowledge and 
expertise in respective areas of operations.
The above discussion signifies that  there has been a distinction among the officers of different 
cadres due to the persistence of elitism in the structure of Bangladesh civil service. 
b. How does elitism matter?
Colonial legacy and history of organisation
The above discussion  raises  the  issue on how elitism makes  distinction  among the  officials  of 
different cadres. There is an elitist service structure in Bangladesh; in other words, there is lack of 
egalitarian  service  structure  in  terms  of  having  equal  opportunities  for  promotion  at  the  upper 
echelons of the Bangladeshi administration. This is because the way through which Bangladesh 
civil service was organised and structured after its independence in 1971 is akin to the structure and 
73 DG refers to Director General. The Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock in Bangladesh has six affiliated departments 
or offices. The Department of Livestock Services (DLS) is one of them, wherein the highest post is DG.
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organisation of the civil service developed 200 years back by the British for colonial administrative 
purposes. In British colonial administration in the Indian sub-continent, the structure of the civil 
service  was  designed  for  ‘multifarious  purposes  such  as  maintaining  law and order,  collecting 
revenues, and sub serving the imperial interest and displaying pomp and panoply of the British 
imperial power in India’ (Obaidullah, 1996: 45). To this end, civil servants were trained in a manner 
that  leads them to believe that they  are  rulers rather than administrators (Obaidullah, 1996: 45). 
Moreover, there were no operational boundaries of politics and administration since the form of 
government at that time was not representative in nature. Accordingly, generalist bureaucrats were 
given  unparalleled  power  and  authority  over  other  segments  of  administration,  apart  from 
occupying all key policy positions in colonial administration. 
After  the British departed in  1947, Pakistan inherited the colonial  legacy of the domination of 
generalists in the administration; Bangladesh, after becoming independent from Pakistan, adopted 
the same tradition. Even after 38 years of independence, the domination of generalist administrators 
in the civil  service remains  almost unchanged.  This means that  the colonial  legacy of absolute 
domination of the administration cadre in terms of promotion to or occupying higher positions of 
administration has perpetuated in civil service that has resulted in establishing an elite cadre in the 
overall  service  structure.  Consequently,  this  system has  caused  the  successful  indoctrination  of 
rulership  and not  administration/coordination  that,  in  turn,  has  led  to  the  institutionalization  of 
elitism in civil service. This finding supports Selznick’s (1957) view that ‘institutionalization is a 
process. It is something that happens to an organisation over time, reflecting the organisation’s own 
distinctive history, the people who have been in it, the groups it embodies, and the vested interests 
they have created, and the way it has adapted to its environment--’ (cited in Scott, 2001: 24). The 
above finding also corroborates the finding of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
team. The UNDP team (1993) identifies that the position of generalist in the civil service remains 
unchanged  from  where  it  had  been.  The  team  advocated  the  abolition  of  the  existing  and 
progressive cadre distinction (cited in Obaidullah, 1996: 54). Moreover, the above finding helps us 
understand Obaidullah’s observation that the existence of the tradition of colonial administrative 
legacy ‘has always been the crux of the problem in establishing an egalitarian service structure’ 
(Obaidullah, 1999: 67). 
 
Elitism, cadre distinction, and coordination
A total  of  5  out  of  7  respondents  opined  that  cadre  distinction  has  created  problems affecting 
coordination  in  the  functions  of  different  cadres.  The  rest  of  the  respondents  stated  that  since 
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officials  of  a  particular  cadre  are  superior  over  other  cadre  officials  and  subordinates  simply 
cooperate  with their  superiors,  there  is  no  relation  between cadre  distinction  and coordination. 
Furthermore,  cadre  distinction  has  caused  discontent,  jealousy  and  certain  level  of  resentment 
among  the  civil  servants,  thereby  creating  conflicts,  lack  of  cooperation,  and  hence,  poor 
coordination among them. Many times, the conflict is about the supremacy of administration cadre 
over other cadres; hence a question arises ‘What is the state of the supremacy of administration 
cadre and what factors may explain it’?
c. Does supremacy matter?
Horizontally, the civil service system in Bangladesh is organised into four classes, namely, Class-I, 
Class-II, Class-III, and Class-IV. The total strength of Class I officers is about 40,000. Of these, 
70% are recruited directly to the cadre, while the rest are non-cadre members working in functional 
areas (Monem and Kim, 2009: 3). The higher civil service is categorised into 29 cadres, each of 
which  is  confined  to  a  particular  ministry  at  the  secretariat74.  Logically,  higher  positions  of  a 
ministry should be occupied by the members of the cadre concerned. For example, in the present 
administrative setup, most (if not all) higher positions of all ministries and the secretariat for the 
cabinet  office  and  the  prime  minister,  and  all  coordinating  positions  at  all  tiers  of  field 
administration are filled by the members of the administration cadre. Even autonomous and other 
constitutional bodies are administered by the deputed officers of the administration cadre (DFID, 
2004  cited  in  Monem  and  Kim,  2009:  3-4).  Moreover,  there  is  a  system  of  reservation75 of 
secretariat posts for the members of the administration cadre. The Fisheries officer remarked:   
The  UNO is  entitled  to  receive  a  vehicle  from the  government  and is  accordingly 
provided  a  four-wheel  drive  vehicle,  aside  from  a  duplex  complex  for  his 
accommodation,  which is renovated whenever a new UNO is posted.  The UNO has 
more than two personal bearers and a guard watching over for his complex. Meanwhile, 
officers of other cadres working at the upazila are usually given a motorcycle and are 
made to share a building consisting of four to six flats for their accommodation. The 
building  where  I  live  in  was  renovated  eight  years  ago.  I  was  told  by the  official 
concerned  that  there  was  no  money  for  renovation.  Yet,  after  several  weeks,  the 
complex for the UNO was renovated for the newly posted UNO. Moreover, we do not 
have any other bearer except an office bearer.
The Agriculture officer remarked:
Officers of the administration cadre do not reckon us as officers; they treat us as their 
servants. They do not cooperate with us; rather, they merely expect obedience from us.
74 Refers  to  the  combination  of  all  ministries/divisions;  in  other  words,  the  offices  of  ministries/divisions  are 
collectively known as the secretariat. The secretariat is considered as the nerve centre of all administrative functions. 
75 Popularly known as a quota system, established as being taken for granted.
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An Upazila Health and Family Planning officer also commented:
Members of the administration cadre usually get promoted to the next higher position 
within  four  years.  The  UNO entered  civil  service  at  least  ten  years  later  than  me. 
Previously, the UNO served as assistant and senior assistant secretary, but I have been 
serving  in  the  same  position  when  I  joined  16  years  ago.  This  is  because  higher 
positions of our line ministries are occupied by members of the administration cadre. 
They willingly prolong our promotion process in order for the senior officers of other 
cadres to serve the leadership of the least senior officer of their cadre. In such way, they 
can exhibit their supremacy over others. Therefore, how can sound relationships exist in 
such an unfair civil service system? Moreover, how is it possible to work with them in a 
coordinated manner?
The  above  data  prove  the  supremacy of  the  administration  cadre  over  the  rest  in  the  service 
structure. The following statements illustrate how supremacy is maintained and how senior officials 
of the administration cadre help juniors maintain their cadre supremacy over others. The Agriculture 
officer expressed his disappointment:     
As most of secretaries belong to administration cadre, instructions are issued from the 
ministries or divisions to departments at the upazila in such a strategic way that it does 
not  only  involve  the  UNO  in  our  departmental  activities,  but  also  gives  absolute 
authority to the UNO in some cases over various departments.  
  
However, the UNO stated that:
Actually, I have no supremacy over others; the problem lies with governmental rules 
and regulations. Basically, my job is to coordinate the activities of various departments. 
Aside  from  this  role,  I  am  sometimes  tasked  to  supervise  the  activities  of  other 
departments and have full authority in some activities of some departments, creating 
conflict among us. He gave an example in this regard as follows:
The Department of Social Welfare is responsible for dealing with the affairs related to 
social welfare in an upazila. One of the functions of this department is to identify senior 
citizens and provide allowance for them. The government has given full authority to me 
to conduct such duty.
This example also signifies the supremacy of administration cadre over others as  the respondent 
himself  belongs  to  the  administration  cadre.  Thus,  it  may  be  said  that  supremacy  matters  in 
coordination.
d. How does supremacy matter?
Inter-cadre jealousy and rivalry, and conflict of interest and preferences
The above circumstance raises  the question of  how supremacy of  the administration cadre has 
caused lack of coordination. The UNOs hold higher administrative positions compared with officers 
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of other cadres working in an upazila. They are privileged in terms of many aspects, such as: a) they 
are  provided  four-wheel  vehicles,  whereas  other  officers  only  have  motorcycles;  b)  they  are 
responsible  for  coordinating  the  overall  functions  of  an  upazila,  whereas  other  officers  merely 
coordinate the tasks related to their departments; c) they can visit and inspect police stations and 
other  institutions  in  an  upazila,  whereas  other  officers  only  take  care  of  the  tasks  related  to 
concerned matters in upazila; and d) they are promoted as UNO within a maximum of ten years in 
service, and can be promoted to the next higher positions within a short period after serving as 
UNO, whereas others spend more than half of their career life in an upazila. In fact, in most cases, 
few of them are promoted to a position above the district level before they retire from service.
Consequently, the UNO holds the views of being superior over the officers of other cadres and is 
inclined  to  display his  power  and authority  under  the  guise  of  his  coordinating  role.  Officers, 
particularly specialists, hardly take into account the supremacy of generalists, and they themselves 
never consider them as being inferior to the former. However, the existing dominant position of 
generalists in the civil service structure has bred inter-cadre jealousy and rivalry. For instance, a 
serious conflict ensued in the 90s between the generalist and Prokrichi, a professional coalition of 
three cadres namely engineers, agriculturists and doctors, who protested vehemently against the 
supremacy of the general administration cadre. Officers of other cadres at the upazila level have 
become  extremely  jealous  of  the  position  of  the  UNO,  generating  a  rivalry  between  them. 
Moreover, there are conflicts of interest and preferences between them as respective histories of 
their cadre development are varied. The resulting lack of trust and confidence in their relationship, 
along with the opportunistic tendency to achieve partisan interests and preferences have impeded a 
smooth partnership between them, leading to the failure in ensuring harmonious collaboration. As a 
result, coordination in their activities has become problematic, a finding which confirms that of 
another study conducted by the National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA). This particular 
study revealed that inter-cadre rivalry is the major cause of coordination-related problems at the 
upazila level (Morshed, 1997: 186).
 
Although all cadres, in theory, are now considered equal units within the Bangladesh civil service 
system, the findings above indicate that inequality in power still persists in the civil service, thereby 
creating  resentment  among  civil  servants  outside  the  administration  cadre.  At  the  same  time, 
generalists are inclined to maintain their status quo with the view of being the prototype of colonial 
generalist administrators. Colonial legacy was hierarchic and was a vertical administrative system; 
in addition, colonial administration was mainly concerned with control and regulation under the 
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main objective of upholding stability and order. However, because of development goals including 
different skills and expertise, the vertical administrative system has gradually become outdated; in 
other words, since different skills and expertise are now required for achieving development goals, 
the top-down administrative system has become largely irrelevant.  With network administration 
over multiple policy actors belonging to different organisations, different skills and expertise have 
become important requirements. In fact, this change is creating problems of coordination among 
them.
6.2.2. Do working procedures and norms matter?
Generally, working procedures refer to a pattern or way through which something is done in order 
to achieve intended results; here, it refers to a fixed or established way of accomplishing the tasks of 
an organisation. Norms refer to the expected pattern of behaviour in a given situation; here, norms 
refer  to  the  behavioural  patterns  of  an  organisation’s  members  and  expectations  of  similar 
behaviours from members of other organisations.  
All  the respondents (N =7) opined that  there is  no common working procedures and norms in 
accomplishing inter-departmental activities. This means that they are guided more by their own 
working procedures and norms when they perform their respective functions. When there is a lack 
of similar  working procedures  and norms,  inter-departmental  functions  assigned to  departments 
involved are accomplished in different manners, given that working procedures explain how a task 
is  supposed  to  be  done  and  norms  are  circulated  and  re-circulated  among  individuals  in  the 
organisation over a period of time.  A different working procedure is thus developed based on the 
nature  of  the  subject  matter;  this  means  that  differences  in  the  nature  of  functions  necessitate 
different types of working procedures, especially since the course of action varies depending on the 
nature of the task to be accomplished. In the case of the upazila, there are multiple departments that 
vary from each other  in  terms  of  functions;  for  these,  a  series  of  steps  are  taken,  which  vary 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  task  or  function.  Given that  different  departments  have  varying 
functions, it also means that they have different working procedures. The norms of an organisation 
convey the expectation that everyone must behave in the same way, indicating that members of an 
organisation know how they should behave with others and what would be their role in a given 
situation. Norms differ from one organisation to another because behavioural patterns and members’ 
respective roles vary. Table 7 clearly reveals that inter-departmental coordination is hampered as 
working procedures and norms vary from one department to another.
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Table 7. Relationship between coordination and other variables 
            Those who answered 'yes' 
Differences in working procedures and norms 100
  affect coordination.
Officers are more loyal to their respective departmental 100
  head at the district level than the UNO.
More attention to the intra-departmental activities 100
  causes lack of inter-departmental coordination.
Differences in status influence coordination. 100
Absolute frequency in number of those who answered ‘yes’ (N = 7)
Note:  The  questions  asked  were:  a.  ‘Do  you  think  that  differences  in  working  procedures  and  norms  affect 
coordination’?;  b.  ‘What  you  do  think  about  the  loyalty  of  the  officers  in  charge  of  departments  to  respective 
departmental heads at the district and the UNO at the upazila’?; c. ‘Do you think that more loyalty to intra-departmental 
activities creates problems in ensuring coordination in inter-departmental activities’?; d. and ‘Do you feel that the status 
of the officials influences coordination’? The answer alternatives to each question were ‘Yes’ and ‘No’.
a. How do differences in working procedures and norms matter?
Standard working procedures, performance consistency, and coordination 
Since  one’s  performance  affects  another’s  in  the  case  of  inter-departmental  activities,  ensuring 
coordination depends largely on the consistent  performance of  all  those involved.  Performance 
consistency  is  ensured  when  all  involved  perform  assigned  functions  by  following  the  same 
procedures every time, especially since similar working procedures make consistent performances. 
Given that there is no standardised working procedure in inter-departmental activities in an upazila, 
the officials  perform their  respective functions by following their  unique departmental  working 
procedures  developed  based  on  departmental  preferences  and  choices.  This  setup  results  in 
performance  variations  because  differences  in  working  procedures  would  mean  differences  in 
preferences and choices with regards the proper performance of their assigned tasks. It could be said 
that there is lack of similar culture among officers of different cadres since the existence of common 
preferences and choices is an indication of the existence of cultural compatibility. This supports 
Jamil’s  argument  that  variation  in  performance  occurs  because  of  cultural  differences  among 
organisations (Jamil, 2007: 66-67).  Due to the fact that performance variation is a result of the lack 
of  common  preferences  and  choices,  these  result  in  failure  to  ensure  synchronization  of  the 
functions  accomplished,  thereby  leading  to  coordination  problems.  Thus,  in  terms  of  inter-
departmental coordination, a higher degree of cultural compatibility among organisations leads to 
the use of standardised working procedures. Moreover, standardised working procedures lead to 
consistency in performance. In turn, a more consistent performance leads to improved coordination. 
In addition, the reason behind the use of standardised working procedures lies in the fact that such 
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standard procedures ensure that an organisation functions sequentially. In effect, time and resources 
are maximised, attesting to the existence of coordination among those involved.
Avoidance of behavioural contradiction and coordination
In the case of inter-departmental functions in an upazila, variations in behavioural expectations of 
each involved occur because of different norms. Contradiction inevitably arises in terms of how 
they are required to cope with each other behaviourally since they differ in terms of preferences and 
choices.  In  order  to  avoid  such  contradiction,  they  try  to  modify  their  behavioural  patterns 
depending on each other’s preferences and choices. This change is creating coordination-related 
problems among them.
6.2.3. Does loyalty matter? 
As presented in Table 7, officers in charge of various departments in an upazila are more loyal to 
their respective departmental heads at the district level than to the UNO, meaning that officers are 
more  concerned  with  their  intra-departmental  activities.  In  doing  so,  they  try  to  exhibit  their 
sincerity as a means to satisfy their departmental heads at the district headquarters. This is because 
of the ACR, which is regarded as the key to success in service. Positive performance evaluation in 
the ACR helps in the career development of an incumbent.  Promotion of officers to the higher 
position is mostly made on the basis of their ACR. The power to write the ACR of the subordinates 
is vested on the head of the department, which means a good ACR is subject to the satisfaction of 
the departmental head concerned. Thus, loyalty to intra-departmental function results in the greater 
satisfaction of the departmental head. The more the departmental head is satisfied, the more the 
likelihood of a positive ACR. All the respondents were of the opinions that lack of inter-service 
loyalty causes lack of inter-departmental coordination (Table 7). 
a. How does loyalty matter? 
Officers consider departmental functions as their own, and they try their level best accordingly. In 
addition, performance in inter-departmental function is not taken into account when the ACR is 
made.  Thus,  in  most  cases  of  inter-departmental  function,  officers  can  neither  perform  their 
assigned functions properly nor meet the deadlines for accomplishing the assigned function, causing 
failure  in  synchronizing their  functions,  leading to coordination problems. Moreover,  there is  a 
provision involving the UNO in inter-departmental function which, in turn, has made the officers of 
other cadres reluctant to get involved in such functions due to inherited cadre conflict. As a result, 
the accomplishment of inter-departmental functions as a whole is delayed, leading to wastage of 
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time and limited resources. The Fisheries officer gave the following example:
Although I was involved in inter-departmental function, I had to attend meetings called 
by the departmental head at the district headquarters on days when I was expected to 
assume responsibilities associated with my post. As a result, the completion of function 
was deferred because my absence prevented others from performing their respective 
tasks. 
The Livestock officer commented:
Inter-service loyalty does not mean loyalty to the service of others because none of us is 
superior or subordinate to each other. Rather, inter-service loyalty means loyalty to the 
UNO.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  UNO is  not  our  commanding boss,  he  is  the  chief 
coordinator of the upazila administration. In reality, we are not loyal to him at all. We 
have a psychological conflict with the administration cadre of the civil service to which 
he belongs. Moreover, he does not write our ACR. Thus, we are not serious about inter-
departmental activities. That is why the functions assigned to us are not accomplished 
on time when we are involved in inter-departmental activities, no matter if these cause 
grave coordination problems.
The Agriculture officer also remarked: 
The UNO is neither our commanding boss nor the one who has the power to write our 
ACR. Thus, our courtesy to him is only grounded on the provisions of the system.
The  above  data  indicate  that  loyalty  among  officers  is  more  intra-  than  inter-service-oriented, 
leading to the failure of accomplishing tasks on time and increased problems related to inter-service 
coordination.
6.2.4. Does status matter?
All respondents voiced the opinion that differences in status affect coordination (Table 7); but how 
does inequality in status affect coordination?
a. How does status matter?
Background of the officials, their status, and coordination
Differences in the status of the officials—particularly between the generalist and specialist—have 
caused dissatisfaction among specialists. This is because most of them are senior to the generalist 
(UNO) in terms of length of service, and seniority is the root of respect in public service as well as 
in Bangladeshi culture. In relation to this, promotion by seniority (although frequently violated) is 
one of the principles of the Bangladesh civil service system. The officials are the best performers in 
their  secondary  and  higher  secondary  examinations  and  accordingly,  they  prefer 
professional/technical education. Upon the completion of studies, they tend to join various technical 
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and professional civil service cadres, including BCS medical, agriculture, and engineering. On the 
other hand, most generalists are graduates of general education, which is mainly the first choice of 
those post-secondary students who prefer to be educated in liberal arts/social science rather than 
technical/professional  programs  because  they  are  relatively  academically  weak.  Furthermore, 
students  who are  dropped out  from the admission race of technical/professional  education also 
prefer general education. All these have bred a kind of psychological conflict among the specialists, 
causing  disunity  between  them.  This  implies  the  existence  of  cultural  incompatibility  among 
officers  of  different  cadres  since the  existence  of  cultural  compatibility facilitates  unity among 
different groups of people. The above findings ascertain Meek’s observation that disunity among 
organisational members is an indication of cultural differences (Meek, 1994: 268). This situation 
has spurred non-cooperation among different cadre officials particularly between the generalist and 
specialist, leading to failure in ensuring the coordination of their functions. 
Power, status, and coordination
The status of the UNO in the office are extended outside the office as well. Since, power is a major 
symbol of status in Bangladeshi culture. Those who have access to power possess higher status in 
society. In the case of generalists, since they have more access to power because they are placed 
directly at the authority structure of the government, there is honour and respect for them in society 
because: i) citizens generally fear those who have access to power because power is frequently 
abused for personal interest or narrow gains; ii) educated citizens respect and honour them as they 
know the value of authority position in the administration and its importance in running the affairs 
of the government; and iii) less educated or illiterate citizens honour them since the government 
itself places them in the position of authority, and consequently, they are given more power and 
privileges. Such leverage has given them more status in and outside the service compared with 
others; they have thus become the object of reverence. Therefore, access to power has made status 
difference  between  the  generalist  and  specialist,  and  for  this  reason,  they  both  suffer  from 
superiority and inferiority complex, respectively. In effect, lack of mutual respect to each other has 
caused  failure  to  ensure  spontaneous  and  need-based  cooperation  that  has  led  to  lack  of 
coordination in their function. The Livestock officer expressed his opinion as quoted below:
The identification mark of the UNO is that he is the chief executive officer of an upazila 
and has been afforded more power and facilities compared with others. Thus, one kind 
of social status has developed around him. People address him as ‘sir’, saluting him 
wherever  he  goes.  Moreover,  he  is  offered  a  better  seat  in  an  assembly.  Likewise, 
despite being senior in terms of length of service, I have to show respect to him. Even I 
should address him as ‘sir’. I give salaam to him. This indicates his higher status in both 
service and society. Thus, there has been a major difference in status between the UNO 
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and other cadre officials. We can neither break nor avoid this system. Rather, it has been 
institutionalised  in  the  civil  service.  Therefore,  we  refrain  ourselves  from  his 
association, impeding spontaneous cooperation and causing coordination problems. 
The UNO expressed his views as:
I am a civil servant of the 20th Batch76. Some officers of the 11th batch are still working 
in an upazila. I am invited to be present as chief guest in various programs organised by 
different departments in the upazila. Moreover, I preside over the state program taking 
place in upazila. So, other cadre officials suffer from inferiority complex which makes 
them jealous about my status. This causes lack of cooperation that, in turn, leads to lack 
of coordination. 
From the above discussion, it is obvious that generalists and specialists have different positions in 
and outside the service in terms of status. Despite being bright students, specialists enjoy fewer 
privileges and have lower status in and outside the service compared with relatively less talented 
students  who are  now generalist  officers.  This  status-oriented  difference  has  caused  discontent 
among officials of lower status which has led to the lack of cooperation between them. Moreover, 
the higher status of generalists both in and outside the bureaucracy has perpetuated, and this can be 
attributed to two reasons. One is colonial legacy (discussed in another segment) and another is the 
favourable attitude of society to power, which is embedded in Bangladeshi culture. This finding 
ascertains that there is cultural difference between the generalist and the specialist officers. When 
officers  of  higher  status  are  inappropriately  treated,  they retaliate  and consequently  show non-
cooperation. As a result, coordination has become a huge problem. Despite the immense importance 
of cooperation in achieving coordination, there is lack of cooperation between the generalist and the 
specialist officers. Now the question is what factors can explain this lack of cooperation and how 
does it affect coordination?
6.2.5. How does cooperation matter?
Generalist vs. specialist controversy
The lack of cooperation between the generalist and the specialist takes place because of the lack of 
equal  opportunities  for  going up the  service  ladder.  Under  the present  regulations,  20% of  the 
policy-making posts  of  the  government  are  supposed to  be  filled  by civil  servants  outside  the 
administration cadre. In reality, however, only 5% are allowed to be in these respective posts. This 
is  an indication of the absolute supremacy of generalists  at  the top of administration,  which is 
unfortunately carried over to other tiers of administration scattered throughout the country. Low 
76 This is an identification mark of civil servants, which indicates who has joined the civil service at what time, and 
determines the seniority of these civil servants in terms of length of service. To date, 27 batches of civil servants 
have joined the civil service. 
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levels of cooperation between the generalist and specialist exists locally compared with the central 
administration (e.g.  secretariat).  This is  because generalist  and specialist  officers co-exist  at  the 
local level administration, whereas specialists hardly exist in the secretariat. As a result, policy is 
implemented at the local level without ensuring necessary coordination among them. In the case of 
the  existence  of  spontaneous  and  need-based  cooperation,  the  functions  assigned  to  officers 
involved are executed on time, leading to synchronization in their function as one’s action affects 
the others to act. Coordination of their functions leads to projects that are completed on time. Thus, 
it is argued that the less the supremacy of generalist over others, the higher the level of cooperation 
there will be. In turn, increased cooperation among officers facilitates improved coordination. This 
indicates  that  the  egalitarian  service  structure  can  make  a  difference  in  the  degree  to  which 
coordination is achieved. The Health and Family Planning officer commented as follows: 
When I entered the civil service, the current UNO did not even finish secondary school. 
Many of my batch mates from the administration cadre are now joint secretaries, while I 
am still working under the leadership of the UNO at the upazila level. How can things 
be done smoothly in this circumstance? He proceeded:
Above the rank of joint secretary, all civil servants are entitled to have a vehicle for their 
personal use and additional money around of 20,000 taka monthly (US$291) for the 
maintenance of their vehicle. The question is who are the joint secretary and above? No 
doubt that more than 90 percent of them belong to the administration cadre. Why are we 
deprived of the opportunity to be a joint secretary or candidate to occupy a top position? 
In the given situation, how can we work together and let others expect cooperation from 
us? 
The above discussion and quotations indicate that the root of the lack of cooperation lies in the 
conflict between generalists and specialists. 
From the overall data regarding organisational culture discussed above, it has been revealed that 
there  is  lack  of  uniform privileges  and  benefits  between  the  generalist  and  specialist  officers. 
Moreover,  there  is  lack  of  standardised  working  procedures  and  norms  in  inter-departmental 
activities, apart from the status-oriented difference, lack of mutual trust, and lack of cooperation 
between the generalist and specialist officers. All these are due to the history of the civil service 
system in the country. These circumstances have caused tension between them, leading to problems 
that impede inter-departmental coordination. The lack of cultural compatibility may be one reason 
why the generalist and specialist officers think and act differently. If cultural compatibility exists, it 
may lead them to think and act homogeneously in terms of common preferences and choice, norms, 
beliefs, and working procedures. These findings are parallel with those of Christensen and Lægreid, 
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whose study on coordination in Norway’s central government organisations points out that when the 
horizontal dimension of coordination is the concern, people across organisations or across units of 
an organisation consider themselves to be culturally homogeneous.  In this light,  coordination is 
unlikely  to  take  place  when  cultural  incompatibility  exists.  They  argued  that  coordination  is 
culturally  appropriate  when  there  are  similar  cultural  values  and  norms,  and  when  the  parties 
involved work in accordance with existing values and norms (Christensen and Lægreid, 2008: 114). 
In another study analysing the response of organisations to Hurricane Katrina, it has been found that 
organisational culture is an important factor in coordinating inter-organisational activities. It was 
firmly  admitted  that  ‘organisational  culture  has  a  tremendous  impact  on  the  ability  of  one 
organisation to coordinate successfully with others’ (Morris et al., 2007: 103). The above discussion 
indicates that if organisations could only exhibit the logic of appropriateness, then coordination will 
certainly take place among them. This confirms the earlier hypothesis stating that organisational 
cultural compatibility among departments may facilitate more coordination in their activities. 
6.3. Policy implementation: Impact of the lack of inter-departmental coordination
From the  data  regarding  independent  variables  analysed  in  the  fifth  and  sixth  chapters,  inter-
departmental  coordination  has  clearly  been  revealed  to  be  problematic  at  the  local  level  in 
Bangladesh, particularly in the upazila level. Thus, attempts were made to examine what happens to 
policy implementation when inter-departmental coordination is the problem.
6.3.1. When does coordination matter?
a. Timely policy implementation
 According to 43 out of 4977 respondents, policy implementation hardly meets the deadline. In most 
cases, implementation remains unfinished for several months. The lack of coordination among those 
involved creates this inefficient mode of service. Given that inter-departmental coordination is a 
problem in upazila, the delay in implementation is an obvious outcome of the lack of coordination 
among the departments involved. A contractor gave an example:
The  construction  of  a  bridge  over  the  Ghagot78 River  in  the  Shadullapur  Upazila 
remains unfinished for several months. The problem associated with the construction of 
that bridge was the untimely disbursement of funds and the lack of coordination among 
those empowered to disburse such funds.  
Another  respondent  pointed  out  that,  among  others,  the  deadline  of  policy  implementation  is 
77 Respondents include the general public, the contractor, and the Chairman of Union Parishad who were 35, 8, and 6 
in number, respectively.
78 This is a river in Bangladesh.
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considered important.  This  is  because timely policy implementation is  a  major  condition when 
policy is  dependent  on foreign funds.  Funds are withdrawn when the deadline is  not met.  The 
following example attests to the significance of timely policy implementation and foreign funds.
An  amount  of  taka  worth  around  430-crore  (US  $  63,235,294)  allotted  for  rural 
infrastructure development for the fiscal year 2007/08 are to be sent back to the donors 
due to the inability of the implementing agency to meet the deadline of implementation 
(The Daily Prothom Alo, 27.02.2008). 
b. Quality of implementation work
The quality of implementation work is not satisfactory since 27 out of 4179 respondents marked 
implementation quality as bad, whereas only 3 respondents expressed their satisfaction towards the 
implementation  quality.  Among  others,  6  and  5  respondents  termed  implementation  quality  as 
moderate and very bad, respectively. One respondent, part of the local elite in the area of study, 
expressed his views:
I myself am a member of the Managing Committee80 of a primary school. Two years 
back, a building was constructed in my school. Many parts of that building have now 
cracked. It is unusual that the building would now have plenty of fissures within two 
years of construction.
In this case, it can be said that the lack of coordination affected the quality of its implementation. As 
inter-departmental coordination in upazila is a problem, poor policy implementation is an obvious 
outcome of the lack of coordination among departments involved. One respondent, a school teacher, 
gave an example:
Under the ADP 2007/08, an amount of taka worth 172,000 (US$2,515) was allocated 
for the construction of a toilet for a primary school in Borodaudpur81 of the Shadullapur 
Upazila. Within nine months of completion, the roof of the toilet began to crumble. The 
contractor and officials involved were called while more irregularities in construction 
works were noticed during implementation. Neither the LGED engineer nor the UNO 
took initiative in this regard. We came to know that poor quality materials were used in 
the construction because of the untimely disbursement of funds. 
An example of poor implementation in quality 82 
Under the ADP 2008/09, an amount of taka worth 3,165,000 (US$46,272) was allocated 
79 Respondents  include the  general  public,  and the  Chairman of  Union Parishad  who were 35 and  6 in  number, 
respectively.
80 The Managing Committee is such a committee formed to run the school. Only the parents of the students are eligible 
to become members of this committee. Selection of members is either by appointment or by election. 
81 This is a place in the Shadullapur Upazila
82 This is an example discussed by more than one respondent. 
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for the construction of a building for a primary school in Tajnagor83. After investing a 
certain amount of money, it was noticed that the existing size of the land was less than 
the size required. To continue the project, however, the contractor bought the required 
land,  thereby affecting the quality of construction works as the money allocated for 
these was utilised for purchasing the required land. Since contractors work for profit, it 
would have been unusual that he spent his own money to purchase the land. In such 
situation, how can quality works be ensured?
The above data substantiate the fact that the lack of inter-departmental coordination causes delay in 
policy implementation. Delayed implementation leads to failure in meeting the policy goals within 
the  expenditure  framework.  This  necessitates  allocation  of  more  funds  as  price  for  essential 
materials of implementation increases rapidly. In the given situation, the quality is not ensured as 
increased price is never readjusted with inflation rate. A contractor remarked:
Policy implementation is normally delayed due to the lack of coordination among those 
who are responsible for disbursing money. In the case of untimely fund disbursement, 
we  use  construction  materials  that  are  lower  in  quality  since  project  cost  is  never 
readjusted with inflation rate.  In  every project,  we ensure our  profit  since  it  is  our 
profession. In addition, we have to spend an amount of money for official purposes84. 
Moreover,  contractors  who are  not  financially  solvent  start  working  with  their  own 
money  and  can  only  continue  if  funds  are  disbursed  timely.  Since  the  timely 
disbursement of fund is a problem, there is a growing trend among those contractors to 
sell their works to other contractors with a higher rate than that of the government. The 
succeeding contractor also ensures his profit from the deal, making it nearly impossible 
to ensure the quality of policy implementation. 
The above analyses reveal that problems arise in policy implementation when coordination does not 
take place among the departments involved. In the case of lack of inter-departmental coordination, 
the problems associated with policy implementation are delay in implementation, requirement of 
additional time and fund, and poor quality of work. 
6.4. Conclusion
The purpose of this  chapter was to analyse the extent to which and how organisational culture 
affects coordination among departments involved in policy implementation in an upazila and the 
impact  of  inter-departmental  coordination  on  policy  implementation.  From  the  data  analysed 
throughout  this  chapter,  it  has  clearly  been  realised  that  organisational  culture  has  tremendous 
influence on coordination. Inter-departmental coordination in an upazila has become problematic 
since  there  is  cultural  incompatibility  among  departments.  Therefore,  policy implementation  is 
greatly hampered.
83 This is a place in the Shadullapur Upazila.
84 Specifically it refers to bribe known as PC (percentage). 
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Chapter Seven
Discussion and Conclusion
7.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present discussions about the findings of this study and come to a 
conclusion.  The  following aspects  of  this  study are  highlighted  in  this  chapter.  What  were the 
objectives? What theories and methodology were used? What was found and which theories were 
most useful? How and to what extent could our findings be generalised? What conclusion could be 
made on the basis of such findings? and How can this study be used in further research?
7.2. Review of the study’s objectives, theory, and methodology
The  purpose  of  this  study  was  mainly  to  analyse  inter-organisational  coordination  among 
departments  involved  in  policy  implementation  at  the  local  level  in  Bangladesh.  Given  that 
coordination is the interplay of many factors, this study also intended to explore and identify the 
factors affecting coordination, inquire as to why problems of coordination take place, and identify 
and examine those factors that make a difference in the extent to which coordination is achieved. 
For  doing  so,  the  present  study employed a  qualitative  approach.  The  implementation  of  rural 
infrastructure  development  policies  was  studied  as  a  process  to  comprehend  why  and  how 
coordination-related problems among departments  involved in  policy implementation in upazila 
arise.  Formal  division  of  labour,  informal  communication,  resources,  and organisational  culture 
formed the basis of theoretical framework for describing and analysing the issue of coordination at 
the local level in Bangladesh.  
7.3. Major findings of the study
  
7.3.1. Inter-departmental coordination in policy implementation: what matters?
Despite the importance of inter-departmental coordination in policy implementation, coordination 
does not take place properly among departments involved in policy implementation in an upazila. 
The existing mechanisms of coordination can hardly produce any meaningful result  in ensuring 
coordination. Among others, the committee system is a major mechanism of coordination. Truly, the 
meetings of some committees are held on a regular basis, but no significant outcome is produced. 
This is because members quite often are absent from the meetings, causing failure to ensure fruitful 
discussion of the issues brought in the meetings. Thus, information is not adequately exchanged, 
resulting in persistent problematic coordination. Moreover, some committees only exist on paper. 
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Out of the committee system, another mechanism of coordination is informal communication which 
has  also  become  a  futile  mechanism  due  to  infrequent  communication  among  officers.  More 
discussions regarding infrequent communication will be made in the latter section of this chapter.
7.3.2. Formal division of labour: what matters?
Inter-departmental coordination is a major problem because there are no proper rules for specifying 
what each department will do, when, and how. This is an indication of the lack of clear division of 
labour among departments involved in policy implementation.  Another problem associated with 
coordination is role ambiguity  among officers which is a result of the lack of appropriate rules, 
indicating that the nature of rules determines the extent of coordination. Therefore, the existence of 
appropriate rules can ensure a major difference in achieving coordination.  
Another interesting finding that affects coordination is the apathy of the officers toward the rules 
and their applications, indicating that the civil service system in Bangladesh does not contain the 
feature of an ideal type of bureaucracy in which official business is undertaken on the basis of 
written documents. Rather, officers exercise their personal judgment or follow the pathway of their 
predecessors in discharging their duties. Such actions can be attributed to the fact that failure to 
perform assigned functions is not a ground for determining punishment within the system. Second, 
the reward system in the civil service is more network- and relation-based, rather than performance-
based. Moreover, there is lack of monitoring of the way officials carry out their assigned tasks.  
7.3.3. Resources: what matters?
Another factor that also affects coordination is the untimely disbursement of funds. In the case of 
policy implementation under the ADP in an upazila,  the funds required are  allocated when the 
policy  has  obtained  approval  from  the  authority  concerned.  Problems  arise  in  the  timely 
disbursement of those funds at the upazila level because of the system of dual authority in the 
disbursement of funds. Officers authorised to disburse funds belong to separate and rival cadres; 
thus, due to narrow partisan interests and the lack of trust between them they hardly arrive at an 
agreement as far as disbursement of funds is concerned. In addition, the reason behind the lack of 
consensus on the withdrawal of funds lies in the fact that from the administrative point of view, civil 
servants— particularly generalists and specialists—are culturally separated. Generalists always tend 
to display their  authority by whimsically getting dissatisfied with the quality of another cadre’s 
work. Such practices are but a way of maintaining the status quo of the domination of generalists 
over other cadres. This system was established by the British, and the present service structure is a 
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legacy of this system. That is why the Bangladesh civil service is regarded as a ‘representative of 
bureaupathology’ or ‘pathological bureaucracy’. Furthermore, corruption of officers involved in the 
disbursement  process of  funds has  impeded the timely disbursement  of such funds.  Thus,  it  is 
argued that the service-oriented attitude of officers concerned and the avoidance of bureaucratic 
control over the disbursement of such funds can facilitate its timely disbursement which, in turn, 
can make a difference in the extent to which coordination is achieved. 
The lack of skilled manpower is another factor affecting coordination. Even those many officials 
serving  for  several  years  have  not  been  provided  any  comprehensive  training  except  their 
foundation training. Moreover, government officials, in many cases, have not undergone any recent 
training program due to the shortage of staff. Another notable factor affecting coordination is that 
the  incumbent  officials  have  become  overloaded  by  work,  especially  since  the  upazila 
administration faces the critical problem of shortage of officers. In many cases, an officer assumes 
more than one office. Therefore, sufficient number of skilled and required staff can ensure more 
coordination.
7.3.4. Informal communication: what matters?
Coordination has become problematic due to the lack of frequent informal communication among 
officers involved in inter-departmental function. Factors affecting the frequency of communication 
are the lack of willingness among the officers to engage in informal communication. This is mainly 
due  to  two factors.  The  first  is  the  lack  of  institutionalization  of  the  reward  system based  on 
performance. Rather, better career prospects in service depend on the development of network and 
relation with higher officials of the line ministry and political party in power. Thus, a relationship of 
‘patron-client’ dominates the Bangladesh civil service. Second, nothing concerning informal role is 
specified in rules. 
Another factor affecting the frequency of communication is the non-existence of partnership among 
departments which is a by-product of the lack of trust among officers. Factors such as common 
preference and choice, interest, and norms that are rooted in trust do not exist among departments. 
As such, there has been lack of harmony in their relationship which, in turn, has impeded informal 
communication. It indicates that social capital (trust) determines the degree of coordination. Thus, 
the existence of social capital in the relationship can ensure more coordination.
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7.3.5. Organisational culture: what matters?
The organisation and structure of the civil service system in Bangladesh has been found to represent 
the colonial legacy of the domination of generalists in administration. This has led to the creation of 
different organisational cultures between generalist and specialist cadres; in turn, these have caused 
coordination problems between them. 
Another noteworthy finding is that there is a significant variation in civil service performance which 
affects coordination of functions. Variation in performance occurs since there are no standardised 
working  procedures  for  accomplishing  inter-departmental  functions  in  upazila.  Moreover,  the 
behavioural expectations of civil servants in inter-departmental functions also differ as they do not 
share similar norms, further creating coordination problems. Since similar working procedures and 
norms attest to the existence of common culture, coordination-related problems can be identified as 
a result of cultural incompatibility among officials of different cadres, that is, between the generalist 
and the specialist. Thus, common culture can enhance the length to which coordination is achieved.
Another interesting finding is that officers working at the upazila level are more attentive to intra-
than inter-departmental activities. As a result, coordination in inter-departmental activities does not 
take place properly. There are two reasons behind the lack of inter-service attention. The first is the 
failure to accept the coordinating role of the UNO. Second, performance only in intra-departmental 
activities is taken into consideration, when ACR is made. Thus, if attention to inter-departmental 
activities is subject to the determination of performance as well, it can ensure better coordination in 
comparison with the extent to which coordination is achieved. In this connection, there must be a 
leader in inter-departmental activities to whom officers should express loyalty. The leader has to be 
respectful to his colleagues, whether the leader is the UNO or other officials.
Another factor affecting coordination is the lack of mutual respect among officers because of the 
status-oriented  difference  among  them,  particularly  between  the  generalist  and  the  specialist. 
Generalist  officers  enjoy  more  privileges  and  benefits  and  are  also  afforded  more  power  and 
authority compared with the specialist officers. Such culture has placed a demarcation between the 
powerful  and  the  powerless,  a  status  difference  that  has  caused  grave  disunity  between  them. 
Difference in status refers to dissimilarity in terms of culture as cultural compatibility enhances 
unity among groups of people. Moreover, the positive attitude of society toward power embedded in 
the societal culture of Bangladesh has aggravated the problems of status-oriented difference. Hence, 
cultural compatibility can ensure more coordination.
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In addition, this study has revealed that inter-departmental coordination has become problematic 
due to the lack of cooperation between the generalist and specialist officers. The poor cooperation 
between them is a by-product of the existence of the colonial legacy of supremacy of the generalist 
over others. Implementing an egalitarian service structure, which espouses equality and impartiality, 
can make a difference in the degree to which coordination is achieved.
7.3.6. Policy implementation: what matters?
Policy implementation has been found to be greatly affected when coordination does not take place 
properly among departments involved. In the case of the lack of inter-departmental coordination, 
problems associated with  policy implementation  include  delay in  implementation,  necessity for 
additional time and fund, and poor quality of implementation. 
7.4. Usefulness of theories used in this study:
In order to develop a theoretical framework for describing and analysing the issue of coordination at 
the local level in Bangladesh, attempts were made to establish a relationship between coordination 
and  the  factors  (e.g.,  formal  division  of  labour,  informal  communication,  resources,  and 
organisational culture) that affect coordination. In doing so, the present study has found that formal 
division  of  labour,  resources,  and  informal  communication  are  indeed  useful  in  exploring  and 
analysing the issue of coordination. There is an important role of such factors in ensuring inter-
departmental  coordination.  Moreover,  organisational  culture  was  also  an  important  factor  in 
analysing  the  issue  of  coordination,  owing to  the  role  of  cultural  compatibility  in  establishing 
relationship among organisations. A situation of cultural compatibility really matters in fostering 
inter-departmental coordination. 
7.5. Generalization of the study’s findings
Despite  the  fact  that  the  findings  of  this  study reveal  that  inter-departmental  coordination  is  a 
problematic issue in upazila, it  may not apparently be possible to generalise the findings to the 
entire country since this study was conducted based on a small sample (i.e., a single upazila versus 
the 482 upazilas in Bangladesh at present). However, it is more likely that if this study is applied to 
other upazilas, the study’s findings may be similar because the variables studied in this study are 
homogeneous in nature in terms of country perspective. For example, upazila administration is run 
by rules  and regulations  made by the  central  government,  and  these  rules  and  regulations  are 
equally applicable to all upazilas. Findings such as the supremacy of the administration cadre over 
others, problems of inequality in terms of privileges and benefits between the generalist and the 
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specialist, problems of cultural incompatibility between the generalist and the specialist, and lack of 
performance-based reward system are not unique instances within a single upazila; rather, these are 
rooted in the history of civil service. Other findings such as involvement of the civil servants in 
corruption, lack of skilled manpower, and shortage of manpower are the common problems in all 
public  sectors  in  Bangladesh.  Moreover,  the  Bangladeshi  people  are  homogeneous  in  terms  of 
culture and therefore, cultural differences from societal perspective are common for all upazilas.
7.6. Conclusion and implications for further research 
To sum up, despite the fact that the need for inter-departmental coordination is paramount among 
departments involved in policy implementation, it has neither been a documented issue nor has it 
been made an issue done on ad hoc basis in Bangladesh public administration. This clearly indicates 
that the administrators of the country’s civil service system do not take hold of Fayol’s view on 
coordination, that is, coordination is considered one of the major roles of administrators. This is 
mainly because the government does not look into what is happening to the issue of coordination at 
the local level in Bangladesh. Moreover, this study used coordination both as ends and means. As an 
end, inter-departmental coordination was analysed in terms of role played by independent variables 
(e.g., formal division of labour, resources, informal communication, and organisational culture) in 
ensuring  coordination.  Rural  infrastructure  development  policy  was  examined  when  inter-
departmental  coordination  was  seen  as  means  of  implementing  policy  successfully.  This  study 
reveals that coordination has neither been an end of public administration nor a means of policy 
implementation  in  field  administration  in  Bangladesh.  However,  this  study  indicates  that 
coordination has not been a philosopher’s stone of public administration in Bangladesh; what has 
become important to civil servants is the completion of assigned functions perfunctorily. Thus, the 
issue of inter-departmental coordination can be exemplified by the highly individualistic approach 
of civil servants in carrying out their respective tasks. As a result, policy implementation is delayed, 
time and resources are wasted, and quality is compromised. 
However, the present study makes room for further research, and facilitates more in-depth analysis 
of the research problem by narrowing down the theories, texts, and concepts used. Furthermore, for 
more better understanding of research problem, a comparative study can be done. As coordination is 
interplay of many factors, a study based on quantitative approach can produce more interesting and 
noteworthy findings. Apart from these, since each upazila in Bangladesh, from administrative point 
of  view,  shares  similar  features,  this  study  provides  more  concrete  and  context-dependent 
knowledge, which may also be used to resemble the findings revealed by the study done in future.
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Appendix-A
Research Questionnaire for the Respondents
Designed and conducted by:
   A. H. M. Kamrul Ahsan, Lecturer, Department of Public Administration
University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh (Now on study leave for pursuing   
 Master of Philosophy (M. Phil) in Public Administration, Department of
 Administration and Organization Theory, University of Bergen, Norway.
Part-I
(Questions for the Government Officials)
Discuss  the  importance  of  coordination  while  multiple  departments  are  involved  in  policy 
implementation.
Discuss how coordination takes place in upazila while multiple departments are involved in policy 
implementation.
Do you feel any problem of coordination while you are involved with other departments in policy 
implementation? Please specify.
Discuss  the  major  problems that  you  face  in  ensuring  coordination  in  the  activities  of  various 
departments.
Do you think that problems of coordination affect policy implementation?
[  ] Yes [  ] No
Discuss how lack of coordination or problem of coordination affects policy implementation.
What in your opinion are the mechanisms that may ensure sound coordination among departments 
involved in policy implementation?
Discuss  the  extent  to  which  division  of  labour  is  important  in  ensuring  coordination  among 
departments involved in policy implementation and why.
Discuss about the existing rules which can guide inter-departmental activities in upazila.
Do  you  think  that  lack  of  division  of  labour  creates  problem in  ensuring  coordination  among 
departments involved in policy implementation?
[  ] Yes [  ] No
Discuss how lack of division of labour affects coordination.
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Discuss how funds are important in coordination while multiple departments are involved in policy 
implementation and why.
Which adequate or timely funding is more important in ensuring coordination in upazila?
Discuss how timely funding fosters coordination.
Do you think that funds are disbursed timely in upazila?
[  ] Yes [  ] No
What in your opinion the problems are in untimely disbursement of funds in upazila?
Discuss how skilled human resource is important in coordination while multiple departments are 
involved in policy implementation.
Do you think that there is a lack of skilled human resource in upazila?
[  ] Yes [  ] No
If your answer is yes, give reasons in favour of your answer.
Do you feel problem in coordination due to lack of skilled human resource?
[  ] Yes [  ] No
Discuss how lack of skilled human resource affects coordination.
Do you encounter any problem in coordination due to shortage of human resource?
[  ] Yes [  ] No
Discuss how shortage of human resource affects coordination.
Discuss the extent to which and why informal communication is important in ensuring coordination 
among departments involved in policy implementation.
How does informal communication take place among departments?
How often do you communicate informally with others while you are involved with others in policy 
implementation. Give reasons.
Do  you  face  problems  in  ensuring  coordination  when  there  is  lack  of  frequent  informal 
communication?
Discuss how lack of frequent informal communication affects coordination.
Discuss how you evaluate the term ‘elitism’  in the civil service.
Does elitism make distinction among different cadres in the civil service? Discuss.
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Does cadre distinction in the civil service create problem in ensuring coordination in the activities 
of different cadres? How? Discuss.
Do you have similar working procedures and norms when you are involved in inter-departmental 
activities? 
If your answer is no, do differences in working procedures and norms affect coordination while you 
work with others? How? Discuss.
What  do  you  think  about  the  loyalty  of  officers  in  charge  of  departments  to  the  respective 
departmental head at the district level and the UNO at the upazila? Discuss.
Please  specify  ‘more  loyalty  to  intra-departmental  activities  creates  problems  in  ensuring 
coordination in inter-departmental activities’. 
Discuss how lack of inter-service loyalty or lack of loyalty to inter-departmental activities affects 
inter-departmental coordination.
Do you feel that status of officials influences coordination? 
[  ] Yes [  ] No
Discuss how differences in status affect coordination.
Discuss the reasons behind the lack of cooperation and how it affects coordination.
Discuss about the impact of the lack of inter-departmental coordination on policy implementation.
Part-II
(Questions for the Chairman of Upazila Parishad) 
Discuss  the  importance  of  coordination  while  multiple  departments  are  involved  in  policy 
implementation.
What in your opinion are the mechanisms that may ensure sound coordination among departments 
involved in policy implementation?
Discuss  the  extent  to  which  division  of  labour  is  important  in  ensuring  coordination  among 
departments involved in policy implementation and why.
Discuss about the impact of the lack of inter-departmental coordination on policy implementation.
Part-III
(Questions for the Chairman of Union Parishad)
Discuss  the  importance  of  coordination  while  multiple  departments  are  involved  in  policy 
implementation.
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Do you think that policy is implemented timely in upazila?
What do you think about the quality of policy implementation in upazila?
Discuss about the impact of the lack of inter-departmental coordination on policy implementation.
Part-IV
(Questions for the Contractors)
Discuss  the  importance  of  coordination  while  multiple  departments  are  involved  in  policy 
implementation.
Discuss how funds are important in coordination while multiple departments are involved in policy 
implementation and why.
Do you think that funds are disbursed timely in upazila?
[  ] Yes [  ] No
What in your opinion the problems are in untimely disbursement of funds in upazila?
Do you think that policy is implemented timely in upazila?
Discuss about the impact of lack of inter-departmental coordination on policy implementation.
Part-V
(Questions for General Public)
Do you think that policy is implemented timely in upazila?
What do you think about the quality of policy implementation in upazila?
Appendix-B
Functions of urban local governance (City Corporations and Pourashavas)
The functions assigned to the Pourashavas are quite similar to City Corporation's functions in nature 
without one important difference.  The functions of Pourashava are categorized into two groups 
known as compulsory and optional according to the  Pourashava  Ordinance, 1997. In the case of 
City Corporation, although functions have not been grouped into such classification, there has not 
been  any  significant  change  in  the  texts.  Therefore,  the  functions  of  Pourashavas  and  City 
Corporations can be subject to the classification of compulsory and optional. These categorizations 
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of the functions are delineated below:
a. Mandatory functions
1. Construction and maintenance of roads, bridges and culverts; 
2. Removal, collection and disposal of refuse; 
3. Provision and maintenance of street lighting; 
4. Maintenance of public streets, provision of street watering; 
5. Provision and regulation of water supply; 
6. Establishment and maintenance of public markets; 
7. Plantation of trees on road sides; 
8. Regulation of insanitary buildings 
9. Prevention of infectious diseases and epidemics; 
10. Registration of births, deaths and marriages; 
11. Provision and maintenance of slaughter houses; 
12. Provision and maintenance of drainage; 
13. Control over the construction and reconstruction of buildings; 
14. Provision and maintenance of graveyards and burning places; and
15. Control over traffic and public vehicles (Siddiqui, 1995: 163-64). 
b. Optional functions
1. Checking adulteration of food products; 
2. Control over private markets; 
3. Maintenance of educational institutions and provision of stipends to meritorious students; 
4. Provision of flood and famine relief; 
5. Provision and maintenance of parks and gardens; 
6. Establishment of welfare homes, orphanages, prevention of begging and organization of
   voluntary social welfare services; 
7. Establishment of public dispensaries, provision of public urinals and latrines; 
8. Establishment of veterinary hospitals, registration of cattle sale and improvement of 
livestock; 
9. Celebration of national holidays; 
10. Reception of distinguished visitors; 
11. Establishment of public libraries and reading rooms; 
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12. Promotion of community development schemes; and 
13. Naming of roads and numbering of houses (Siddiqui, 1995: 164).
Functions actually performed
In practice, they cannot perform all these functions because of acute paucity of funds. The functions 
actually performed by the City Corporations as well as Pourashavas are stated below:
1. Construction and maintenance of roads, bridges and culverts; 
2. Removal, collection and disposal of refuse; 
3. Provision and maintenance of street lighting; 
4. Provision of water supply; 
5. Establishment and maintenance of public markets; 
6. Provision, maintenance and regulation of graveyards and burning places; 
7. Registrations of birth, deaths and marriages; 
8. Maintenance of slaughter houses; 
9. Control over private markets; 
10. Provision and maintenance of parks and gardens; 
11. Naming of roads and numbering of houses; and
12. Provision of nominal stipends to primary education institutions (Siddiqui, 1995: 165). 
Functions of rural local governance
A. Functions of Upazila Parishad
The government Resolution of 1982 divided the government functions at the upazila level into two 
distinct categories namely retained subjects or functions and transferred subjects or functions. The 
responsibilities of transferred subjects are given to the upazila parishad and national government 
retained the responsibilities of important subjects at the upazila level. In spite of providing a list of 
retained  subjects,  Resolution  did  not  provide  any  list  of  transferred  subjects.  Later,  functions 
transferred  to  the  upazila  parishad  were  enumerated  in  the  Second  Schedule  of  the  Local 
Government Ordinance, 1982.
a. Transferred subjects or functions
The functions transferred to the upazila parishad are given below:
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1. All development activities at the upazila level; formulation of upazila development plans 
    and programs: and implementation, monitoring and evaluation thereof.
2. Preparation of upazila development plans on the basis of union development plans.
3. Giving assistance and encouragement to the union parishad.
4. Promotion of health, family planning and family welfare.
5. Provision for management of environment.
6. Training of Chairman, members and secretaries of the Union parishads.
7. Implementation of government policies and programs within the upazila.
8. Supervision, control and coordination of functions and officers serving in the upazila 
   except Munsifs, Trying Magistrates and Officers engaged in regulatory functions.
9. Promotion of socio-cultural activities.
10. Promotion and encouragement of employment generating activities.
11. Such other functions as may be specified by the government from time to time.
12. Promotion and extension of cooperative movement in the upazila.
13. Assistance to the Zilla Parishad in development activities.
14. Planning and execution of all rural public works programs.
15. Promotion of agricultural activities for maximizing production.
16. Promotional of educational and vocational activities.
17. Promotion of livestock, fisheries and forest (Rahman, 2000: 71-72).
b. Regulatory or retained subjects or functions
Functions retained by the government at the upazila level are as follows:
1. Maintenance of law and order.
2. Civil and criminal judiciary.
3. Administration and management of central revenues like income tax, customs, excise,  
     land revenue, land tax etc.
4. Maintenance of essential supplies.
5. Large scale industries.
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6. Irrigation schemes involving more than one district.
7. Mining and mineral development.
8. Generation and distribution of electric power.
9. Technical education and all other education above primary level.
10. Modernized district hospitals and hospitals attached to medical colleges.
11. Inter-district and inter-upazila means of communication.
12. Flood control and development of water resources.
13. Compilation of national statistics (Faizullah, 1987: 104).
B. Functions of Union Parishad
The functions undertaken by union parishad are as follows:
1. Maintenance of law and order and assistance of administration in the maintenance of law 
and order;
2. Adoption of measures for preventing disorder and smuggling;
3. Adoption and implementation of  development  schemes in agriculture,  forestry,  fisheries, 
animal husbandry, education, health, cottage industries, communication, irrigation and flood 
protection for the economic and social upliftment of the people;
4.  promotion of family planning;
5. Implementation of such development schemes as may be assigned by the upazila parishad;
6. Development of local resources and their use;
7. Protection and maintenance of public property, such as roads, bridges, canals, embankments, 
telephones and electricity lines;
8. Review of the development activities of all agencies at the union level and the making of 
recommendations to the upazila parishad in regard to their activities;
9. Motivation and persuasion of the people to install sanitary latrines;
10. Registration of births, deaths, beggars and destitutes;
11. Conducting of census of all kind (Siddiqui, 1995: 157-58).
